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INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the most critical antitrust issue of the
new century: how to regulate competition in Internet, medical,
media, telecommunications, computer hardware and software, and
other high technology markets. The form of such regulation will
have implications beyond the high technology sector. During the
1990s, high technology innovations became the greatest drivers of
U.S. economic growth. Traditional industrial firms began to use
high technology to enhance their productivity.1 New Internet
software allowed firms to adapt their purchasing and production
schedules to meet changing demand, thus smoothing out the peaks
and valleys of the economic cycle. Linchpins of the "old economy,"
such as Ford and General Motors, began to collaborate in business-
to-business (B2B) e-commerce ventures that allowed them to sell
products and purchase supplies online.2 A 1999 survey found that
1. High technology products caused most of the improvement in American workers'
productivity during the latter half of the 1990s. Many economists believe that such
productivity is "the single most important factor affecting our economic well-being." Willow
A. Sheremata, Barriers to Innovation: A Monopoly, Network Externalities, and the Speed of
Innovation, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 937, 937 (1997) (quoting PAUL KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF
DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS: ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990s, at 17 (1990)); see also Louis
Uchitelle, Notions of New Economy Hinge on Pace of Productivity Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2001, at Al ("Productivity is the principal contributor to economic growth."). As one
commentator recently pointed out, 'There is little doubt that technology is somehow
responsible for it all." Steve Liesman, Productivity Gains Extend Beyond Technology Area,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8,2001, at A3; see also Richard W. Stevenson, The Boom is Over: What's
Next, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3. According to Stevenson:
[T]echnology [in the 1990s] really was transforming the economy in concrete
ways-in particular by helping to drive a resurgence in productivity, or the
ability to produce more for less. After languishing for two decades, the growth
rate of productivity-the single best indicator of an economy's ability to expand
in a sustainable way-began accelerating around 1995.
Id.
2. Michael Totty, The Next Phase, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2001, at R8 (describing B2B
among automobile companies and supply-chain management improvements made possible
by the Internet and by new software); see David Leonhardt, Wall Street Still Sees No Wolves
in its Midst, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, § 3 (Money & Business), at 4 ("[Clompanies are
making decisions more quickly as a result of computer systems that give them up-to-date
information about their business.... [C]ompanies have used this knowledge to cut jobs and
hours more rapidly than in the past, laying the groundwork for a fast recovery."). A B2B
involves a collaboration among competitors to develop and operate an Internet website for
the sale of the parties' products or for the purchase of raw materials and other inputs used
in the manufacturing process. Robert B. Bell & William F. Adkinson, Antitrust Issues Raised
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American executives believed that they had exploited "only half of
the potential of high-tech."' Thus, continued productivity gains
across the breadth of the U.S. economy could be at risk if antitrust
policy does not create an environment conducive to high technology
investments.
There is currently considerable debate about whether aggressive
antitrust enforcement helps or hinders the development of high
technology. That debate will be joined sharply in two cases whose
outcome could determine the future control of the Internet: AOL
Time Warner's pending monopolization suit against Microsoft'
(AOL) and the final remedial phase of the most recent of three cases
brought by the government against Microsoft5 (Microsoft III). A
recent Wall Street Journal editorial posed the high technology
dilemma as follows:
It's increasingly clear that products whose primary value lies in
intellectual property-products such as software, pharma-
ceuticals, movies, records and many of the other things that
drive today's economy-are fundamentally different from staples
of the industrial economy such as autos and steel, or service-
by B2B Exchanges, 15 ANTITRUST, Fall 2000, at 18, 18; see also David H. Evans, B2Bs---A
Technical Perspective, 15 ANTITRUST, Fall 2000, at 45, 45 (describing B2B as "a place in
cyberspace where buyers and sellers come together to trade in goods and services").
3. Greg ip & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Did Greenspan Push High-Tech Optimism on
Growth too Far?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2001, at Al.
4. AOL Time Warner filed its complaint against Microsoft through its subsidiary,
Netscape Communications Corporation, which it acquired in 1999. See Complaint in
Netscape Communications Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Related to Civil Action Nos. 98-1232 and
98-1233 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22, 2002).
5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) thereinafter Microsoft
III]. As the District of Columbia Circuit Court pointed out in Microsoft III, "We decide this
case against a backdrop of significant debate amongst academics and practitioners over the
extent to which 'old economy' ... [antitrust) doctrines should apply to firms competing in
dynamic technological markets .... " Id. at 49. There were two earlier government cases
against Microsoft. In the original case, fied in 1994, the government alleged that Microsoft
unlawfully maintained a monopoly in the operating systems market through anticompetitive
terms in its licensing and software development agreements. The case was settled in a
consent decree. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter
Microsoft I]. In the second case, the Government filed a civil contempt action alleging that
Microsoft had violated one of the provisions of the consent decree by bundling its Internet
Explorer web browser with its operating system. The District of Columbia Circuit Court held
that Microsoft did not violate the consent decree. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d
935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Microsoft II].
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economy products such as banking and insurance. And those
fundamental differences are wreaking havoc with traditional
6notions of economics that underlie antitrust laws ....
Some observers argue that the antitrust laws were designed to
regulate competition in traditional industrial markets, where the
effects of technological changes are relatively measured and
predictable. When regulators understand the economic effects of
particular conduct, they can condemn or approve it with relative
confidence.' The courts and antitrust enforcement agencies, how-
ever, comprehend little about the ultimate economic effects of high
technology.8 They may therefore unintentionally preclude the
development of promising new products by overregulating high
technology industries.9 Firms may be less willing to invest in
6. Alan Murray, Intellectual Property: Old Rules Don't Apply, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,
2001, at Al. The dilemmas of high technology antitrust enforcement were evident in the
difficult decisions faced by the U.S. Department of Justice in prosecuting its most recent case
against Microsoft in the fall of 2001. On one hand, the government feared that Microsoft
would be able to hinder innovation in competing products if it were able to bundle new
applications into the newest version ofits operating system, Windows XP. On the other hand,
if the government succeeded in keeping Windows XP offthe market, it might harm the entire
high technology sector of the economy, which was counting on Windows XP to jump start new
sales of personal computers. Ted Birdis & Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft Judge Signals
Hearing May be Long, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2001, at A3. In a recent New York Times article
David Pogue explained:
[Windows XPI is designed for very young, high-octane PC's ... and if it's a hit,
the net effect is likely to be a wave of PC buying and upgrading. No wonder that
executives at PC makers are walking around with dilated pupils and moist
palms, hailing Windows XP as the savior that will deliver us from the tech
slump, the recession and probably world hunger.
David Pogue, Windows XP: Microsoft's New Look for Fall, in Size =2L, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2001, at D1.
7. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Does Antitrust Have a Competitive Advantage?, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLN 5, 8 (2000) (stating that regulators can "condemn or approve [conduct with
clear competitive effects] out of hand").
8. See Adam Liptak, Millions for Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at 10 ("Courts,
which are rarely competent to regulate technology to begin with, surely cannot do it on a
schedule entirely divorced from the pace of technical development.").
9. See Seth Schiesel, Bringing Competition into the Age of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
25, 2000, at Cl ("Many of the analytical and intellectual tools that competition authorities
use these days were developed for slow-changing industries like manufacturing. But these
methods may not be up to the task of dealing equitably with technology sectors where the
competitive landscape can change significantly from year to year."); David Wessel, Measuring
Bush as Regulator in Chief, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2001, at Al ("New technologies are altering
almost every industry and challenging a government apparatus that was crafted to ease the
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high technology if they fear that they will be penalized for their
success.'0 As Judge Frank Easterbrook has stated, "People are
quick to condemn what they do not understand. Hasty or un-
informed judgments may condemn novel practices just because of
their novelty."" Former Federal Communications Commission
Chairman William Kennard has explained how regulatory restraint
freed firms to make the investments necessary for the development
of the Internet: "The best decision government ever made with the
Internet was the decision the FCC made 15 years ago not to impose
regulation on it.... It was intentional restraint born of humility." 2
In its 1998 Microsoft II decision, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court declined to find Microsoft liable for tying its Internet
browser to its "Windows" operating system, pointing out that since
courts have limited competence in evaluating high technology
product designs, they should be "wary of second-guessing the
claimed benefits of a particular design decision."' 8
Some commentators have argued that antitrust enforcement
is less necessary in high technology industries then in more
traditional markets. They emphasize that the pace of technological
change is so swift, and so transforming, that no firm can hold
monopoly power in a high technology market for a meaningful
period.' 4 The "paradigm shifts" that occur in such markets "enable
transition from the agricultural to the industrial age. New ways of doing things require new
rules of the road.... Poorly conceived rules can stunt development of promising
technologies.").
10. See David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis
in High.Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 809 (1998) (noting that "efforts to
hobble the winner in one round of innovations will be seen as diminishing the returns
available from competing in such high-risk environments, thereby diverting resources to
other sectors of the economy displaying less risk and affording less innovation.').
11. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 8; see also Fred L. Smith, Jr., The Case For Reforming
the Antitrust Regulations (If Repeal is not an Option), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 43
(2000). Smith predicts that
this confusion will most likely occur in the frontier sectors of the economy,
where innovations dominate. In other words, antitrust regulation will most
likely go awry in newer, more complex areas of the economy where disruption
is high. Populist confusion and reactionary dismay-the dominant forces
driving political predation-are also likely in these areas.
Id.
12. James K Glassman, The FCC's Dangerous Internet Precedent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
2001, at A26.
13. Microsoft II, 147 F.3d 930, 950 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
14. See, e.g., John Schwartz, The Land of Monopolies, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2001, § 4 (Week
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new entrants to upset the existing order" more quickly and more
effectively than could any court or administrative agency.' 5 Since
high technology industries are self-correcting for market power,
there is no need to risk the potential adverse effects of antitrust
enforcement.
Many commentators and government enforcers insist, however,
that antitrust can help ensure the efficiency of high technology
industries. Robert Pitofsky, a former Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission, argues that the relevant issues in high
technology industries are no different than those which antitrust
has traditionally addressed: that is, the adverse effects of cartels
and the abuse of monopoly power.1" An October 2000 study
conducted by the staff of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC Staff
Report) concluded that B2Bs "are amenable to traditional antitrust
analysis."17 Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut's Attorney General,
recently claimed that the District of Columbia Circuit Court's
decision in Microsoft III constituted "a sweeping and historic
victory, not only for this case but also for the application of
antitrust laws in the technology sector and the New Economy."1 8
Even advocates of less aggressive enforcement policies have
concluded that antitrust has a role to play in high technology
markets. Judge Richard A. Posner, a respected antitrust scholar
and jurist of the more conservative "Chicago School,"1 9 has opined
that "antitrust doctrine is supple enough, and its commitment to
in Review), at 3 ("Some commentators ... point to the fact that the technology market is so
volatile that today's monopolist is tomorrow's loser-lessons learned by the makers of such
products as Lotus 1-2-3 and Wordstar, which once dominated their worlds.").
15. See Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at 809 (observing that "paradigm shifts
periodically enable new entrants to upset the existing order-something rather rare in
mature industries.").
16. See Joel M. Mitnick, A Structural Approach to Analyzing Competition in B2B e-
Commerce, 15 ANTITRUST, Fall 2000, at 31, 32 (referring to Pitofsky's argument that "the
antitrust issues arising in the high technology context are the same issues that antitrust has
traditionally addressed").
17. FTC, ENTERING THE 21"' CENTuRY: COMPETmON POLICY IN THE WORLD OF B2B
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES, Executive Summary, at 2, at http:/www.ftc.gov/0s/2000/10/
b26report.pdf (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT].
18. Ted Birdis, Microsoft Ruling: A High Antitrust Test, WALL ST. J., July 2,2001, at B4.
19. For a discussion ofthe development ofthe "Chicago School" approach to antitrust, see
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated
Restrictions on Distribution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 n.6 (1988).
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economic rationality strong enough, to take in stride the com-
petitive issues presented by the new economy.""
Unfortunately, the courts have established confusing and
inconsistent standards for the regulation of high technology
competition.2' The courts' analytical failure could have profound
implications for the American economy in the twenty-first century
as firms are deterred from investing in high technology.22 It is
critical that the courts adopt a new approach that gives clearer
guidance on the types of high technology competition that will be
permitted or precluded. As a recent editorial in the Wall Street
Journal pointed out, "In a world where intellectual property serves
as the source of greatest value, antitrust policy ... may turn out to
be more important than ever before. That means the government
and the courts face a greater challenge to get it right."28
The greatest threat to competition in high technology markets
stems from exclusionary conduct undertaken by joint ventures and
by individual firms with monopoly power. Since its enactment in
1898, the Sherman Act has set forth the standards for judging such
conduct. Section 1 of the Act deals with relationships among
competitors, prohibiting "[e]very contract, combination ... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade ..... 24 Section 2 makes it illegal for
any firm to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize" interstate
commerce.25 Although originally designed for traditional industries
such as steel, railroads, and oil, these standards are just as
applicable to today's computer hardware and software, tele-
communications, and e-commerce firms. In fact, two antitrust
doctrines developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century are particularly appropriate for twenty-first century high
technology firms. Both of these doctrines recognized that the
objective of antitrust is not to dictate the outcome of the com-
petitive struggle, but simply to ensure that the competitive process
20. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in theNew Economy, 68ANTITRUSTL.J. 925,925(2001).
21. See infra notes 134-35, 253-86, and accompanying text.
22. See Steven Syre & Charles Stein, Next New Thing Will Have to be Optimism, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 13,2001, at C2 ("The soul of the [high technology economy is the ability
and willingness to take bigger risks....") (quoting MICHAEL MANDEL, THE COMING INTERNET
DEPRESSION (2000)).
23. Murray, supra note 6, at Al.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
25. Id. § 2.
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is conducted fairly. Thus, antitrust regulation should be concerned
more with the conduct of firms than with the structure of markets.
The "essential facilities doctrine," established in 1912, did not
outlaw monopolies, but merely precluded them from arbitrarily
denying competitors access to their resources. 26 Similarly, the
"ancillary restraints doctrine," which dates back to 1898, did not
forbid firms from collaborating injoint ventures, but simply forbade
them from conspiring to limit competition in areas outside the
legitimate scope of their venture.27
Such precedent provides a basis for regulating today's high
technology industries. The courts should recognize that it is in-
evitable, and even beneficial, for individual firms and joint ventures
to obtain market power in high technology markets. The problem
with high technology monopolies and joint ventures stems not from
their existence but from their conduct. Instead. of precluding such
monopolies and joint ventures, the courts should ensure that they
do not engage in conduct that unduly perpetuates or extends their
market power.
Such a conduct-based approach to high technology competition
plays to the federal judiciary's strengths. Judges and juries are
adept at determining the purpose and motivation for defendants'
conduct. They are "well suited to the task of holding individual
firms accountable for their conduct."' It is a task they face every
day in resolving legal disputes. Courts, however, have little
competence to determine the structure of markets or the precise
economic effects of agreements among competitors. Fortunately, a
defendant's purpose for engaging in certain behavior usually can be
counted upon to reveal its likely impact on competition. 29 By
concentrating on such a purpose, the federal courts can distinguish
more effectively between the competitive abuses that should be
deterred and the innovative conduct that should be encouraged in
high technology markets.
Part I of this Article describes the tendency of high technology
markets to confer a durable form of monopoly power on the first
26. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
28. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economic and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the
Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust? , 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1224 (1977).
29. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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firm to successfully commercialize a new product. Part II explains
how collaborations among competitors have the ability both to
mitigate and to reinforce this trend to monopoly. Part III describes
a proposed new means of analyzing high technology competition.
Part IV explains how the approach would apply to particular types
of monopoly conduct by high technology firms, and Part V applies
the approach to high technology joint ventures. Part VI explains
how certain types of collaborations would be treated under the
proposed approach. Part VII describes the proposed analysis of
restraints on competition among the partners to high technology
joint ventures, and Part VIII sets forth a proposed approach to the
monopoly conduct of high technology joint ventures.
I. THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY
MARKETS
High technology markets have unique economic characteristics
that distinguish them from traditional industrial markets. As
former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky has stated, "High tech ...
markets, are different .... The kind of static analysis that we often
have applied in the past ... is in fact unlikely to be fully adequate to
take high tech into account."8"
A. Initial Competition for the Market
High technology markets are defined by their rapid pace of
innovation. Technological breakthroughs can alter markets almost
overnight. The explosion in computing power has shortened the
time required to develop a new product or to copy a rival's product.
"Moore's Law" is often used to describe the increasingly rapid
pace of change: the power of a silicon chip will double every
eighteen to twenty-four months, accelerating the rate of tech-
nological advances."1 C.K. Prahalad, a professor at the University
of Michigan Business School, has pointed out that the "[t]ime lines
30. Schiesel, supra note 9, at C3.
31. Five Questions for Gordon E. Moore: Technology Intensifies the Law of Change, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2001, § 3 (Money & Business), at 4. Moore's Law is named after Gordon E.
Moore, a co-founder of Fairchild Semiconductor, who described the phenomenon in a 1965
article in Electronics Magazine. Id.
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which used to be measured in 5- to 10- year periods are now down
to 2 years .... 2 The acceleration of technological cycles is evident in
the time it took Americans to adopt four major technologies-the
telephone, the television, the personal computer, and the Internet.
It took forty years for 30% of Americans to own a telephone,
seventeen years for 30% of Americans to own a television, thirteen
years for 30% of Americans to own a personal computer, and only
seven years for 30% of Americans to come online on the Internet."3
Because of the rapid pace of innovation, firms participating
in high technology markets are subject to greater risks and
potentially can reap greater rewards than firms in more traditional
industrial markets. Competition is intense, and success is un-
certain for firms at the initial stage of a high technology product
cycle. The innovation that occurs in high technology markets
frequently causes major paradigm shifts. Andy Grove, the CEO of
Intel, refers to these shifts as "major inflexion points."' Firms that
do not correctly predict the next product that will catch consumers'
fancies will fail. Indeed, in most high technology markets, only one
or a very few firms can be successful. However, for those firms that
do succeed, the rewards can be enormous. As they mature, high
32. David Leonhardt, Uneasy Pieces in an Era of Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,2000, § 3
(Money & Business), at 1.
33. Daniel J. Meckstroth, MANUFACTURERS'ALLIANCE/MAPI, How New B2B E-Business
Strategies are Changing Manufacturing, Jan., 2001, at 2 (on file with author) [hereinafter
MAPI REPOIRT). There are many examples of creative destruction in high technology markets.
Henderson and Clark studied five generations in the semiconductor photolithographic
alignment equipment industry, and they concluded that no firm that led in one generation
figured prominently in the next. Rebecca M. Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural
Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of
Established Firms, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 9 (1990); see also Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at
805 (discussing Henderson and Clark's study). Xerox's control over the copier market, for
example, evaporated in the 1970s. See Kevin Dooley, The Paradigms of Quality: Evolution
and Revolution in the History of the Discipline, at http'/www.eas.asu/-kdooley/papers/
qualityparadigm.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2002) (referring to the decline in Xerox's share of
the U.S. copier market from ninety-six to forty-six percent in the 1970s). In the 1980s and
1990s IBM lost much of its dominance in computers due to advances in microchip technology
that allowed personal computers to do the work ofmainframes at a fraction of the cost. David
L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL.
859, 875 (Fall-Winter 1998). Some commentators argue that even the dominance of
Microsoft's Windows operating system is now being eroded by the growth of the Internet.
Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, Rethinking Antitrust, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2001, at
A22;
34. Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at 804.
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technology markets tend to coalesce around single products that
create the standard for an entire industry. Firms that bet correctly
on the next paradigm 'shift can reap the traditional benefits of
monopoly power: high prices, healthy profit margins, and relative
immunity from new entrants.3" Consider Xerox in copier machines
in the 1970s, IBM in mainframe computers in the 1980s, and
Microsoft in operating systems in the 1990s. Because of the
advantages that will accrue to the "first mover" to be successful in
a network market, there is likely to be fierce competition among
firms for the ultimate winner-take-all position. 3 This early
competition is often referred to as "competition for the market." 7 As
one commentator explained, "Like purchasers of lottery tickets,
companies seem even more eager to compete when they know the
winner will take all. Instead of competing on price, they compete by
innovating, and trying to leapfrog old technologies.""
Thus, in high technology markets, antitrust regulators must
walk a fine line between overenforcement and underenforcement.
At the initial stages of a high technology market, the courts and
agencies must avoid regulation that discourages firms from
competing to capture the market. In mature high technology
markets, however, antitrust enforcers should be more willing to
35. See William J. Holstein, To Gauge the Internet, Listen to the Steam Engine, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 26,2001, § 3 (Money & Business), at 5 ("If you get on the right bandwagon, you
get enormously rich. Of course, guessing the right horse is very difficult, especially when
there are 10,000 horses in the race.") (quoting author John Steele Gordon).
36. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and
the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 169 (1999) ("The market's
tendency to tip makes the early competition in network markets with incompatible standards
particularly intense."); William J. Kolasky, Jr. & William F. Adkinson, Jr., Single Firm
Conduct: Who's Big?. What's Bad?, Presentation Before the American Bar Association Section
of Antitrust Law 30 (Apr. 15, 1999) (on file with author) ("If the ultimate market outcome is
likely to be a monopoly of the surviving firm, with the opportunity to earn substantial rents,
competition among firms to be the survivor will be intense.").
37. See Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Effects of Antitrust and Intellectual
Property Law on Compatibility and Innovation, 43 A MTrITUST BULL. 609, 611 (1998)
(observing that "when fims recognize the possibility of tipping, they may compete vigorously
to become the dominant supplier: so-called competition for the market").
38. Alan Murray, For Policy Makers, Microsoft Suggests Need to Recast Models, WALL
ST. J., June 9, 2000, at Al. Michael Powell, the Chairman of the FCC, has pointed out that
in high technology industries the incentive of potential monopoly power encourages
investment: "Companies that invest the money and take the risks need to be able to reap the
rewards for a while, or else they lose all incentive to innovate .... " Yochi J. Dreazen, FCCs
Powell Quickly Marks Agency as His Own, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2001, at A28.
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intervene to prevent dominant firms from using their market power
to raise already substantial entry barriers.
B. The Trend to Monopoly in Mature Markets
Although competition is often intense at the initial stage of a
high technology product cycle, it is likely to slacken, or even
disappear, as the market matures. In fact, the natural evolution of
most high technology markets is from competition to monopoly.
This trend to monopoly occurs as a result of the "network effects"
present in most high technology markets.
A network includes any system "that structures and facilitates
the exchange of information, money, goods, or services among
individuals or firms." 9 Networks control many high technology
markets. Indeed, one commentator recently opined that "[tihe
extraordinary innovations of our modern world are increasingly
the result of networks .... ' Examples include the Internet, B2Bs,
telecommunications systems, computer operating systems, trans-
portation systems, stock exchanges, and ATM and credit card
systems. Users of networks benefit from the ability to access and
connect with each other."1 By adopting uniform standards for
interconnection, networks assure that all participants can use the
system on equal terms.
Because networks can only operate effectively under a single
standard, they tend to vest dominant market power in the firm that
owns the standard, leaving little, if any, room in the relevant
market for other players. As one commentator pointed out, "You
either win big-like Microsoft-or lose big-like the pile of dot-coin
carcasses building up in Nasdaq's wreckage. In these industries,
there is no Avis."'2 Many observers believe that monopolies are
inevitable in network markets because of consumers' demand for
39. William H. Pratt et al., Refusals to Deal in the Context of Network Joint Ventures, 52
BUS. LAW. 531, 533 (1997).
40. George L. Priest, ARuling for 'Predators--and Consumers, WALLST.J., May3,2001,
at A18.
41. See A. Douglas Melarned, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 147, 149 (2000) (describing how network users "can access and benefit from one
another").
42. Murray, supra note 6.
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one compatible technical standard.4 The tendency of network
markets to coalesce around a single standard is often referred to as
the "tipping" effect." Once a particular standard gains enough
acceptance to be perceived by most consumers as the ultimate
technological winner, the market "tips" and consumers migrate to
that standard en masse.' Early users of a particular network often
"join in anticipation of other users hopping on the bandwagon at a
later date."" Even "[ii nferior products win if they are expected to do
so."47 There are many examples of network markets that started out
as competitive but ultimately came to be dominated by one or a few
firms. In the video recording market, the VHS format achieved such
an advantage over the Beta format,"' and in computer operating
systems, Microsoft prevailed over IBM, Apple Computer, and
Novell. 49
The trend to monopoly in high technology markets is aug-
mented by a set of circumstances that economists call "network
externalities." This phenomenon results from the fact that the
43. See David A. Balto & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New
Challenge, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 583, 604 (1998) ("In industries characterized by networks
even monopoly is seen by some observers as inevitable and merely an accommodation to
consumer demand for a compatible technical standard."); Rubinfeld, supra note 33, at 876
("With consumer preferences for uniformity in products and compatibility in complementary
products, dominant firms operating with a single standard are likely to develop in dynamic
network industries."); Steve Lohr, Open Windows: The New Math of Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9,2000, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 ("[Network markets] tend to naturally evolve toward
one or two dominant companies (think Cisco in routers for Internet data or eBay in online
auctions). They control the technology standards in their markets.").
44. See Sheremata, supra note 1, at 958.
45. See id. (describing how "[olne standard eventually dominates" in network markets);
Paul Krugman, Rights of Bill, N.Y. TIMS, Apr. 9,2000, § 4 (Week in Review), at 17 ("High-
tech competition naturally and necessarily looks like a series ofwinner-take-all tournaments,
in which 'all' means a temporary monopoly that lasts until something dramatically better
comes along."); see also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything.
The Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 721 (1998)
("(OInce consumers perceive that a de facto standard has been established, tipping will occur
very quickly.").
46. Balto & Pitofsky, supra note 43, at 588.
47. Sheremata, supra note 1, at 958; see also id. at 954 (describing how "consumers will
get 'locked into' the first product that appears on a new platform, even when the product is
technologically inferior").
48. See Sheremata, supra note 1, at 958 (pointing out that "VHS dominated Beta
formats").
49. See Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust
Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J., 1163, 1229 n.270 (1996).
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benefits to a particular user increase in direct proportion to the
number of other users in the network.50 As a network expands, its
users can communicate with a greater number of fellow members.
Consumers are naturally attracted to successful networks because
of their greater utility. Network externalities thus reinforce the
market power of a dominant network. A telephone system is more
valuable if it is connected to a larger number of telephones. Stock
exchanges gain their utility by bringing together the maximum
number of buyers and sellers of public securities. An ATM system
is more attractive to consumers if several different charge cards can
be used at a single access point.5 ' Consumers subscribe to a
dominant Internet access provider such as AOL because they want
to be able to communicate with the widest range of other users.52
Computer operating systems, such as Microsoft's Windows
program, become more valuable as additional applications are
50. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999)
[hereinafter Microsoft III-Findings of Fact] ('A positive network effect is a phenomenon by
which the attractiveness of a product increases with the number of people using it."); Lemley
& McGowan, supra note 45, at 718 ("In other words, a network effect exists if the consumer
finds a good more valuable as additional consumers use the same good."); Sheremata, supra
note 1, at 952 ("Direct network externalities exist when the value of a good to any user is a
function of network size."); MAPI RPORT, supra note 33, at 4 (noting that "Robert Metcalfe,
designer of the Ethernet protocol and founder of 3Corn, calculated the 'network effect' in this
way: the value of a network equals the square of the number of members on the network.).
Timothy Muris, the current Chairman of the FTC, has argued, however, that there is simply
no empirical evidence supporting the network effects theory. See Timothy J. Muris, GTE
Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 908 (2001)
(claiming that "empirical evidence supporting this strong version of the network effects
theory is lacking").
51. See David A. Balto, The Murky World of Network Mergers: Searching for the
Opportunities for Network Competition, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 793, 846 (1997) ("[A]s an ATM
network expands the number of its financial institution members and ATMs, its value to
network cardholders increases due to the greater accessibility of their deposit accounts.").
52. See Alan Murray, In the New Economy, You've Got Scale, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2000,
at Al ("[Nietwork businesses often become more valuable to their customers the bigger they
get. Adolescents want AOL so they can chat with their buddies ...."). John Schwartz offered
one example, explaining that
Itihe power of the network effect can be seen in technologies like America
Online's Instant Messenger. Once teens realized that they could gab after
school online, it became a must-have ... and its use exploded, rapidly bringing
AOL a near-lock on a market of more than 100 million people.
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 3. Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has used the
example of a fax machine to describe network externalities: "If there is only one, 'it is best
used as a doorstop.' But ifthere are 100,000, 'that is 10 billion possible connections." Murray,
supra note 38, at AS.
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developed to run on a particular system.53 In the case of credit card
systems, "the more cardholders in the system, the more attractive
the system is to merchants.... [Tihe more merchants in the system,
the more attractive the card is to cardholders."5 '
The trend to monopoly is particularly pronounced in e-commerce
markets, which link thousands or millions of users. The Internet
has been referred to as a "land grab," in which the first dominant
player in a market "walks off with most of the booty."5 As one
commentator has pointed out, "it's all about being the lead player,
and success breeds success.... This process is self-reinforcing, so the
strong get stronger."56 Furthermore, the number one player in e-
commerce markets often reaps the greatest stock market
valuations, giving it an advantage over its competitors in pursuing
acquisitions to consolidate its market power.57 Some consultants
refer to the competitive difficulties of secondary players in e-
commerce markets as "the plight of the silver medalist."8
The trend to monopoly is evident in the recent consolidation of
various B2B markets. 9 The larger a B2B, the more likely it is to
attract participants. 60 The advantages of economies of scale in a
B2B purchasing venture, for example, encourage firms to join the
largest B2B in the relevant market.6 ' This creates "a real potential
for the market for exchange services to 'tip' in favor of the exchange
that emerges as the early leader or with the most impressive array
53. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
54. Nat'l Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1260 (S.D. Fla. 1984),
affd, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986).
55. Bernard Wysocki, Jr., No. 1 Can be Runaway Even in a Tight Race, WALL ST. J., June
28, 1999, at Al.
56. Id. (quoting Cornell University economics professor Robert H. Frank).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. One commentator has pointed out that B2B markets are "moving from a period of
manic innovation into a period of consolidation and standardization." Kenneth W. Gilpin,
Technology Wreckage: Yes, More to Come, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, § 3 (Money & Business),
at 7 (quoting Roger McNamee, General Partner, Integral Capital Partners).
60. As the FTC Staff Report points out:
[Iln B2B marketplaces, network effects are present where the more buyers
there are in a particular marketplace, the more likely any given seller will be
to find a buyer and get a good price, and likewise for buyers being able to
purchase necessary goods and services with more sellers in the marketplace.
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 1, at 20.
61. See infra note 371 and accompanying text.
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of initial participants." 2 Indeed, since January 2000, many B2B
exchanges have gone out of business."3 With more transaction
volume concentrated in a few firms, it will become more difficult for
new B2Bs to enter these markets."' Thus, B2B markets appear to
be fulfilling the forecast of many economists who "have long
predicted that the New Economy would promote a concentration of
the market in the hands of a small number of competitors. " 5
C. High Technology Monopolies' Effects on Consumers
From the days of the early English common law, monopolies
have been considered harmful because they raise prices, reduce
output, and hamper innovation.6 Modern economists emphasize
that monopolies misallocate and waste economic resources.67 To
the extent that monopolists can price products in excess of the
level that would prevail in a competitive market, they are able to
bring about a transfer of wealth from consumers to themselves.6"
62. Bell & Adkinson, supra note 2, at 19; see also Roundtable on B2B Exchanges, 15
ANTITRUST, Fall 2000, at 8, 10 (comments of Professor Sunil Gupta, Graduate School of
Business, Columbia University) (i[There is an impression that due to network effects there
will be one dominant exchange in every industry.").
63. See Lee Gomes, How Lower-Tech Gear Beat Web 'Exchanges' at Their Own Game,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2001, at Al ("[Miany exchanges have shut down, and virtually all the
rest are badly behind in implementing their business plans.").
64. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 2, at 20 (describing rising barriers to
entry in B2B markets).
65. Greg Ip, Blame the Profit Dive on a Marked Change in Companies' Costs, WALL ST.
J., May 16, 2001, at Al; see also Kara Swisher, The Beast and the Borg Take to the Ring,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 2001, at BI (referring to "several recent studies showing a continued
dramatic contraction of the Internet industry and a troubling trend of domination by only a
few huge companies, particularly AOL and Microsoft").
66. In the Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (IB. 1603), which involved the
monopolization of the playing card market, Lord Coke concluded that the vices of monopoly
were that
the price of the same commodity will be raised, for he who has the sole selling
of any commodity, may and will make the price as he pleases.... [And] the
[quality of the] commodity is not so good and merchantable as it was before: for
[he who has] the sole trade, regards only his private benefit, and not the
common wealth.
Id. at 1263.
67. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989)
(describing wealth transfer from consumers to monopolists).
68. See id. Furthermore, a "deadweight loss" occurs in monopoly markets because a
monopolist has the ability unilaterally to reduce output in order to increase prices. Id. Since
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Consider the local cable and telephone markets in the United
States, where most firms still hold monopoly power.69 In the
absence of competition, these providers have had little incentive to
lower prices or to improve their service. 0 In fact, since 1996, cable
rates in the United States have risen almost three times as fast as
the rate of inflation.7 Comparative prices in the local and long-
distance telephone markets illustrate the differences between
monopoly and competitive markets. In long-distance telephone
markets, where several firms compete to provide service, prices
have declined almost thirty-four percent since 1984, but in local
telephone markets, where the "Baby Bells" have retained their
monopoly power, prices have increased over seventy percent in that
same period.72
Many antitrust commentators believe that monopolists have
less incentive to innovate than firms which lack such market power.
In 1945, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA), 73
Judge Learned Hand emphasized that monopoly power "deadens
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; ... the spur of
constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition
to let well enough alone."74 Some economic studies have indicated
that monopolists engage in less research and development than
the monopolist makes no profit on the output it does not produce, a portion of the wealth
taken away from consumers is not transferred to the monopolist but is simply "lost." Id. at
14 (describing "wealth that is taken away from consumers but which is not given to the
monopolist"). Some economists argue that society as a whole is not harmed by the mere
transfer of wealth from consumers to monopolists, because there is no efficiency loss. The
only loss to society occurs from the deadweight loss, which eliminates wealth that would
otherwise be generated if resources were allocated more efficiently. Id.
69. "[Flewer than 5% of the residential customers in the U.S. have a choice of local-
service companies." C. Michael Armstrong, Break Up the Baby Bells!, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28,
2001, at A22.
70. Jared Sandburg, The Big Telecom Disconnect, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2001, at B1
("Lacking competition, incumbent cable and phone companies have been raising prices, and
they have relatively little pressure to improve shoddy service.").
71. Rebecca Blumenstein, Reform Act Hasn't Delivered Promises to Customers, WALL ST.
J., May 3, 2001, at B1.
72. Seth Schiesel, Sitting Pretty: How Baby Bells May Conquer Their World, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2001, § 3 (Money & Business), at 1.
73. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
74. Id. at 427.
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firms in competitive markets and that new products are developed
more efficiently by smaller firms.7 5
Despite the potential problems with monopoly power, con-
sumers are not always disadvantaged when a firm dominates a
particular market. Indeed, in certain respects, monopolies can
benefit consumers. The prospect of obtaining a monopoly, and the
superior returns associated with it, often induce firms to enter new
markets they otherwise would have avoided. In many cases, firms
obtain monopolies simply because they have been the most
successful in meeting consumers' demands for low prices and
innovative products. In high technology markets, monopolies can be
particularly beneficial to consumers. Monopolies in network
industries establish uniform standards that make it easier for
consumers to connect to the network and interact with other
users. 7 Some observers believe that the monopoly Microsoft
acquired during the 1990s in operating systems for personal
computers has been responsible for "the rapid evolution of the PC
... from a glorified typewriter and adding machine to a multimedia
communication device."78 By establishing a consistent worldwide
75. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust, Uncertainty, and Technological Innovation, 24
ANTITRusT BULL. 635, 649 (1979) ("Studies have indicated ... that small firms are more
efficient than larger ones in conducting research."); Mark Green, Have the Antitrust Laws
Promised Too Much and Accomplished Too Little? Answer Yes, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 752, 755
(1977) ("The best studies of size and innovation demonstrate that moderate sized firms are
the most innovative-not our largest firms who like to coast with a comfortable status quo.*);
Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of
the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 961 (2001) (citing a study that
demonstrates that "innovations were deployed faster in competitive markets than in
monopoly markets").
76. See Muris, supra note 50, at 909 n.44 ("[Mlonopoly may be the necessary reward for
some winners in high-tech competition because monopoly allows for recovery of the high
costs ofinnovation....")(quoting speechofformer Secretary of Treasury Lawrence Summers).
77. See Stephen Labaton,Airlines andAntitrust:ANew World. OrNot., N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
18, 2001, § 3 (Money & Business), at 1 ("The old antitrust principles do not apply easily
because there are countervailing benefits to consumers-like lower prices, standardization
or more frequent service-when control of the industry is in the hands of a few companies.").
The benefits of uniform technological standards are evident in the contrast between wireless
phone performance in the U.S. and most of the rest of the world. The United States never
was able to settle on a single standard for wireless phone technology "and that blunder has
resulted in a patch-work of multiple, incompatible technologies." Walter S. Mossberg, A
Guide to the Lingo You'll Want to Learn for Wireless Technology, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28,2002,
at B1. By contrast, Europe and most other countries settled on a single standard thus have
.better and more innovative wireless phones and wireless services." Id.
78. Finally, A Settlement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2001, at A14. As one commentator has
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standard for operating systems, Windows has allowed independent
firms to write a nearly unlimited number of programs for word
processing, spreadsheets, databases, games, electronic mail, instant
messaging, Internet browsers, and other applications. 9
D. The Persistence of High Technology Monopolies
The problem with high technology monopolies stems from their
ability to persist beyond their useful economic life. If monopolies
were truly transitory,.the courts would not need to regulate them
at all. Free competition could be counted upon to induce rivals to
enter a market and undercut a monopolist's power." As long as a
firm feels that its market power can be challenged, it will continue
to seek efficiency gains even after it achieves a monopoly."' When
a monopoly is well entrenched, however, a firm may not feel
compelled to continue to pursue efficiencies.8 2 Such firms are
more likely to engage in the most harmful monopolistic conduct,
explained, "A common operating system that everyone can use provides enormous benefits."
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Do We Need a "New Economy" Exception for Antitrust?, 15
ANTrrRUST, Fall 2001, at 89, 92.
79. One observer recently pointed out, "the fact that everyone uses ... [Microsoft's
products], like the fact that so many people speak English, is in itself a social good." Paul
Krugman, Making Windows Transparent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,2001, § 4 (Week in Review),
at 13.
80. Judge Easterbrook has noted, "No one doubts that this occurs. The question is, 'how
long does it take?'" Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 7.
81. See 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 505 (1978). Joseph
Schumpeter believed that the fear of losing monopoly power guarantees that firms will
continue to engage in innovation even after they have achieved a monopoly. See JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-106 (3d ed. 1950); see also
Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,26 (D.D.C. 1999) ([Although Microsoft could
significantly restrict its investment in innovation and still not face a viable alternative to
Windows for several years, it can push the emergence of competition even farther into the
future by continuing to innovate aggressively.").
82. According to the court in United States u. VISA U.S.A. Inc.:
The higher the barriers to entry, and the longer the lags before new entry, the
less likely it is that potential entrants would be able to enter the market in a
timely, likely, and sufficient scale to deter or counteract any anticompetitive
restraints.... Where barriers to entry are high, ... a monopolist would find it
easier to raise prices because it would be unlikely that a competitor would, or
could, enter the market.
163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342; see also Beltway on Top, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2000, at A18 ("The
only incentive to produce anything is the possession of temporary monopoly power.")
(emphasis added).
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including raising prices, deferring innovation, and reducing output
in ways harmful to consumers.
Some commentators have argued that monopolization should
not be a concern in high technology industries because the rapid
pace of technological change will act as a natural counterweight
to a firm's market power.' These observers believe that high
technology markets confer only brief "serial monopolies" on firms
which disappear when nimbler rivals appear."' At the initial stage
of a product cycle, the commercialization of a new product generates
high returns. Market leaders may price their products at a level
that yields the highest short-run profit but encourages new entry
on a long-term basis.85 Returns then decline precipitously as firms
cut prices to the level of their costs."6 Joseph Schumpeter, an early
83. The bursting of the NASDAQ high technology stock "bubble" in 2001 and 2002 has
been cited as an example of the "boom-and-bust" cycle typical of high technology industries.
See David Wessel, Steering the Economy Gets Harder, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2002, at Al
("Rapid changes in technology can produce more booms and busts. Technological change
increases uncertainty about the future, and with more uncertainty comes NASDAQ-like
bubbles and busts. The promise of technology creates tidal waves of euphoria that are
followed by tidal waves of despondency when profits prove disappointing.") (comments of J.
Bradford De Long, University of California at Berkeley).
84. See Yochi J. Dreazen, FCC's Powell Quickly Marks Agency as His Own, WALL ST. J.,
May 1, 2001, at A28 (describing views of Michael Powell, the Chairman of the FCC); Timothy
J. Muris, Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word-Continuity,
Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Section Annual Meeting (Aug. 7,2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/
speecheshnuris/murisaba.htm ("The fierce competition for success in these [high technology]
industries often results in the winner enjoying a (perhaps short-lived) monopoly."). In
Microsoft III, the District of Columbia Circuit Court opined on the fleeting nature of high
technology monopolies: "In technologically dynamic markets, ... [monopoly) may be
temporary, because innovation may alter the field altogether." 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir.
2001). In its proposed consent order in Intel Corp., the FTC opined that "[tihe computer
industry is characterized by short, dynamic product cycles, which are generally measured in
months." [1997-2001 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,575, at 24,482 (Aug. 3,
1999).
85. 'See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 1225 (describing the price that yields "the highest
short run monopoly profit, but also does the most to attract entry); see also Holstein, supra
note 35, at 5 ("Nobody works any harder than they have to .... If you have the right widget
and everyone comes to you, you get lazy.") (quoting John Steele Gordon). James Utterback
has compared high technology competition to the game of Chutes and Ladders: "A player may
arrive at the bottom of a ladder, and then rapidly ascend to a higher level and obtain higher
stakes. The converse is also true ...." Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at 804.
86. See Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at 824 (describing the high technology business
cycle).
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twentieth-century Austrian economist, called this process, in which
market power rises and falls, "creative destruction."87
Bill Gates recently explained how creative destruction can
operate in high technology markets. High technology firms derive
their primary value from intellectual property such as computer
software. Upfront costs to create intellectual property are high, but
once the product has been developed, the marginal costs of
producing and selling each additional unit approach zero. According
to Gates, this makes high technology monopolies particularly
vulnerable to competition:
With intellectual property, the upfront costs are what it's all
about.... Say a piece of software costs $10 million to create and
the marginal costs, because it's going to be distributed
electronically, are basically zero. Once the costs of development
have been recouped, every single additional unit is pure profit.
But if someone comes along with a significantly superior
product, your demand can literally almost drop to zero."
Commentators emphasizing the phenomenon of creative
destruction have, however, overlooked the extent to which mo-
nopolies can become entrenched in high technology markets.
Indeed, a combination of natural and artificial barriers to entry
often makes it impossible for new firms to enter such markets. If
the courts can do nothing about the natural barriers to entry, they
should at least eliminate the artificial ones.
Once they have obtained monopoly power, firms can attempt to
extend the duration of such power by various types of exclusion-
ary conduct, such as access restrictions, exclusive dealing, and
87. SCHUMPER, supra note 81, at 83; see also David A. Balto,EmergingAntitrust Issues
in Electronic Commerce, 19 J. PUB. POLY & MKTG. 277, 278 (Fall 2000) (stating that high
technology markets "may not be conducive to long-term market dominance by a single firm');
Balto & Pitofsky, supra note 43, at 585 (stating that when "product generations are
measured in only a few years and whole new industries can be created at any time," it is
difficult for firms to retain a market power advantage for a significant period); Leonhardt,
supra note 32, at 13 (arguing that investments in high technology markets "can turn sour
within years, or even months").
88. Murray, supra note 6, at Al (quoting Bill Gates). In good times, sales exceed high
technology firms' fixed costs, but when sales decline, companies' profits also decrease quickly,
as they are unable to cover their enormous fixed costs. For example, it costs Amazon.com,
in good times and bad, $50 to $100 million a year to maintain its website. Ip, supra note 65,
at A1O.
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predatory pricing. 9 High technology monopolists have a particular
incentive to extend their monopoly power through such practices. 90
Because of low marginal costs, most of the incremental revenues
earned by high technology monopolists "go directly to the bottom
line."9 Thus, the profits earned by extending a high technology
monopoly often exceed the costs of the exclusionary practices
required to achieve the extension.92
High technology monopolies also possess inherent natural
advantages that make them difficult to dislodge.9" High technology
markets tend to reinforce the market power of the first firm to
commercialize a new technology. More often than not, such markets
vest a durable form of monopoly power in such "first-movers." The
first-mover advantage is evident in the market for computer
operating systems, where Microsoft has been able to perpetuate its
monopoly power by taking advantage of what Judge Jackson, in his
district court decision in Microsoft III, termed the "applications
barrier to entry."94 With over ninety percent of the computer
operating system market,95 Microsoft has an installed base which
encourages independent software vendors to write compatible
programs for applications such as databases, games, spreadsheets,
word processing, electronic mail, and Internet browsers." This
installed base makes it difficult, if not impossible, for other
operating systems to enter the market. Programmers do not want
to spend a lot of time and money developing applications for
89. See infra notes 166-245 and accompanying text.
90. See Posner, supra note 20, at 935 (calling the period during which a high technology
monopoly is extended by exclusionary practices "the extension period").
91. Id. Another commentator has described how low marginal costs affect movie studios
and pharmaceutical companies: "If it's a hit, the profit potential is immense, since it costs
little to make more copies of the film or drug." Ip, supra note 65, at A10.
92. Posner, supra note 20, at 935; see also Rubinfeld, supra note 33, at 862 (explaining
that network monopolists "have an incentive to adopt competitive strategies" that exclude
rivals).
93. See FTC STAFFREPORT, supra note 17, Part 3, at 29 ("[Oince a marketplace monopoly
is attained, it may be very difficult to dislodge.").
94. Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,20 (D.D.C. 1999). Judge Jackson then
asserted that the "fact that a vastly larger number of applications are written for Windows
than for other PC operating systems attracts consumers to Windows, because it reassures
them that their interests will be met as long as they use Microsoft's product." Id.
95. See id. at 19 (finding that Microsoft's share of the market for "Intel-compatible PC
operating systems" is at ninety percent).
96. See Microsoft II, 147 F.3d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (referring to such compatible
programs).
2002]
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operating systems that do not have a large installed base, because
demand for such applications is low. Thus, Windows users are
unlikely to switch to other systems, because Windows allows them
to choose from among a much larger number of compatible
applications.97 Because the "switching costs" for consumers in
network markets are so high, they are, in a very real sense, "locked
in" to their current network.98 The result is a "positive feedback"
process in which more and more applications are written for a
dominant operating system such as Windows. Consumers are then
even more attracted to the system because of its compatibility with
so many applications. "This, in turn, encourages more developers to
write programs, which attracts more customers, and so on."
The phenomenon of "sunk costs" also creates substantial
barriers to entry in high technology markets. Consumers are likely
to remain with an established network because of the costs they
have incurred in adapting to the network. Even if a new entrant
promises a less expensive or technically superior product, users of
the current network may not be willing to run the risk of losing
their investments in that network. This consequence is sometimes
referred to as "path dependency."100 Users of Microsoft's Windows
operating system, for example, may be unwilling to switch to
Apple's operating system out of a concern that they will have to
learn new programming procedures. Similarly, participants in a
particular B2B may be reluctant to switch to another B2B because
of the substantial investments already made in integrating their
information technology systems with the current B2B.
97. See Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at 814 ("[T]he more users of a given [computer
operating] platform, the more complementary products that will likely be supplied to that
platform. This will lower the cost or increase the value of the platform.").
98. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 36, at 170 ("Software vendors tend to write
applications for the most popular operating system. The greater availability of applications
in turn induces new users to choose that operating system. The market thus tips in favor of
a single standard, to which the industry is locked in.").
99. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic
Networks, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1998).
100. See Posner, supra note 20, at 930 (explaining "the issue of 'path dependence': an
industry may be stuck with an inferior technology because of the cost advantage of the
existing network").
101. According to the FTC Staff Report:
One workshop panelist [at the hearings on the FTC StaffReport] observed that
large companies will not readily switch from one B2B to another'because they
have to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars to do the integration' by
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Consumer expectations may also play a significant role in ex-
tending the duration of a high technology monopoly. In order to be
successful, a new network must convince a large number of the
installed base of users to migrate from the incumbent network. In
a classic "chicken-and-egg" problem, users may not be willing to
take a chance on a new network if they do not believe that it will be
successful.10 2 With its large subscriber base, an Internet service
provider such as AOL Time Warner is likely to retain its market
power advantage even "in the face of attempted entry by seemingly
superior products."03 Firms will find it difficult to enter the
national ATM market unless they can demonstrate that "a sub-
stantial number of transactions and cardholders within the market
will be available on a long-term basis."'O°
Durable monopolies may lock consumers into technologically
inferior networks for a considerable period of time.' Only a major
hooking their net marketplacels] into the back-end systems of the buyers and
sellers, [i.e.,] into their supply chain and ERP systems(;J once that is done, it's
very hard for a buyer to move to a different location without redoing the whole
thing over again.
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 1, at 24.
102. See Microsoft 11, 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing how consumers'
preference for a computer operating system *for which a large number of applications have
already been written" creates a 'chicken-and-egg' situation (which] ensures that applications
will continue to be written for the already dominant Windows, which in turn ensures that
consumers will continue to prefer it over other operating systems); United States v. VISA
U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (referring to difficulties facing new
entrants to the credit card market, who must "solve the so-called 'chicken-and-egg' problem
of developing a merchant acceptance network without an initial network of cardholders who,
in turn, are needed to induce merchants to accept the system's cards in the first place");
Melamed, supra note 4 1, at 150 (describing entrants' "daunting chicken-and-egg problem in
attempting to coordinate behavior by large numbers of users and suppliers in order to take
advantage of potential network benefits").
103. Balto, supra note 87, at 279.
104. Balto, supra note 51, at 822.
105. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network
Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making, 40
ANTITRUST BULL. 317, 336 (1995) (explaining how consumers can become "locked in" to
technologically inferior products); Sheremata, supra note 1, at 954 ("[T]here is every reason
to believe that consumers will get 'locked into' the first product that appears on a new
platform, even when the product is technologically inferior.); see also Lopatka & Page, supra
note 36, at 169 ("In theory, a market may tip toward an inferior product. Consumers may
initially adopt a product because it has a greater inherent benefit to them than the other
product then available. Such a good may gain a first-mover advantage, which may then be
reinforced by positive feedback.*).
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paradigm shift will convince users to abandon such a network."°
The promise of mere incremental improvements to the network will
usually not be sufficient to induce a move to a new provider."0 7 The
only new networks likely to be successful are those that promise
revolutionary change.0 8 Thus, in high technology markets, network
effects may deny consumers the benefit of technological improve-
ments that, in traditional industrial markets, would be sufficient
to induce entry by new firms.
II. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY JOINT
VENTURES
High technology firms can exert market power not only by
acquiring individual dominance but also by entering into various
types of collaborations with their competitors. Such "joint ventures"
are a unique form of business organization which require their own
antitrust approach. If the various forms of business organization
were classified along a continuum, joint ventures would lie at
the midpoint between cartels0 9 and mergers. Joint ventures are
distinguished by partial integration. They are more integrated than
cartels but less integrated than mergers. Joint ventures are further
106. See Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at 811 (observing that "that which is ahead
tends to stay ahead, until interception by a major paradigm shift"). "Only occasionally will
a new product induce customers to abandon the old standard en masse, sparking a new
standards competition and eventually a tip to a new standard." Lemley & McGowan, supra
note 45, at 723.
107. See Balto & Pitofsky, supra note 43, at 590 ("If the installed base of the old network
accounts for a very significant portion of prospective users, the new network must offer even
greater technological advantages and utility over the older network to succeed in the
marketplace.").
108. Vacuum tube manufacturers, for example, "could not have stemmed the tide of the
transistor, no matter how hard they might have tried." Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at
813.
109. In a cartel, competitors do not combine their resources or share risks in any manner.
They simply coordinate their competitive conduct. Cartels are completely unintegrated
arrangements. Consider a price-fixing cartel, in which the participants do not combine sales
forces or production facilities to achieve cost savings but merely engage in parallel pricing
and production policies. Such arrangements have been deemed illegal on their face because
they have no potential to generate any economic efficiencies. Their only effect is to eliminate
competition. See Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66
ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 712 (1998) ("If two competitors formed a venture that did nothing but
set their prices, the arrangement would be nothing more than a price-fixing cartel, and it
would be treated as such under the antitrust laws.").
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distinguished from cartels by their procompetitive purpose. In a
joint venture, partners integrate their resources for a specific
efficiency objective, such as the production or marketing of a new
product. The efficiencies created by joint ventures are similar to
those resulting from mergers. Through their collaboration, the
partners in a joint venture often can produce a product which none
of the partners could have produced on their own.1 ' Yet joint
ventures also differ from mergers. Unlike mergers, they do not
involve a complete integration of the partners' operations. Each of
the members of a joint venture continues its separate existence and
continues to compete with its partners outside the scope of the
venture. Thus, joint ventures are less restrictive of competition
than mergers."' For example, Microsoft and AOL Time Warner
have collaborated in the past, agreeing to place AOL Time Warner's
icon on the Windows desktop in exchange for AOL Time Warner's
agreement to use Microsoft's Internet browser. Such cooperation,
however, has not diminished the companies' competition in areas
ranging from instant messaging to Internet access. Nor did it
deter AOL Time Warner from filing its recent monopolization
case against Microsoft. As an AOL Time Warner spokeswoman
recently stated, "Microsoft is both our competitor and at times our
partner."" 2
The integration that occurs in a joint venture is capable of
generating both beneficial and adverse economic effects. Any
effective antitrust approach must be capable of distinguishing
between these two aspects of collaboration among competitors.
110. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
111. See AntitruSt Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, 4 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) '1 13,161 (Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Collaboration Guidelines]; id. 1 20,853 ("Most
mergers completely end competition between the merging parties in the relevant market(s).
By contrast, most competitor collaborations preserve some form of competition among the
participants.").
112. Allison Linn, Tech Titans Uneasy Partners, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 12,2001, at
1-C. Indeed, Microsoft has identified AOL Time Warner as "its newest and biggest
competitor." Rebecca A. Buckman, With its Old Playbook, Microsoft is Muscling into Big Web
Markets, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2001, at Al. For a discussion of the intense competition
between Microsoft and AOL Time Warner for new Internet applications such as instant
messaging, see infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
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A. Beneficial Competitive Effects
Joint ventures allow their partners to penetrate markets they
could not have entered on their own. Indeed, some courts have
emphasized that the distinguishing characteristic of ajoint venture
is its "capability in terms of new productive capacity, new
technology, a new product, or entry into a new market."" A high
technology joint venture facilitates market entry by reducing the
risks of investing in new products. Firms are often unwilling to
make such investments on their own because of short product life
cycles, the difficulties in predicting the next product that will be
popular with consumers, and the likelihood that only one or a very
few firms ultimately can succeed in a particular market."" Joint
ventures, however, mitigate such risks by allowing firms to share
the costs of entering a high technology market. If a firm guesses
incorrectly on the ultimate success of a new technology, it will incur
only a fraction of the losses it would have suffered if it had
attempted to enter the market on its own. Even relatively large
companies have formed joint ventures to share the costs of
developing high technology products. Computer manufacturers, for
example, have entered into joint ventures to construct new
computer chip factories, which can cost as much as $500 million.115
A joint venture can bring together complementary technologies
that allow it to produce a new product that none of its partners
could have produced on their own. AT&T and Nippon Electric
Corporation (NEC) entered into ajoint venture to produce computer
chips using AT&T's computer-aided design technology and NEC's
technology for advanced logic chips.1 ' 6 Fujitsu and McDonnell
Douglas have established a joint venture for factory automation
products to which Fujitsu contributed computer hardware and
113. Compact v. Nashville County, Tenn., 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1574 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); see
also Joseph F. Brodley, Analyzing Joint Ventures with Foreign Partners, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
73, 75 (1984) (stating that a joint venture "involves the creation of a new product or entry
into a new market--or ... 'new competitive dimension.'").
114. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
115. Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Production Joint Ventures, 30JURIMETRICSJ. 253,
264(1990).
116. Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Cross-Border Alliances Become Favorite Way to Crack New
Markets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1990, at Al.
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McDonnell Douglas contributed software systems."7 Complex
alliances among telecommunications, computer hardware and
software, and consumer electronics industries resulted in the
development of "lo]ne of the most recent technology products
for the mass market, the personal digital assistant.""' An alliance
among IBM, Apple Computer, and Motorola produced the Power
PC microprocessor, and Microsoft's relationship with Intel created
the "Wintel" standard operating technology in most personal
computers.1 9
Joint ventures also have beneficial effects in markets for current
products. By combining their resources, the partners can enhance
their efficiency in producing or marketing products in which they
previously competed. A joint venture, for example, may combine
one partner's manufacturing capabilities with another partner's
marketing strengths. 20 Joint ventures among current competitors
also allow their partners to achieve economies of scale, eliminate
redundancies, and reduce costs. The major automobile companies
recently entered into an e-commerce joint venture called "Covisint,"
which will reduce costs in "virtually every aspect of designing,
manufacturing, and supplying automobiles."12' The major airlines'
joint venture for the sale of tickets over the Internet,"Orbitz," will
allow them to market their services directly to consumers, thus
eliminating commissions and fees for travel agents.'22
117. Jacob M. Schlesinger, Fujitsu, McDonnell Douglas to Unveil Alliance in Factory
Automation Field, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1991, at B3.
118. Julie Flaherty, The CorporateAlliane, as a TightropeAct, N.Y. TIMEs, June 10, 2001,
§ 3 (Money & Business), at 4.
119. Id.
120. A joint venture between General Motors and Toyota for the production of a compact
car in Fremont, California allowed the parties to combine Toyota's manufacturing techniques
with General Motors' knowledge of the U.S. marketplace. Jeremy Main, Making Global
Alliances Work, FORTUNE, Dec. 17, 1990, at 121, 126.
121. Thomas 0. Barnett & Michael J. Fanelli, B2B's: The Next Generation, Presentation
at 49th Annual Spring Meeting of ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2 (Mar. 28-30,2001) (on file
with author).
122. Marilyn Geewax, Orbitz Ready for Launch, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, April 28,2001, at
1-C; Saul Hansell, Web Sales of Airline Tickets are Making Hefty Advances, N.Y. TIMES, July
4,2001, at Al; Professor Jerry A. Hausman, Remarks at the 49th Annual Spring Meeting of
the ABA Antitrust Section 6 (Mar. 28-30, 2001) (on file with author).
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B. Adverse Competitive Effects
Joint ventures can also have adverse competitive effects. Joint
ventures covering products which the parties are already producing
will eliminate competition that otherwise would have occurred
among the partners."2 That is because the partners will, in the
natural course, refrain from competing with a venture in which
they have a financial interest. Such competition would, after all,
only reduce the profits which the partners could obtain from the
venture. Instead of competing, the partners will cooperate with
each other to maximize the joint venture's returns. Partners in
downstream production and marketing joint ventures, for example,
may limit the output and raise the price for the venture's products
above the level that would prevail in a competitive market.
The amount of competition eliminated by a joint venture is
entirely dependent upon the breadth of the parties' collaboration.
Ajoint venture only eliminates competition within the limited scope
of its activities. Because joint ventures involve only a partial
integration of the parties' resources, they do not prevent the parties
from continuing to compete in other areas. Thus, if a joint venture
covers an area in which the parties are not currently competing, it
can have no adverse effects. No current competition among the
parties will be eliminated under such circumstances. If the parties
are already competing in other areas, they should continue to do so,
regardless of the joint venture. Microsoft and AOL Time Warner,
for example, might enter into a joint venture to design and develop
a new software system for air traffic control, a market in which
neither of the companies is currently involved. Their cooperation in
such a joint venture should not prevent them from continuing to
compete in other areas, such as the emerging market for instant
messaging systems. 124
In certain cases, even joint ventures which combine the parties'
market power may be incapable of causing any adverse effects.
A joint venture, for example, may be confined to research and
123. See United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158,165-67, 173-74 (1964) (finding that
a joint venture between potential competitors could have eliminated competition in violation
of antitrust laws).
124. For a description of the continuing competition between Microsoft and AOL Time
Warner, see infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
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development, standards-setting, or the purchasing of raw materials.
Ventures at such "upstream" levels ofthe production process do not
affect prices or output, which are the prime determinants of
consumer welfare. Regardless of the market power of their
partners, joint ventures cannot control the amount of goods
produced or prices charged to consumers when they are removed
from the downstream production and marketing stages at which
such decisions are made.
III. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
The foregoing discussion reveals that, in high technology
markets, regulators need not be unduly concerned with increased
levels of market concentration associated with monopolies or
joint ventures. Higher prices and decreased innovation are not
the inevitable result of such arrangements. Indeed, more often
than not, high technology monopolies and joint ventures benefit
consumers. Most high technology firms and joint ventures become
more efficient, and more useful to their customers, as they grow in
size. Individual firms and joint ventures usually achieve market
power in high technology markets because they have won the race
to develop the most efficient network standard. Thus, the mere
possession of market power by a high technology firm or joint
venture should not be illegal. To punish a firm simply because it
has achieved a dominant position in its market is to discourage
efficient business performance. As Judge Hand pointed out in
ALCOA, "The successful competitor, having been urged to compete,
must not be turned upon when he wins."
The problem with high technology monopolies and joint ventures
stems not from their achievement of market power but from their
misuse of it. The natural barriers to entry in high technology
markets ensure that market power, once attained, will be long-
lasting. The courts should not allow high technology firms and joint
ventures to perpetuate their market power even further through
exclusionary conduct. Because of their low marginal costs and high
profit margins, high technology firms have a substantial incentive
to engage in conduct that will artificially extend the duration of
125. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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their market power. The rewards of prospective monopoly profits
may, for example, induce firms to implement predatory pricing
policies that deter rivals from entering a monopolized market.
Firms may also be willing to impose onerous access restrictions
or exclusive dealing arrangements on their customers. Firms
incur short-term costs under such circumstances. Predatory
pricing sacrifices profit margins, access restrictions turn away
potential customers, and exclusive dealing unnecessarily alienates
customers. High technology firms, however, are often willing to
incur such costs in order to obtain the long-term benefit of
excluding rivals from the relevant market. Thus, in high technology
markets, improper competitive conduct can be defined as behavior
that makes no economic sense other than as a means of extending or
perpetuating market power.
In reviewing high technology monopolies and joint ventures, the
courts should focus on the purpose of defendants' conduct rather
than the structure of their business or of the markets in which they
operate. In most high technology monopoly cases, the proper
remedy will not be to break up the defendant, but to ensure that it
refrains from any conduct that has no rational purpose other than
to perpetuate or extend its monopoly power. Similarly, in the case
of high technology joint ventures, the courts should review the
conduct of the venture and its partners to determine whether they
are attempting to expand the scope of their collaboration beyond
its legitimate bounds. If such conduct is overly restrictive of
competition, the courts can prohibit it without precluding the
entire joint venture. The parties would be free to proceed with
their collaboration and to obtain the advantage of the resulting
efficiencies as long as they ceased the offending conduct.
Such a conduct-based approach will allow the courts to more
effectively regulate high technology competition. Although judges
and juries are adept at determining "who did what, when and
why," 26 they are ill-equipped to decide economic issues. They lack
the sophisticated economic training necessary to know the extent
to which a particular monopoly or joint venture promotes
efficiencies, on one hand, or raises prices, limits output, and retards
126. Mark Crane, The Future Direction of Antitrust, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 15 (1987):
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innovation, on the other.127 Indeed, economists themselves cannot
agree on the economic impact of many types of business conduct. If
economists cannot effectively evaluate the market effects of
particular competitive practices, certainly judges and juries cannot
be expected to do so.'2'
Courts are, however, adept at judging the purpose of defendants'
conduct. Every day fact finders are expected to apportion liability
based on the purpose of defendants' behavior in contract, tort, and
criminal disputes. The argument for a purpose-based approach is
just as strong in antitrust cases. The courts have recognized that
"motive and intent play leading roles" in antitrust litigation.129 As
Justice Stevens pointed out in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp., "in antitrust, as in many other areas of the law,
motivation matters and factfinders are able to distinguish bad from
good intent."' Indeed, in most instances, a defendant's purpose for
engaging in particular conduct should reveal its likely impact on
competition. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS (BMI),'3' for example,
the Supreme Court stated that a defendant's purpose for a restraint
"tends to show [its] effect."" 2 The next two sections explain how the
127. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-12 (1972) ("[C]ourts are of
limited utility in examining difficult economic problems .... [They are] ill-equipped and ill-
situated for such decision making (and cannot] analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad
of competing interests and the endless data that would surely be brought to bear on such
decisions."); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)
("Judges often lack the expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior
to determine with any confidence a practice's effect on competition.").
128. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
ANTITRusTL.J. 135,153 (1984) ("If you assembled 12 economists and gave them all available
data about a business practice, plus an unlimited computer budget, you would not soon (or
ever) get unanimous agreement about whether the practice promoted consumers' welfare or
economic efficiency more broadly defined."). As Professor Sullivan has concluded, "economics
does not comprehend enough and law, without extreme transformations in its own structure,
cannot adequately deal with all that economics does comprehend." LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK o THE LAW oF ANTITRUST § 2, at 10 (1977).
129. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
130. 485 U.S. 717, 754 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,610-11 (1985); see also McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444
U.S. 232, 243 (1980); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59
(1940); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918); Thomas A. Piraino,
The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distributions, 63
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4, 16-19 (1988)).
131. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
132. Id. at 19. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the Court referred
to the relevance of defendants' motives. Id. at 256-59. One court has concluded that in all
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courts can use such a purpose-based approach to analyze the
antitrust implications of high technology monopolies and joint
ventures.
IV. APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO HIGH TECHNOLOGY
MONOPOLIES
A. Precluding Firms From Extending or Perpetuating Monopoly
Power
Dominant firms may misuse their monopoly power by (1)
extending their market power from the monopolized market to a
related market, or (2) perpetuating the duration of their power in
the monopolized market itself. There are myriad ways in which a
firm can perpetuate or extend its monopoly power, and the courts
have found it difficult to distinguish between the legitimate and
illegal means of doing so. As commentators have noted, "aggressive
competitive conduct by a monopolist, which is beneficial to
consumers, and aggressive exclusionary conduct by a monopolist,
which is deleterious to consumers, look alike."' 8 Some courts have
held that monopolists should not be liable for monopoly power
acquired "as a consequence of a superior product ... [or] business
acumen ...." i Other courts, however, have found monopolists liable
for conduct resulting simply from their development of a product or
cases alleging an illegal group boycott under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, "the touchstone
of per se illegality has been the purpose and effect of the arrangement in question." E.A.
McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consol. Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
133. Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquibel, Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging, 40
ANTrrRusT BULL. 371, 372 (1995).
134. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); see also California
Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[IBM] was entitled
to maintain its ... dominant position in the market ... through 'business acumen' .... Where
the opportunity exists to increase or protect market share profitably by offering equivalent
or superior performance at a lower price, even a virtual monopolist may do so."); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A] monopolist is
permitted, and indeed encouraged, by [Section] 2 to compete aggressively on the merits ....");
Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir. 1975) ("[Tlechnical attainments [by
a monopolist] were not intended to be inhibited or penalized by a construction of Section 2
of the Sherman Act to prohibit the adoption of legal and ordinary marketing methods already
used by others in the market....").
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service especially attractive to consumers. 8 The proposed approach
would resolve such inconsistencies by concentrating on the purpose
of defendants' conduct. Under this approach, the courts would
permit conduct designed to enhance a high technology firm's
efficiency while precluding conduct intended only to perpetuate or
extend a firm's monopoly power.
Because monopoly power so often is inevitable in high tech-
nology markets, the courts must ensure that the initial battle
to obtain monopoly power is undertaken freely and fairly.
13 6
Otherwise, consumers cannot be assured that the most efficient
competitor ultimately will prevail. As Judge Posner recently stated,
"competition to obtain a [high technology] monopoly is an important
form of competition."3 7 Firms will not be willing to engage in such
competition at the beginning of a high technology product cycle if
they believe that their rivals can gain an unfair competitive
advantage. Thus, the courts should preclude monopolists from
extending the power they have already acquired in the monopolized
market into a related market in which the struggle for dominance
is just beginning. Such conduct unduly raises barriers to entry for
potential competitors. Potential competitors, for example, may
decline to invest in the emerging instant messaging market if they
fear that Microsoft can leverage its monopoly power into that
market by precluding their programs from access to the Windows
operating system.'38
135. For example, in Aspen Skiing, the Supreme Court considered the Section 2 liability
of a ski resort which had obtained control, by proper means, over three popular ski slopes
near Aspen, Colorado. The Court found the resort liable for failing to cooperate with a
competing resort in marketing a multi-mountain ticket, considered uniquely desirable to
consumers. Aspen Skiiing, 472 U.S. at 610-11. Under the Aspen standard, a monopolist's
duty to deal with its competitors arguably would increase in direct proportion to the
popularity of its products.
136. "[I]f monopolization is inevitable, then the main basis for criticizing an outcome is
that the market anointed the wrong monopolist." Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at 812.
137. Posner, supra note 20, at 929.
138. "Instant messaging allows users to track which friends or family members are online
and shoot them strings of text that pop up instantly on their screens .... The technology, once
limited to a young, chat-happy audience, promises to become one of the most significant new
platforms for communications." Rebecca Buckman & Julia Angwin, Battle to Control Internet
Centers on Access, E-Mail, WALL ST. J., June 19,2001, at B1. Several firms, including AOL
Time Warner, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, are vying to develop a system that will become the
dominant standard in the market. In fact, Microsoft has bundled its instant messaging
system into the newest version of its operating system, Windows XP, and AOL Time Warner
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Firms can also misuse their monopoly power to exclude
competitors from the monopolized market itself. Many high
technology monopolists already possess a durable form of market
power, and they should not be permitted to artificially extend the
period of their dominance. 3 9 The courts must be particularly alert
to exclusionary conduct by high technology monopolists, because
first-mover advantages give such firms a unique incentive and
ability to perpetuate their monopoly power beyond its natural
period."' Exclusionary practices allow high technology monopolists
to insulate themselves from the natural forces of creative
destruction that ultimately mitigate most firms' market power. If
they are allowed to erect such artificial barriers to entry, such
monopolists will have little incentive to reduce their prices on a
long-term basis or to introduce product innovations attractive to
consumers.
141
Hence, the courts should preclude high technology monopolists
from engaging in conduct that makes no economic sense other than
as a means of perpetuating their power in a current market or
extending such power into a new market. 42 Such a standard would
has vigorously protested Microsof's integration plans. Buckman, supra note 112, at Al. For
a discussion of such bundling, see infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
139. One commentator, for example, has pointed out that Microsoft should be precluded
from erecting artificial barriers to entry in the market for computer operating systems:
There are indeed substantial natural barriers that stand in the way of any
would-be challenger to Microsoft, and which the laws do not make the subject
of legal challenge. But the existence of those substantial natural barriers to
entry makes it all the more necessary to eliminate the artificial barriers that
Microsoft erected.
Sheremata, supra note 1, at 963.
140. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. As the plaintiffs pointed out in their
brief to the District of Columbia Circuit Court in Microsoft III, "[Nietwork effects give[] a
software monopolist both the means and a strong incentive to use predatory product design
with devastating effectiveness." Brief for Appellees at 68, United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/cases/f7400/7425.pdf.
141. See Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at 825 ("[A] monopolist would be a firm shielded
from entry, i.e., insulated from competition and from other innovators and imitators. The
monopolist could stay ahead without innovating or lowering prices.").
142. See William Inglis Baking Co. v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1030-31 (9th
Cir. 1981) (analyzing claim of attempted monopolization according to whether it "makes
sense only because it eliminates competition"); Robert Bork, THE ANTIrRUST PARADOX 137-44
(1993) (proposing that conduct be deemed illegal if the conduct only made economic sense if
it were to result in a monopoly and monopoly profits); Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at
836 (defining anticompetitive conduct as "conduct that makes no sense without the monopoly
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preserve a monopolist's right to engage in legitimate competitive
conduct that increases its sales and profits. A monopolist would
be allowed to improve its products in ways that make them
more attractive to consumers. Monopolists, however, would be
precluded from competitive conduct solely intended to exclude
actual or potential competitors. Unjustified denials of access to
essential resources, exclusive dealing, and predatory pricing cause
monopolists to incur costs-either in lost profits or customer
goodwill-that can be recouped only if the monopolist succeeds in
driving rivals from the monopolized market or from a related
market to which it is attempting to extend its market power. Once
a court determines that but for such purpose, a monopolist would
not engage in particular conduct, it can condemn the behavior
without fear of deterring legitimate competitive actions.
The following subsections explain how the courts can use this
new approach to analyze the primary means by which high
technology monopolists perpetuate or extend their market power.
B. Tying Arrangements
1. The Courts' Confused Approach to Tying
A firm may engage in monopoly leveraging by "tying" the
purchase of a secondary product (the tied product) to a monopolized
product (the tying product).l By requiring customers to purchase
both products, the monopolist can extend its market power from the
tying to the tied product market. For example, in the 1970s, the
FTC claimed that Xerox Corporation attempted to leverage its
monopoly in the photocopier market into the market for toner and
developing supplies used in photocopying machines. A 1975 consent
order prohibited Xerox from requiring its customers to buy such
supplies from it when they purchased photocopying machines.14'
profits that can be made after competition is eliminated or reduced").
143. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1958) (affirming summary
judgment finding that the defendant railroad company illegally tied sales or leases of real
estate to commitment to ship commodities on defendant's system).
144. See In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975) (requiring Xerox to refrain from certain
actions that would cause customers to purchase toner and developing supplies as well as
copiers from Xerox).
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A tying approach is a particularly ill-suited means of judging
the behavior of many high technology monopolists. Tying liability
is appropriate when a monopolist requires a consumer to purchase
two distinct products, such as a camera and film, or a photocopier
and developing supplies. Tying doctrine, however, cannot account
for the complexities of integrating a previously separate high
technology product into a larger whole. Many high technology cases
have involved "technological tying," in which monopolists integrate
components into a single package, thereby making competitors'
components unnecessary because their functions are performed
internally by the packaged product. In cases brought against IBM,
Kodak, and other high technology companies, the courts have found
it difficult to determine whether, after such integration, the
combined components should be considered separate products,
illegally tied together, or simply a single new unit.145 Recent
decisions by the district court and circuit court in Microsoft III have
only further confused the application of tying doctrine to high
technology products.
In Microsoft III, the government claimed that the company
illegally tied its Internet browser to its operating system by failing
to make available a version of Windows without the Microsoft
browser. Microsoft's conduct allegedly made it difficult for
competing browsers, such as Netscape's Navigator, to compete
against Microsoft's Web browser. 14 Microsoft's alleged motive for
the tying arrangement was not simply to extend its monopoly power
to the Web browser market but also to prevent Navigator from
becoming its own platform for applications programs and thus,
ultimately, to challenge Windows' hegemony in the operating
145. See Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534,543 (9th Cir. 1983)
(declining to find per se unlawful tying arrangement by virtue of Kodak's bundling of
"technologically interrelated" 110 Instamatic camera, film, and developing process);
California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727,744 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding
that when integration constitutes product "improvement" it cannot be the basis of an
antitrustviolation); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228,233 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) (finding that IBM's integration of disk assembly into disk drive did not constitute
illegal tying arrangement because it increased storage capacity of drive), affd sub nom.,
Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367
F. Supp. 258, 342 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (finding that IBM's integrations "represented
technological advancements" that could not "be fairly regarded as predatory within the
contemplation of antitrust policy"), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
146. See Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
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system market. '47 Microsoft argued that there could be no illegal tie
because the browser had been integrated into the operating system
and, therefore, did not constitute a separate product that could be
tied to that system. 4" In his district court decision, however, Judge
Jackson concluded that the browser and operating system should
be viewed as separate products because there was separate
consumer demand for each of them."9 In Jackson's opinion, the
company engaged in an illegal tying arrangement by integrating the
browser into the operating system.15
0
In its decision on appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court came to a different conclusion. The court pointed out that
Microsoft's integration of the browser into the operating system
gave consumers the advantage of certain functions not available
when the operating system and browser were offered as stand-alone
products. The integrated product, for example, made the operating
system "a better applications platform for third-party software."151
Given the arguable technical advantages of integration, the court
could not conclude that the operating system and Internet browser
constituted separate products. The court's logical conclusion, then,
should have been to dismiss the tying claim altogether for failure of
proof of one of its essential elements. It is hard to understand how
the circuit court could have concluded that Microsoft had engaged
in any tying at all when the relevant products were not separate
but merely parts of an integrated whole with more utility for
consumers. 152 However, the court confused the issue by deciding
that the plaintiffs could pursue the tying claim under the "rule of
147. The term "middleware" has been used to describe software such as Netscape's
Navigator Internet, browser and Sun Microsystem's "Java" software, which have the
capability to serve as platforms for the operation of applications programs. See id. at 17, 26,
28. As such software becomes capable of supporting a growing number of applications, it
ultimately could compete with Microsoft's Windows program. See id. at 28, 29, 31.
148. See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 85, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing Microsoft's
arguments).
149. Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 48 (D.D.C. 1999); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Microsoft III-Conclusions
of Law].
150. Microsoft III-Conclusions of Law, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47-51 (D.D.C. 2000).
151. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
152. As the Brief for the Appellees in Microsoft lll pointed out, "The only element of tying
liability at issue is whether ... [Microsoft's browser] and Windows constitute separate
products." Brief for Appellees at 43, Microsoft 111, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212,
00-5213), available at http'J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7400/7425.pdf.
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reason" rather than under the "per se rule."' The court remanded
the issue to the district court, where, to prevail under a rule of
reason tying claim, the government would have to demonstrate that
the anticompetitive effects of tying the browser to the operating
system outweighed the procompetitive justifications for the
arrangement.5 4 Given the difficulties of prevailing under such a
standard, the government subsequently decided to drop its tying
claim in the district court action. 55
2. Applying the Proposed Approach
If the circuit court had adopted the approach proposed in this
Article, it simply could have asked whether Microsoft's integration
of its browser into Windows made any economic sense other than as
a means of perpetuating Microsoft's monopoly in the operating
system market or extending that monopoly to the browser market.
Such an inquiry into the purpose of Microsoft's conduct would have
avoided entirely the artificial distinction between single and
separate products that has been so confusing in technological tying
cases. A monopolist should not be liable for tying whenever it can
show that it had a plausible efficiency motive for integrating a
previously stand-alone product into a larger whole. There are many
cases in which high technology monopolists integrate new elements
of functionality into their products that are beneficial to consumers,
and it is not appropriate for the. courts to second guess such
153. The rule of reason requires a plaintiff to prove that the adverse economic effects of
a Section 1 restraint outweigh its procompetitive effects. The per se rule, on the other hand,
merely requires the plaintiffto show that the defendant engaged in the relevant conduct. The
anticompetitive nature of per se conduct is presumed without any additional evidence. See
infra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
154. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The circuit court's decision on tying
in Microsoft III was inconsistent with its own decision three years earlier in Microsoft H. In
Microsoft II, the circuit court dismissed the government's claim that Microsoft had violated
an earlier consent decree by bundling its Internet browser with the Windows 95 operating
system. Comparing the provisions of the consent decree to the requirements of tying law, the
circuit court concluded that Microsoft should not be liable for integrating the browser with
the operating system if it could make any "plausible claim" of benefit from the integration.
Microsoft II, 147 F.3d 935,950 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Nowhere in the opinion did the circuit court
indicate that, in order to prevail, Microsoft should have to prove that the beneficial effects
of the integration outweighed the adverse effects.
155. 81 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 2024 (Sept. 14, 2001), at 215.
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decisions.156 If the newly packaged product enhances performance
or lowers cost, it should be permitted even if it was adopted in part
to preclude competition. 157 It should be sufficient that a monopolist
was spurred to some extent by a desire to improve its products.
According to Professors Ordover and Willig, "[Ihf engineering data
suggest that a new product is superior to the product it replaces,
antitrust inquiry should end." 58
It is clear that Microsoft had a plausible efficiency motive for
integrating its Web browser into Windows. Judge Jackson found in
Microsoft III that "consumers can be said to benefit from Microsoft's
provision of Web browsing functionality with its Windows operating
system at no extra charge." 159 In fact, in its earlier decision in
Microsoft II, the circuit court itself had pointed out that Microsoft
did more than "metaphorically 'bolt' two products together;"" °
with the integration of the browser and the operating system,
Microsoft created a new product with "some technological value."' 1
Microsoft's integration of the browser and operating system was
motivated by a desire to improve its product. Microsoft improved
the functionality of its operating system by providing a seamless
means by which users can move back and forth among various
applications, including the Internet browser. Indeed, consumers
have benefited greatly from Microsoft's integration, of various Web
features into its operating system. As one commentator recently
156. The District of Columbia Circuit Court even acknowledged inMicrosoft IlIthat"j]ust
as Microsoft integrated web browsing into its [operating system], IBM in the 1970s
integrated memory into its CPU's, a hardware platform. A peripheral manufacturer alleged
a tying violation, but the district court dismissed the claim because it thought it
inappropriate to enmesh the courts in product design decisions." Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34,
91 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also id. at 89 ("In fact there is merit to Microsoft's broader argument
that [the Supreme Court's tying precedent] would chill innovation to the detriment of
consumers by preventing firms from integrating into their products new functionality
previously provided by standalone products-and hence, by definition, subject to separate
consumer demand.").
157. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(holding that IBM's design changes to its CPU were not unlawful under Section 2, even
though IBM's "predominant intent" was to preclude or delay competition in the peripherals
market).
158. Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing
and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 29 (1981).
159. Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 55 (D.D.C. 1999).
160. Microsoft II, 147 F.3d 935, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
161. Id.
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pointed out, "If users had to buy and install separately all the
features (browsers, media players, photo displayers) that make the
Web go, we'd still be stuck in the 1970s. 162
Thus, even if the government had elected to pursue its tying
claim upon remand, it would not have been able to demonstrate
that Microsoft's only rational purpose for integrating the browser
was to perpetuate its monopoly in operating systems. Indeed, the
remedy which the government sought for its tying claim-forcing
Microsoft to provide an unbundled version of the operating system
without the browser-would have been completely inappropriate.
AOL Time Warner has included a tying claim in its current
monopolization case against Microsoft, and it therefore may seek a
similar remedy.6'a However, Microsoft should not be required to
allow an inferior version of its product to be placed into the
stream of commerce. The company has a legitimate interest in
maintaining its customers' goodwill and its own reputation for
quality by providing consumers with the most efficient and up-
to-date products. Since the integration of Microsoft's browser
into Windows enhances the functions of the operating system, a
product devoid of the browser would be less attractive to many
consumers.
164
162. Finally, A Settlement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2001, at A14; see also Krugman, supra
note 79 ('Life would be more difficult for millions of computer users if there weren't a
number of useful applications that came as standard features with the operating system.").
163. See Julia Angwin et al., AOL Sues Microsoft Over Netscape in Case that Could Seek
Billions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,2002, at Bl ('[AOL Time Warner) would like to have Microsoft
offer computer manufacturers a stripped-down version of Windows that doesn't include
controversial features such as Microsoft's browser.*). Judge Jackson argued in his district
court decision in Microsoft III that Microsoft could easily make an unbundled version of the
operating system available to consumers. Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,
53-54 (D.D.C. 1999).
164. When an integration of two products has enhanced the efficiency of the combination,
the courts have not required the manufacturers to continue to sell the products separately.
See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228,233 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
("While it would be possible for IBM to sell ... [a previously separate component) for a
separate price from the rest of the ... unit, just as it would be possible to sell many of the
other components separately, IBM is not required to do so .... "), affd sub nom. Memorex
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F. 2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1981). The Proposed Final Judgment in
Microsoft III, accepted by the Department of Justice and several of the State plaintiffs,
preserves Microsoft's right to continue to integrate new features into Windows, 'what the
company calls its 'freedom to innovate.' John Wilke, Negotiating all Night, Tenacious
Microsoft Won Many Loopholes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2001, at Al.
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Although monopolists should be allowed to combine previously
separate products in ways beneficial to consumers, the courts
should not turn a blind eye to the potential anticompetitive
consequences of such integrations. Any company with a large
market share in a network industry may be tempted to integrate
new features in a way that extends its power to new markets.'
The antitrust problem stems not from the integration itself but
from a monopolist's subsequent decision to implement restrictions
on access to its network by firms that make products competitive
with the features integrated into the network. Microsoft, for
example, can integrate its own Web browser into Windows and
thereafter implement design changes that make it difficult, if not
impossible, for other Web browsers to be used in conjunction with
the Windows operating system. Indeed, by restricting access to its
network, a monopolist could endlessly extend its monopoly into the
markets served by any of the functions it integrates into the
network. The next section describes how the courts can use a
traditional antitrust approach, called the "essential facilities
doctrine," to preclude such conduct and ensure that all competitors
are able to use a monopoly network as required to compete in any
markets served by the network.
C. Access Restrictions
1. The Essential Facilities Approach
Traditionally, geographical features such as oceans, rivers, and
highways have served as the critical gateways to U.S. product
markets. However, with the advent of high-speed computing,
electronic networks have also become an avenue through which
165. See Birdis, supra note 1S ("Any company that has a large market share, particularly
in a networked industry, will be tempted to tie whatever it can into its dominant product.)
(quoting Stephen Houck, partner, Reboul, MacMurray, Hewitt, Maynard & Kristol);
Jacobson, supra note 78, at 92 ("[[If the law allows the operating system monopolist to wipe
out competition in applications markets at will ... by bolting the Microsoft version of the
application to the operating system, no one is going to invest good money in developing
applications .... That cannot be good."); Steve Lohr, Pendulum Swings to Microsoft, but the
Degree Remains Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at Cl ("[Biundling new products into
Windows ... serves to give Microsoft an enormous advantage against any competitor who
happens to be in its path.*).
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firms must pass to compete in many markets. A stock broker, for
example, could not compete effectively in the market for the sale of
public securities if denied access to the New York Stock Exchange's
computer network,1 a bank could not compete in the national
credit card market without access to the Visa or MasterCard
networks,167 and programmers for applications ranging from word
processing to instant messaging could not succeed in their markets
without access to the Windows operating system. The critical
nature of such networks gives their owners enormous power to
affect competition in the markets served by such networks. Indeed,
denial of access to a high technology network is often tantamount
to completely excluding a potential participant from a related
market. Thus, simply by denying competitors access to its network,
a firm can leverage its monopoly power from the network market to
the secondary markets served by the network.
A monopolist usually will not have a legitimate reason for
denying competitors access to its network. In most cases, a high
technology monopolist's only purpose for an access restriction will
be to extend its network monopoly into a related market. A high
technology monopolist, like any other firm, should be motivated to
maximize the return on its assets. In the ordinary course, therefore,
a monopolist should want the largest possible number of firms to
purchase its products or services. Indeed, the value of any high
technology network increases in direct proportion to the number of
its users. 6 ' It is thus in a monopolist's legitimate economic interest
to allow all qualified users access to its network. If a firm acts
against such self-interest and denies access to qualified parties,
there should be a strong presumption that the firm is attempting to
perpetuate or extend its monopoly power.
Such an approach is consistent with a long line of cases, dating
back to 1912, in which the Supreme Court recognized that a
monopolist can gain an unfair advantage by denying its competitors
the right to access a resource required to engage in effective
166. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,344 (1963) (discussing effects of the
denial of a broker's access to New York Stock Exchange).
167. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Analysis of Network Joint Ventures, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 5, 41 (1995) (describing such systems' unique cost advantages and economies
of scale that an individual bank could not duplicate).
168. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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competition in a particular market. In those cases, the Court
required monopolists to make certain "essential facilities" equally
available to all qualified parties.'69 Many of the essential facility
cases involved networks with characteristics similar to today's high
technology networks. 7 0
2. Access to Telecommunications Networks
The approach proposed in this Article would prevent the owners
of broadband cable networks from extending their monopoly power
into various Internet markets. Most U.S. communities continue to
be served by single cable companies with monopoly power.' 7 ' Cable
169. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,377 (1973) (requiring electric
utility to provide wholesale power to cities that had established their own power companies);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961) (per
curiam) (requiring that a seal of approval from industry standards-setting organization be
made equally available to all competitors); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143,
152-57 (1951) (requiring newspaper to sell advertising to patrons of radio station that
competed with newspaper in local media market); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224
U.S. 383,394-97 (1912) (requiring open access to railroad terminals that controlled the only
means of access to two bridges leading across the Mississippi River to St. Louis). In a similar
line of cases, the Supreme Court required monopolists to prove a legitimate business
justification for refusing to deal with rivals. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) (requiring Kodak to prove "valid business reasons" for
refusing to deal with firms servicing its copiers); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585,610-11 (1985) (requiring ski resort to prove its efficiencyjustification for
refusing to cooperate with a rival in marketing a multi-mountain ski ticket).
170. The essential facility doctrine originally covered physical assets such as
transportation facilities. See Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. at 394-97. However, it was
eventually extended to cover various types of networks. See Silver, 373 U.S. at 347-49
(requiring access to electronic connection among stock brokers); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1945)(precludingmembers ofAssociated Press from denying access
by their competitors to wire news services). In recent years, the lower federal courts have
applied the essential facility doctrine to high technology networks, requiring the owners of
networks with monopoly power to permit competitors to use the networks on equal terms.
See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1131-33 (7th Cir. 1983)
(requiring AT&T, which at the time of the suit still owned the local Bell telephone systems,
to allow MCI, its competitor in the long-distance market, to interconnect its long-distance
lines with AT&T's local lines); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th
Cir. 1980) (precluding real estate multiple listing service from adopting subjective
membership rules that could exclude qualified brokers); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3
F. Supp. 2d 1225,1269-70 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated by 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding
that Intel's microprocessors constituted an essential facility because the network of installed
base of computer workstations used such microprocessors and holding that Intel must
provide competitor with access to microprocessors and related technical information).
171. See Robert Frank & Deborah Solomon, Cable Industry Mergers? Count the Ways,
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has the broad bandwidth that allows it to carry all types of data,
including video, audio, text, film, and still pictures, to consumers,
simultaneously and quickly, over a single wire. Cable systems have
a unique advantage over telephone lines. Because of their narrower
bandwidth, telephone lines accept Internet transmissions at much
slower speeds than cable networks.'72 Thus, for many consumers,
"broadband cable could become the sole entry point into the home
for a whole new world of information, communication, and
entertainment services."17 Unless they are required to grant open
access to all rivals, cable operators could effectively control what
consumers see on the Internet, by directing them exclusively to the
cable companies' own broadband services. 17'
In the 1990s, AT&T purchased several cable operations that
constitute the sole source of broadband service for their
subscribers.175 AT&T markets its own Internet access service, and
by requiring its cable customers to connect to the Internet through
that service, AT&T can leverage its cable monopoly into the
Internet service market. Under the approach proposed in this
Article, however, AT&T's cable system would be deemed an
essential facility to which other Internet service providers should
be granted equal access. In the areas covered by AT&T's cable
networks, competing Internet service providers have no other
means of reaching consumers through a broadband network, and a
similar network would be too expensive to duplicate. There is little
reason to believe that local cable markets would support the
construction of a second system to consumers' homes. AT&T has no
rational reason to forego cable revenue from providers of Internet
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at Cl ("[Cable companies] are virtual monopolies, with little or
no competition from other cable companies in their markets.").
172. See Bryan Gruley, AOL Leads Lobbying Campaign to Gain Access to 'Broad-Band'
Cable TV Lines for the Internet, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1999, at A20 (describing relative
disadvantages of telephone lines); Michael J. Wolf, And the Triumph of Broadband, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 11, 2000, at A26 (describing capabilities of cable's broad bandwidth).
173. Anthony Perkins,New Hopefor the New Economy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,2001, at A22;
see also Murray, supra note 52, at Al.
174. See John Schwartz, Bigger is Always Way Better, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 4
(Week in Review), at 5 ("[Cable) companies, through preferential treatment of their own
enterprises and those of business partners, could inundate consumers with marketing come-
ons for a few sites, making it easy to ignore alternatives.").
175. John R. Wilke& Kathy Chen, Merger Partners Vow OpenAccess to Cable Lines, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 11, 2001, at B1.
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services, other than to prevent them from competing with it in the
service market. Thus, it is appropriate to require AT&T, and any
other owner of a monopoly in local cable service, to allow competing
providers of Internet services open access to such cable systems.
17 6
3. Access to the Windows Operating System
The proposed approach would also ensure open competition in
markets for the wide range of applications that utilize the Windows
operating system. In Microsoft III, neither the district court nor the
circuit court found that the company had denied its competitors
access to Windows as an essential facility. However, both the
district court and the circuit court held that, with over ninety-five
percent of the market for Intel-compatible personal computer
operating systems, Microsoft possessed monopoly power. 177 Under
the approach proposed in this Article, the Windows operating
system would be deemed to be an essential facility, and Microsoft
would be required to give all its competitors equal access to the
system. 178 As a resource which programmers must use in order to
compete in the applications markets, Windows possesses all the
characteristics of the networks to which open access was compelled
in the essential facilities cases."' Microsoft has no reason to deny
its competitors access to Windows, other than to perpetuate its
operating systemmonopoly. If Windows were deemed an essential
facility, the courts could adopt effective remedies to prevent
176. Twelve of the hundreds of municipalities that reviewed AT&T's recent purchases of
cable systems required the company to guarantee access to other Internet service providers.
Wilke & Chen, supra note 175, at Bl. Similarly, as a condition to its approval of AOL's
acquisition of Time-Warner, the FTC required the merged entity to allow competing Internet
access providers to use the company's cable systems. See Julia Angwin, FTCApproves AOL.
Time Warner Deal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2000, at B8. In December 2001, Comcast agreed to
merge its cable operations with AT&T's cable systems. The merged entity, AT&T Comcast,
will hold monopoly power in even more communities. Deborah Solomon &,Robert Frank,
Comcast Deal Cements Rise of Oligopoly in the Cable Business, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2001,
at Al. Thus, following the transaction, AT&T Comcast should also be required to ensure open
access to its cable systems.
177. Microsoft 111, 253 F.3d 34, 51-58 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Microsoft III-Conclusions of Law,
87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000).
178. As one commentator has pointed out: "Windows is the gateway through which all the
hardware and software used in the vast majority of personal computers must pass." Lohr,
supra note 43.
179. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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Microsoft from leveraging its operating system monopoly into the
applications markets. As in the essential facility cases, Microsoft
would be required to give its competitors in the applications
markets the same access to Windows as its own products enjoy.
a. Microsoft's Denial of Access to Windows
Microsoft has engaged in, and continues to pursue, a variety of
anticompetitive acts designed to perpetuate its operating system
monopoly and to leverage that monopoly into various applications
markets. Microsoft's activities originally were designed to prevent
Netscape's Navigator browser from becoming a viable alternative
platform for applications programs. After integrating its own
browser into Windows 98, Microsoft succeeded in denying Navigator
access to the critical distribution channels necessary for its success.
Computer manufacturers such as Hewlett-Packard, Gateway, Dell,
and Compaq (OEMs) constitute one of the most important channels
of distribution for Internet browsers and other applications
competitive with those made by Microsoft. Consumers are not likely
to delete applications that are pre-installed by OEMs. " Thus, pre-
installed applications have a critical advantage over any competing
applications. In order to give its own browser such a competitive
advantage, Microsoft included various provisions in its license
agreements aimed at preventing OEMs from pre-installing com-
peting browsers.' 8 ' OEMs were forbidden to delete icons for
Microsoft's Explorer browser from the "boot-up" screen that users
first see when they turn on their computers. OEMs were also
precluded from adding icons different in size or shape than those
supplied by Microsoft, using the "Active Desktop" feature to
promote rival applications, or causing any user interface other than
the Windows desktop to launch automatically."l 2
180. See Competitive Impact Statement at 13, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-
1232 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/caseslf950/9549.pdf
[hereinafter Competitive Impact Statement) ("Users rarely switched from whatever browsing
software was placed most readily at their disposal, which was usually the browsing software
installed on their computer by the OEM ....").
181. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
182. Id. at 61-62.
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Microsoft bundled its Eiplorer browser with the operating
system in ways that made it difficult for OEMs to remove the
browser. Microsoft deleted its browser from the "Add/Remove"
utility program on Windows 98 and decided to commingle the code
for its browser in the same file as the code for the operating system,
so that deleting the code for the browser would cripple the
operating system.18 ' The circuit court pointed out in Microsoft III
that the company did not argue that any of these actions would
achieve "any integrative benefit" for consumers.' To the contrary,
Microsoft's bundling of the browser with the operating system was
intended to deter OEMs from pre-installing competing browsers.
Microsoft realized that OEMs product support costs would increase
if the software for Microsoft's browser remained on the operating
system, because they would have to "test and train [their] support
staff to answer calls related to every software product pre-
installed on the machine .... Furthermore, as long as the
Microsoft software remained, pre-installing an additional browser
would "to many OEMs be 'a questionable use of the scarce and
valuable space on a PC's hard drive."
183
Microsoft not only foreclosed the OEM distribution channel to
rival applications; it also adopted certain design and disclosure
practices that prevented Netscape and other rivals from accessing
the operating system itself. Microsoft realized the advantage of
withholding information on the internal design of Windows. In
order to interface effectively with Windows, applications must be
able to utilize Microsoft's "application programming interfaces," or
"APIs."1 8 ' These are the critical pathways into the Windows
183. Id. at 64-66. The Microsoft browser had been included on the "Add/Remove" utility
in Windows 95. Id. at 65. The district court found that Microsoft's decision to exclude its
Internet browser from the dozens of other features covered by the "Add/Remove" utility'in
Windows 98 served no legitimate purpose. Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,
52-57 (D.D.C. 1999). It also found that Microsoft's commingling of browsing and non-
browsing software routines in the same file "to a greater degree than is necessary to provide
any consumer benefit ... unjustifiably jeapordized the stability and security of the operating
system .... [and] increased the likelihood that a browser crash will cause the entire system
to crash...." Id. at 53.
184. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
185. Id. at 64.
186. Id.
187. Indeed, some commentators have described the Windows API interface itself as an
essential facility. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright
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operating system to "which the developer of an application can
connect to invoke pre-fabricated blocks of code" that cause the
operating system to serve the particular application.118 Software
developers must obtain information about changes in the APIs
sufficiently in advance of their implementation to allow them to
make the corresponding modifications to their applications
programs. Microsoft has consistently withheld such information
in order to give its own applications an advantage over rival
programs.
189
Microsoft has designed Windows so that it "doesn't work quite
right" with certain rival applications. 9 ' Like Netscape's Internet
browser, Sun Microsystems' "Java" software has the potential to
compete with Windows itself by serving as its own platform for the
operation of applications programs.' 9' Since Java was originally
designed by Sun Microsystems to work with any operating system,
the program "threaten[ed] Microsoft's monopoly by making users
and application writers indifferent to the operating system used."1 92
Microsoft, however, made it impossible for the universal version of
Java to run on its operating system by designing its own Windows-
compatible version of Java that lacked the cross-platform capa-
bilities of the universal version.193
Microsoft designed the latest version of its operating system
(Windows XP) in ways that continue to leverage its operating
and Contract: Copyright Preemption ofSoftware License Terms, 45 DUKFL.J. 479,547 (1995)
("By virtue of the operating system provider's monopoly power, its interface becomes an
essential facility because access to it is necessary for others to compete.").
188. Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1999) ("he operating
system supports the functions of applications by exposing interfaces, called 'application
programming interfaces,' or 'APIs.").
189. Sun Microsystems, for example, has complained that Microsoft failed to disclose
technical information on the interfaces to its Windows NT operating system for business PCs
and that, as a result, Sun's server software would not function as efficiently with Windows
as Microsoft's server products. Paul Davidson, EUAdds to Claims vs. Microsoft, USATODAY,
Aug. 31, 2001, at lB.
190. Krugman, supra note 79, at 3. The European Commission has alleged that Microsoft
"deliberately designed its Windows 2000 desktop software and companion products so that
they wouldn't work well with rivals' software." John R. Wilke, Microsoft May Face Huge Fine
From EU, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2001, at A3.
191. Microsoft II1-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17, 26, 28 (D.D.C. 1999).
192. Robert H. Bork & Kenneth W. Starr, Court Ruling Was No Victory for Microsoft,
WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A12.
193. Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 106-07 (D.D.C. 1999).
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system monopoly into new applications markets. Windows XP, in
fact, continues Microsoft's policy of denying access to Sun
Microsystems' Java program. Windows XP does not include the
software necessary to run Java-based programs.194 One commen-
tator recently described Windows XP as "a sort of Trojan horse" for
various Internet services for which Microsoft can charge a
subscription fee. 195 Microsoft has built in certain features, such as
instant messaging, music and video players, and online photo
printing, "that are just blatant efforts to lure consumers into using
a set of new Web-based services Microsoft is launching, while
ignoring alternative services that may be better."' Since the
services being bundled into Windows XP can reach into all corners
of the Internet, they are even more threatening to competition than
Microsoft's earlier acts directed solely against Netscape's Internetbrowser."'9
Microsoft believes that by pre-loading its own Internet services
on Windows XP it can prevent OEMs from offering consumers
similar services from its competitors. Indeed, Windows XP does
more than simply integrate Microsoft's Internet services; it
"contains hooks that could drive ... [users] to Microsoft's own
194. John R. Wilke & Don Clark, Microsoft Pulls Back Its Support for Java, WALL ST. J.,
July 18, 2001, at A3.
195. Walter S. Mossberg, The New Windows: Best Yet, but Beware, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20,
2001, at B1.
196. Id. Another commentator recently described Microsoft's "moves to fold a breathtaking
series of features into its new and disturbingly powerful operating system ..., which is fully
Internet-oriented." Kara Swisher, They're Here, They're Feared, So Get Used to It, WALL ST.
J., July 2, 2001, at B1.
197. See Buckman, supra note 112, atAl (arguingthat Microsoft's current anticompetitive
acts are "in many ways more expansive than Microsoft's earlier tactics of linking new desktop
products to Windows."). Microsoft's competitors allege that "Windows XP is being designed
to extend the Microsoft monopoly to the Internet ...." John R. Wilke & Don Clark, Senate
Panel Plans Hearing Over Microsoft, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2001, at A3. Microsoft has agreed
to make it easier for users to include rival Internet browsers on Windows, but Microsoft's
competitors point out that such browsers now pose only a small competitive threat to
Microsoft. Id. at A10. Microsofts integration of Internet services into its latest version of
Windows targets AOL Time Warner in the instant messaging market and RealNetworks in
Internet music and video markets "with much the same aggressiveness ... [Microsoft] once
used in going after Netecape ...." John R. Wilke & James Bandler, New Digital Camera Deals
Kodak a Lesson in Microsoft's Ways, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2001, at Al. As the CEO of a Web
services company recently stated, "The big play is to try to tie [all the new services] together
into one gigantic universe. It makes some of the things they did in 1995 now look like child's
play." Buckman, supra note 112.
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Internet services, rather than competitors. '" ' 98 Windows XP
partially disables the applications software of "some of Microsoft's
fiercest rivals," including Apple Computer's media player, AOL
Time Warner's America Online software, and RealNetwork's audio
software. 199 Microsoft's instant messaging, identity authentication,
and photo printing services "work only with Microsoft's own
proprietary Internet services, or services owned by companies that
pay Microsoft for inclusion in Windows XP."2  Microsoft's instant
messaging system, called "Windows Messenger," connects only to
Microsoft's own messaging network and not to "the larger and more
popular AOL messaging system."20 1 Users, in fact, cannot utilize
Windows Messenger without signing up for "Passport," a universal
Internet log-in and identification card, that serves as the gateway
to all of Microsoft's Internet services. Passport stores users' credit
card and password information for a host of new consumer services
that Microsoft has named "Hailstorm." Combining instant
messaging, digital music, and video, those services, for a monthly
subscription fee, will allow users to purchase products online,
receive e-mail at remote cellphones or other mobile devices, and
make copies of digital music.
20 2
Microsoft would not have taken all these actions to deny access
to the OEM distribution channel and to the Windows operating
system itself, unless it intended to perpetuate and extend its
Windows monopoly. It is in Microsoft's legitimate interest to
maximize revenues by insuring that as many different applications
as possible use the Windows system.20 Microsoft had no legitimate
198. Buckman, supra note 112. AOL Time Warner fears that access to the Microsoft
Internet services bundled into Windows XP will be "made so easy and obvious that
consumers will never get around to trying competing products .... " Hiawatha Bray,
Microsoft'sAggressive Unveilings Cause Worry, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 11, 2001, at 1-C.
199. Mossberg, supra note 195. This feature of Windows XP has been termed "somewhat
suspicious." Id.
200. Walter S. Mossberg, For Microsoft, 2001 Was a Good Year, But at Consumers'
Expense, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2001, at BI.
201. Mossberg, supra note 195.
202. Buckman, supra note 112 ("In essence, ... [Passport] is Microsoft's way of attacking
the field of Internet commerce and intensifying its push into subscription-based services that
it can sell for recurring fees.").
203. As one commentator suggested, "Shouldn't a firm with a successful operating system
product, such as Microsoft's Windows, welcome the development of applications programs?
After all, the more and better the applications ... the greater the demand for operating
systems." Timothy F. Breshahan, A Remedy that Falls Short of Restoring Competition, 16
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reason to alienate OEMs and consumers by making it so difficult
for applications such as Navigator, Java, and competing Internet
services to interface with Windows. In doing so, Microsoft has
revealed its true purpose to exclude competitors from these appli-
cations markets.
b. Remedies for Ensuring Access to Windows
i. The Final Judgment
The District Court for the District of Columbia is currently
considering remedies in the Microsoft III remand proceeding. It has
also begun to consider AOL Time Warner's monopolization case
against Microsoft. In both cases, the court could use the approach
proposed in this Article to craft a comprehensive open access decree
that would prevent Microsoft from continuing to perpetuate and
extend its operating system monopoly. The Department of Justice
and several of the state plaintiffs have agreed to settle Microsoft III,
and they submitted a proposed Final Judgment to the district court
(Final Judgment).2 4 Several other states refused to join the
settlement and elected to continue to pursue the case in the remand
proceedings. Although the Final Judgment does not adopt any
particular legal theory, it imposes certain restrictions on Microsoft's
behavior that will enhance access to the Windows operating system.
In several respects, however, the Final Judgment falls short of
a comprehensive open access decree. The district court should
address these deficiencies by adopting a broader remedial approach
in its final remand decision.
The final remedy in Microsoft III must deal with all of the
means by which the company leverages its operating system
monopoly. At the same time, the remedy must protect Microsoft's
right to continue to improve Windows. The company must remain
free to integrate new functions into Windows that benefit con-
sumers. Microsoft should not, for example, be deemed to have
illegally tied its instant messaging system to Windows simply by
ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 67, 67.
204. Second Revised Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft, No. 98-1232
(D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2002), available at http'/www.usdoj.gov/atr/casesfflOlOO/10146.htm
(hereinafter Final Judgment].
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embedding the software in the operating system. Such conduct had
a legitimate purpose apart from Microsoft's desire to leverage its
operating system monopoly. Consumers benefit from such bundling
by being able to use the instant messaging feature in conjunction
with other Internet services." 5 Thus, it is appropriate that the
Final Judgment does not require Microsoft to make available
versions of Windows in which particular functions have been
removed.0 8 Such a requirement would force Microsoft to market an
inferior product to consumers.20 7
The final remedy in Microsoft III must ensure open access to the
OEM distribution channel.0 8 The Final Judgment takes several
important steps to open the OEM distribution channel to competing
applications. Microsoft cannot restrict the freedom of OEMs to
pre-install competing applications, and the company is precluded
from taking any actions to retaliate against OEMs that distribute
or promote such applications.2 9 The Final Judgment also prevents
Microsoft from selectively modifying the terms of its license
agreements to induce particular OEMs to avoid competing
applications. Microsoft is required to license Windows under
uniform terms to the twenty largest OEMs in the world, and it
must publish its pricing terms on a Microsoft website accessible to
OEMs and to the government.210 Finally, Microsoft may not use its
205. One commentator has pointed out that the integration of instant messaging with
Windows will allow consumers to be notified electronically of "events ranging from a busted
eBay bid to a cancelled plane flight ...." Buckman, supra note 112.
206. As one commentator explained, "luinder the proposed deal, Microsoft won't be forced
to remove anything from Windows, leaving intact the browser, online audio-video players and
instant messaging." John R. Wilke et al., Microsoft Antitrust Accord Would Place Few
Restrictions on Entering New Markets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2001, at A3.
207. The Department of Justice, in fact, considered, and then rejected, the idea of
including such a requirement in the Final Judgment. Competitive Impact Statement, supra
note 180, at 60-63. However, the remaining state plaintiffs in Microsoft III have requested
that the district court require Microsoft to make available to OEMs versions of the operating
system that delete any functions (including browsers, e-mail, media services, playback
software, digital imaging, and instant messaging software) that have been bundled into
Windows. Plaintiff Litigating States' Remedial Proposals at 5, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://209.190.248.167/issues/microsoftl
pdf011207-states-remedy.pdf [hereinafter, Plaintiffs' Remedial Proposals].
208. As one commentator recently pointed out, "If the PC makers have greater freedom
to add rivals' software and remove some features that Microsoft bundles with Windows,
consumers should benefit from a greater diversity of offerings." Lohr, supra note 165.
209. Final Judgment, supra note 204, §§ III.A., III.C.
210. Id. § III.B.
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license agreements to preclude OEMs from removing icons,
shortcuts, or menu entries for Microsoft applications, replacing
such features with those designed to direct users to non-Microsoft
applications,2 ' and electing to have the operating system auto-
matically invoke competing programs in place of Microsoft appli-
cations.212
ii. Deficiencies in the Final Judgment
Under the Final Judgment, Microsoft can still take certain steps
to foreclose the OEM distribution channel to competing appli-
cations. Microsoft may prevent Windows from invoking a non-
Microsoft product whenever that product fails "to supply the end
user with functionality consistent with a Windows Operating
System Product" or "fails to implement a reasonable technical
requirement" of Microsoft. 213 This provision gives Microsoft
considerable leeway to continue to direct end users to its own
applications, and it should be eliminated by the district court in its
final remedy. The Final Judgment also does not restrict Microsoft
from inducing users to remove competing applications after they
have been pre-installed by OEMs. The final remedy should preclude
Microsoft from using rebates, discounts, or other incentives to
convince users to change their selection of applications after they
purchase a personal computer.
The Final Judgment entirely disregards the District of Columbia
Circuit Court's conclusion in Microsoft III that the company
bundled its Internet browser with the operating system in order to
prevent OEMs from pre-installating competing browsers. 21 The
circuit court's conclusions on bundling were the most controversial
aspect of its Microsoft III decision.21 The bundling conclusions,
211. Id. §§ III.C., III.H. However, as one commentator recently pointed out, "it is unclear
whether any PC makers will ... [take advantage of their right to alter the boot-up screen].
Microsoft offered this flexibility for browsers in July [2000], and not one major PC maker
took them up on it." Wilke et al., supra note 206.
212. Final Judgment, supra note 204, § III.H.2.b.
213. Id.
214. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 64-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
215. In fact, Microsoft filed a motion requesting that the circuit court reconsider its finding
that Microsoft's bundling of the browser with Windows was anticompetitive. In a short three-
sentence decision, the circuit court denied Microsoft's motion. United States v. Microsoft
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however, may ultimately prove to be the most important portion
of the Microsoft III case.21 On remand, the district court should
recognize, as the circuit court did, that OEMs will be willing to
install a competing application in. place of Microsoft's only if they
can remove not only the visible evidence of Microsoft's application
(i.e., icons, shortcuts, and menu entries), but also the underlying
software that powers the application. As the circuit court ex-
plained with respect to Microsoft's browser, if OEMs had been able
easily to remove the Internet Explorer browser, "they might have
chosen to pre-install Navigator alone."217 Thus, Microsoft should be
required to include its applications on the "Add/Remove" utility
program and to cease its practice of commingling the code for its
applications with the operating system code.218 OEMs could then
truly configure software on their PCs in a manner dictated by
consumers. OEMs would have a choice of electing to accept
Windows as is, configured only with Microsoft applications, or to
substitute competing programs for the Microsoft applications.
It is not enough, however, for Microsoft simply to allow open
access to the OEM distribution channel; it must also permit open
access to the Windows operating system itself. The Windows
operating system has no inherent capacity limitations. Its value
both to Microsoft and to its customers increases with the number of
compatible applications programs. Thus, it is against Microsoft's
legitimate interest to make it difficult for competitors' applications
to work in conjunction with Windows. In order to give competing
applications a level playing field, the final remedy should require
Corp., No. 00-5213 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 2001), available at http://ecfp.cadc.uscourts.gov/MS-
DOCS/1741/0.pdf.
216. See Wilke et aL, supra note 206 (referring to "the most critical part of the appeals-
court decision" and concluding, "Most important, the court found that 'commingling'
competitive features such as the Internet browser with Windows was unlawful if its purpose
was to protect the Windows monopoly.").
217. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
218. Charles James, the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, has argued that Microsoft's new Internet features are so deeply
woven into Windows that they cannot be removed without harming the operating system.
He recently asked, 'How would consumers be served if we forced Microsoft to remove that
code? The market has changed." Wilke, supra note 164. However, both the district court and
circuit court inMicrosoft Ifi answered this question by stating that Microsoft should not have
designed the relevant version of Windows initially in such a way that removing the cede for
a particular application would cripple the entire operating system. See supra notes 183-86
and accompanying text.
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Microsoft to (1) design Windows so that consumers can replace
Microsoft products with applications of their own choice, (2) make
timely disclosure of technical API information to rival applications
programmers, and (3) refrain from imposing hurdles to Java's
interface with Windows.
If consumers are to have a real choice of competing applications,
they, as well as OEMs, should be able to cause the Windows
operating system to invoke non-Microsoft applications. As a com-
mentator recently pointed out, the Windows "interface should be
neutral about which service a customer wants."2 1 9 Therefore,
instead of initially calling up a Microsoft application, the Windows
interfaces should include a prompt that explains how users can
attach their own instant messaging, browser, e-mail, or other
application.
The Final' Judgment requires Microsoft to disclose to rival
applications developers technical information concerning its
APIs.22 ° The Final Judgment, however, does not eliminate
Microsoft's advantage in having such information well in advance
of its competitors. Under the Final Judgment, Microsoft is not
required to release API information until new versions of the
operating system have entered the "beta," or testing phase. Indeed,
the Final Judgment does not require disclosure until after Microsoft
has released a test version of a new Windows program that is made
available through a subscription offering or of which 150,000 or
more beta copies are distributed.221' This will be too late for rival
applications firms to develop programs that can be immediately
219. Mossberg, supra note 200.
220. Final Judgment, supra note 204, § III.D. Microsoft has "allegedly leveraged its
monopoly power from operating systems into application software markets, by withholding
technical information on interfaces ... from application developers." Sheremata, supra note
1, at 945. Microsoft has no legitimate reason to deny competitors information concerning its
APIs. It can disclose sufficient information about the APIs to enable programmers to write
such applications without disclosing the vital portions of the Windows source code. Thus,
Microsoft should be required to disclose "enough high level information to satisfy the
requirements of application writers without disclosing low-level kernel detail that discloses
much about the implementation of the operating system ...." O'Rourke, supra note 187, at
513 n.150. Microsoft, in fact, already discloses such information to certain computer
manufacturers and software developers. See Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d
9, 40, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The company should extend the same advantage to all software
developers, including those developing cross-platform applications.
221. Final Judgment, supra note 204, § III.D.
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competitive with Microsoft. Microsoft can also refuse to disclose
technical information to a firm that does not meet reasonable,
objective standards established by Microsoft for qualifying as a
viable business.222 This provision "could be a loophole for Microsoft
to keep information from a start-up with no track record, but whose
technology could challenge one of Microsoft's products. 23 The final
remedy in Microsoft III should eliminate these exceptions and
simply require Microsoft to make technical information concerning
any changes in its APIs available to all third-party applications
developers at the same time the company makes such information
available to its own applications programmers. 24
The final remedy in Microsoft III should also ensure that Java
software has the same ability to run on Windows as Microsoft's
own applications software. The Final Judgment precludes
Microsoft from retaliating against any software developers that
develop or promote competing software such as Java.2" However,
the Final Judgment does not prevent Microsoft from developing and
promoting a version of Java that runs only on Windows, or from
designing Windows so that a "cross-platform" version of Java
will not run effectively. The district court concluded in Microsoft
III that Microsoft's development of its own Java version was
anticompetitive, because it was designed to protect Microsoft's
monopoly in operating systems.2" The District of Columbia Circuit
Court reversed the Java liability finding, concluding that "a
monopolist does not violate the antitrust laws simply by developing
a product that is incompatible with those of its rivals." 27 Under the
approach proposed in this Article, however, Microsoft's redesign of
Java would constitute an illegal denial of access to Windows.
Microsoft had no legitimate reason to make Windows incompatible
222. Id. § III.J.2.c.
223. Stephen Labaton & Steve Lohr, U.S. and Some States Split on Microsoft, Risking
New Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at Cl.
224. See id. (N1 would prefer that ... [the fimal remedy] simply embrace the principle that
competitors will'get equal treatment with the Microsoft developers making software products
that run on Windows.... The decree should say outside firms will be treated equally instead
of giving Microsoft a head start.*) (quoting anonymous Microsoft competitor).
225. Final Judgment, supra note 204, § III.F.
226. Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 110 (D.D.C. 1999).
227. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court did, however, find that
Microsoft improperly discouraged software developers from supporting the universal version
of Java. Id. at 75-78.
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* with Sun Microsystem's version of Java. The changes that caused
such incompatibility did not add any technical value to the
operating system. In fact, the changes made the operating system
less efficient by preventing cross-platform porting. Thus, Microsoft
was acting against its own legitimate self-interest in redesigning
Java. The District of Columbia Circuit Court should have concluded
in Microsoft III that the real purpose of the redesign was to
perpetuate Microsoft's operating system monopoly, and the district
court should include in the final remedy a prohibition on any
designs that prevent the cross-platform version of Java from
running on Windows.228
Finally, the ultimate remedy in Microsoft III should ensure that,
in future versions of Windows, Microsoft cannot make it more
difficult for consumers to use competing Internet applications. The
Final Judgment is deficient in this respect. Although it does apply
to future versions of the operating system and to new Internet
applications designed by Microsoft, including video and audio
services and instant messaging,22 the Final Judgment allows
Microsoft to continue to preclude competing.Internet applications
from accessing Windows. The company, for example, does not have
to share technical API information with rivals if doing so would
"compromise the security of ... anti-piracy, anti-virus, software
licensing, digital rights management, encryption or authentication
systems .... uo These are critical technologies for online media and
Internet commerce, and many of Microsoft's competitors believe
that Microsoft will use this exception to shield a number of new
Microsoft applications, including Passport and Microsoft's Media
Player, from disclosure requirements.3 1 Thus, the district court
should remove the exception from its final remedy in Microsoft III.
228. The remaining state plaintiffs in Microsoft III have proposed that the district court
require Microsoft to "distribute free of charge ... with all copies of ... Windows ... a
competitively performing Windows-compatible version of ... Java ... ." Plaintiffs' Remedial
Proposals, supra note 207, at 18.
229. Final Judgment, supra note 204, § VI.K.2.a.
230. Id. § III.J.1.
231. Wilke, supra note 164.
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D. Exclusive Dealing
In a competitive market, a seller may have legitimate reasons
for requiring its customers to purchase products exclusively from it
and not from its competitors. Such "exclusive dealing" contracts
force a reseller to concentrate on promoting the seller's products
and prevent it from giving rivals a "free ride" on the seller's
promotional efforts.2" 2 Such rationale, however, do not apply to
monopolists. Since a monopolist's products are, by definition,
already dominant in the relevant market, it need not require its
resellers to focus their efforts exclusively on its products.
Furthermore, a monopolist incurs short-term costs when it imposes
exclusive dealing arrangements on its customers. Such agreements
reduce a monopolist's reservoir of goodwill with its customers and
use up leverage with which a monopolist could have pursued
concessions on price, delivery, and other terms of sale. A monopolist
would risk incurring such short-term costs only if it believed that
in the long run, it could benefit by making it more difficult for
potential rivals to access the customer outlets necessary to survive
in the relevant market.
The courts' current standard for exclusive dealing focuses upon
the percentage of customer outlets foreclosed by the arrangement.
Under the current approach, a plaintiff could prevail in an exclusive
dealing case only when it could prove that more than thirty to forty
percent of such outlets have been affected.2"' Such an approach,
however, is unduly burdensome for high technology antitrust
plaintiffs. A plaintiff should have to demonstrate merely that a
monopolist required one or more customers not to deal with it. The
adverse effect of an exclusive dealing arrangement is not dependent
232. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (holding that
prevention of free riding may justify certain restraints placed by seller on its customers); Am.
Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1252 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that a hotel
chain's exclusionary agreements with franchisees is justified, in part, by the chain's desire
to strengthen its position vis-&-vis its competitors).
233. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7, 32 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (finding that exclusive contract which foreclosed thirty percent of market was
not illegal); Microsoft III-Conclusions of Law, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 52 (D.D.C. 2000) (describing
forty percent threshold of illegality for exclusive dealing arrangement); Gonzales v.
Insignares, No. C84-1261A, 1985 WL 2206, at *2 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (granting summary
judgment for defendant when only forty percent of consumers were affected by exclusive
arrangement).
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upon the number of outlets that it covers. A firm may be unable to
compete in the relevant market without access to a particular
reseller that controls an essential gateway to the market.
Foreclosure of a single customer with such characteristics can raise
barriers to entry just as severely as the foreclosure of a substantial
percentage of the other customers in the relevant market.
In Microsoft III, the government claimed that Microsoft had
entered into various exclusive dealing arrangements with OEMs,
Internet access providers (IAPs), and Internet content providers
(ICPs) in order to foreclose Netscape's browser from the market.
Microsoft provided various inducements to such parties, including
rebates, reduced prices, free versions of Microsoft's browser, and
preferential placement on the Windows boot-up screen, all in
exchange for agreements by the OEMs, IAPs, and ICPs to promote
Microsoft's browser exclusively. Judge Jackson held that these
arrangements were not illegal, because they did not foreclose at
least forty percent of the relevant market.234 The District of
Columbia Circuit Court, however, concluded that it was sufficient
that the arrangements foreclosed "a substantial percentage of the
available opportunities for browser distribution."235
Neither of these approaches dealt appropriately with Microsoft's
arrangements with OEMs, IAPs, and ICPs. The district court's
formulation failed to recognize that Microsoft should have been
prevented from foreclosing any of these critical distribution
channels from its competitors. For its part, the circuit court
neglected to explain what percentage foreclosure is substantial
enough to warrant Section 1 liability. By contrast, the proposed
approach recognizes that monopolists have no legitimate reason for
entering into exclusive dealing arrangements. A prohibition of all
such arrangements will clarify the standards for exclusive dealing
and deter monopolists from inducing their customers to assist them
in perpetuating or extending their monopoly power.
234. Microsoft III-Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,67-68,71-72 (D.D.C. 1999); Microsoft
Ill-Conclusions of Law, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 52 (D.D.C. 2000).
235. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Final Judgment prohibits
Microsoft from entering into exclusive dealing arrangements with OEMs, LAPs, and ICPs.
Final Judgment, supra note 204, § III.F.
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E. Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing occurs when a firm lowers its prices in order
to eliminate a current competitor in the relevant market or to
prevent new firms from entering the market.236 After a rival exits
or declines to enter the relevant market, the monopolist can recoup
profits in excess of the losses it incurred in driving the rival from
the market.23 7 Since the late 1970s, the federal courts generally
have adopted the definition of predatory pricing set forth in a 1975
law review article by Professors Areeda and Turner.2 8 Under the
Areeda-Turner approach, a price is considered per se lawful (i.e.,
nonpredatory) if it equals or exceeds the marginal cost of producing
the product, while it is deemed per se illegal (i.e., predatory) if it is
below a firm's marginal cost.2 9 The Areeda-Turner approach is
based on the recognition that lower prices benefit consumers and
are usually the result of fair competition. Under Areeda-Turner, a
firm that makes any profit on each additional product it sells,
however small, is presumed to do so because it is efficient. Only if
a company incurs losses on selling each additional product is it
presumed to be acting for anticompetitive reasons.4
The Areeda-Turner test, however, poses too high a hurdle for
plaintiffs in high technology markets. Even if they do not reduce
their prices to a level below their costs, high technology firms may
engage in predatory pricing strategies that make no sense other
than as an attempt to acquire or maintain monopoly power. Indeed,
a cost-based rule allows high technology firms to evade predatory
pricing liability entirely, because the marginal cost of producing
most intellectual property is zero.2 4 Once a high technology firm
236. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1975).
237. As the Supreme Court pointed out, "For the investment to be rational, the
[monopolist] must have a reasonable expectation ofrecovering, in the form of later monopoly
profits, more than the losses suffered." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986).
238. Areeda & Turner, supra note 236, at 698-99.
239. See, e.g., California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 743 (9th Cir.
1979) (quoting extensively from Areeda and Turner's seminal article in finding that IBM did
not engage in predatory pricing when it sold products at levels above marginal cost).
240. Areeda & Turner, supra note 236, at 711-12.
241. See Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88
GEO. L.J. 2239,2285 (2000) (reasoning that "a cost-based rule that required price to be below
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has achieved monopoly power, its low marginal costs give it the
ability to "underprice potential competitors who may thus never
get big enough to prosper."242 With negligible marginal costs,
high technology firms can reduce their prices to levels low
enough to discourage new entry but high enough to maintain their
profitability.
The unique economic characteristics of high technology markets
aggravate the adverse effects of predatory pricing. Because the
ultimate chances of success for any single firm are so slim, potential
entrants may be more easily discouraged when an incumbent firm
implements a low-pricing strategy.243 Courts must act quickly to
prevent predatory pricing before the strategy is successful, because
network monopolies, once established, are very difficult to un-
wind.2" Indeed, network owners have a substantial incentive to
engage in predatory pricing when they are vying for market power
at a market's initial development stage. Since every new user
increases the value of a network, the revenue lost on temporary
price reductions may be more than made up by the higher
price users ultimately will pay for access to a larger network.
Recoupment of any losses will be easier, because consumers will be
reluctant to abandon a network once it obtains monopoly power,
even if the network substantially increases its prices. 24 1
Instead of the cost-based standard of Areeda-Turner, courts
should adopt a broader purpose-based approach to predatory
pricing in high technology markets. Courts should preclude any
pricing strategy that makes no sense other than as an attempt
to extend or perpetuate a firm's monopoly power, regardless
of whether the firm prices below its costs. A high technology
short-run costs in all cases would effectively exempt computer software from predatory
pricing constraints").
242. Ip, supra note 65.
243. See Bolton et al., supra note 241, at 2247-48 (pointing out that firms confronted with
predatory pricing in high technology markets "may be deterred from entering the industry").
244. See Teece & Coleman, supra note 10, at 869 ("With network industries, ... allegations
of anticompetitive behavior need to be treated quickly and seriously. Once the market has
tipped it may be difficult or even undesirable to undo any anticompetitive effects that have
arisen....).
245. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 45, at 725 ("Because returns in strong network
markets increase with demand ... and because consumers' reluctance to abandon the
dominant standard may deter entry, recoupment of losses incurred ... may be easier than
has been presumed ... in nonnetwork markets.").
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monopolist need not necessarily reduce its prices below cost in order
to deter a potential rival from entering its market. For example, a
cable company with a monopoly in a local market might reduce
its prices when faced by potential competition from a firm
contemplating the construction of a rival cable system. Since the
costs of constructing such systems are substantial, even a relatively
small reduction in cable rates could deter the rival from proceeding
with the new system. The incumbent cable system would have no
rational reason for foregoing profits other than to eliminate a
potential competitor. Assured of its local monopoly, the cable
system could easily raise its rates and recoup its losses after the
new entrant was eliminated as a potential threat. The courts could
preclude such a strategy under the approach proposed in this
Article.
V. APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO HIGH TECHNOLOGY
COLLABORATIONS
A. Deficiencies in the Current Approach
High technology collaborations have become increasingly
popular in recent years. Indeed, B2B collaborations have become
the most prevalent form ofjoint venture for American companies,2 46
including as partners the "stalwarts of the Old Economy," such as
General Motors and Ford, as well as high technology firms.247
The FTC Staff Report characterizes B2Bs as "the new business
development most likely to transform how business is conducted in
the twenty-first century."24 8 The Report states that hundreds of
billions of dollars in transactions are already being directed through
246. Commentators have observed that the scope of new B2Bs is "more pervasive, larger
and all encompassing than any previous wave ofjoint venture activity." Mitnick, supra note
16, at 31.
247. See Totty, supra note 2; see also Roundtable on B2B Exchanges, supra note 62, at 16
(comments of Professor Sunil Gupta) ("In the second stage [of B2B development],
incumbents, such as GM and Ford, started their own exchanges largely in response to the
exchanges created by the new players."). The major automobile companies recently entered
into their "Covisint" B2B joint venture for the design, manufacture and supply of
automobiles. Barnett & Fanelli, supra note 121, at 2.
248. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Introduction, at 1.
[Vol. 44:65
HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
B2Bs and that the volume of such commerce will reach trillions of
dollars within the next five years.
249
Despite the increasing popularity of high technology joint
ventures, the courts continue to struggle with their antitrust
implications. Federal policy toward joint ventures has been termed
"one of the darkest corners of antitrust law."250 One commentator
recently concluded that "[flor over one hundred years, antitrust
joint venture law has been a morass of confusion and ambiguity."25 '
Robert Pitofsky, a former Chairman of the FTC, has remarked that
"enforcement policy (and law) have almost certainly blocked,
delayed, or raised the cost of legitimate [joint ventures]."252 The
courts and enforcement agencies have rendered confusing and
conflicting opinions on the treatment of joint ventures. 25' Despite
recent attempts to clarify joint venture analysis, the relevant
standards "remain frustratingly vague."25 4 This has been especially
true for high technology joint ventures, which "present unusually
difficult questions of fact because of the technical complexity of the
products and services produced by new-economy industries."255
The courts' confusion has left practitioners and business
executives uncertain as to the types of ventures and related
competitive restraints that will pass antitrust muster. Indeed,
249. Id. Certain commentators have stated that there are "now more than 1,000 B2B's,
and they will do about $720 billion in business in 2001." Bell & Adkinson, supra note 2, at
18. Another commentator has opined that B2B commerce may reach $1.3 trillion by 2003.
Shawn Young, Tech Giants Brew Hefty B2B Venture, USA TODAY, May 30, 2000, at B1; see
also MAPI REPORT, supra note 33, at 3 ("Early in 2000, there were between 800 and 1,400
e-marketplaces or exchanges covering virtually every major industry in the U.S. economy.").
250. Joseph F. Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A
Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453,453 (1976); see also Ernest Gellhorn & W.
Todd Miller, Competitor Collaboration Guidelines-A Recommendation, 42 ANTITRUSTBULL.
851,853 (1997) (noting that "the legal rules and policies applied to competitor collaborations
are often confused and confusing").
251. Charles P. Weller, A New Rule of Reason From Justice Brandeis' "Concentric Circles"
and Other Changes in Law, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 881, 881 (1999); see also Donald I. Baker,
Compulsory Access to Network Joint Ventures Under the Sherman Act: Rules or Roulette?,
1993 UTAH L. REV. 999, 1052-54 (1993) (describing the courts' approach to joint ventures as
"the legacy of error and confusion").
252. Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J.
1605, 1605 (1986).
253. See infra notes 261-86 and accompanying text.
254. Edward Correia, Joint Ventures:Issues in Enforcement Policy, 66 ANTITRUSTL.J. 737,
737 (1998).
255. Posner, supra note 20, at 936.
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because of the uncertainty surrounding joint venture analysis, such
arrangements have been treated more harshly than mergers,
despite the fact that mergers have more serious anticompetitive
effects.256 There is no greater deterrence to capital investment in
high technology markets than uncertainty. As one commentator has
stated, "Uncertainty is a high-cost commodity. Indeed, the business
community ... might find uncertainty more costly than clear and
wrong rules."257 Joint ventures are difficult to establish and
maintain. Many such arrangements dissolve because of cultural
differences between the parties, concerns about sharing competitive
information, and disputes over management and control issues.25
It has, in fact, been estimated that approximately sixty percent of
joint ventures ultimately fail.259 Firms will be even less willing to
assume the risks of entering into efficiency-enhancing ventures if
the relevant antitrust standards are unclear.60
The deficiencies in the courts' analysis of joint ventures stem
from (1) their failure to develop a consistent standard for analyzing
competitor collaborations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
(2) their confusion over whether to treat joint ventures as multiple
or single entities.
256. See Gellhorn & Miller, supra note 250, at 853-54 ('Even though they are less formal
or permanent and probably more common and competitively less dangerous than outright
mergers or acquisitions, joint ventures receive a more hostile reception in the agencies and
courts.").
257. Joe Sims, Developments in Agreements Among Competitors, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 433,
440(1989).
258. See Roundtable on B2B Exchanges, supra note 62, at 15 (comments of Professor Sunil
Gupta) (discussing such concerns of potential B2B partners).
259. Howard H. Chang et al., Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy
Towards Joint Ventures, 1998 COLum. Bus. L. REV. 223, 242-43. Another commentator has
concluded that "seventy percent of alliances either fail outright, fall captive to shifting
priorities, or achieve only initial goals, and ... fifty-five percent of alliances ... fall apart
within three years of conception." STUART KLIMAN, VANTAGE PARTNERS, LLC, AVOIDING
LITIGATION: CORPORATE COUNSEL'S ROLE IN ENSURING SUCCESSFUL ALLIANCE
IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2000); see also Flaherty, supra note 118, at 4 (noting that "one-third to
two-thirds of all alliances dissolve within a decade, depending on the industry").
260. See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 111, 20,852 ("[A] perception that antitrust
laws are skeptical about agreements among actual or potential competitors may deter the
development of procompetitive collaborations.*).
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1. Inconsistent Standards for Section 1 Restraints
During the last several years, the courts' analysis of competitor
collaborations has become more confused than ever as they have
struggled to replace the rigid rules of the past with a more flexible
approach. Traditionally, Section 1 analysis had been cleft into two
diametrically opposed standards: a "per se rule," under which
clearly anticompetitive restraints were deemed illegal on their face
without any inquiry into their actual competitive effects, and a "rule
of reason," under which the courts felt compelled to inquire into all
conceivable economic circumstances before finding a restraint
illegal.261 The per se rule was ascendant during the activist
antitrust era of the 1960s.262 However, beginning in the late 1970s,
the federal courts began to adopt a more economics-oriented
approach to antitrust analysis, and they became progressively more
disillusioned with the rigidity of the per se rule. In a series of
decisions between 1977 and 1986, the Supreme Court cut back on
the breadth of the per se rule and expanded the circumstances in
which the rule of reason would apply. For example, in BMI, the
Court declined to apply the per se rule to a blanket copyright
license developed by an association representing approximately
20,000 music copyright owners.26 3 Conceding that the license
constituted price fixing "in the literal sense,"264 the Court
nevertheless concluded that the license should be judged under the
rule of reason. The Court pointed out that, given the virtual
impossibility of "thousands of individual negotiations," the blanket
261. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches
to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 685-88 (1991) (describing per se and rule of
reason conduct).
262. By the late 1960s, the Supreme Court had applied the per se rule to horizontal price
fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 151 (1940), tying
arrangements, N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 2 (1958), horizontal territorial
and customer allocations, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 355 (1967), group
boycotts, United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966), and vertical
restrictions imposed by a supplier on its distributors, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977).
263. BMI v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1978).
264. Id. at 8-9.
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license made it possible for the members of the association to
compete in the market for musical compositions.265
The expanded use of the rule of reason, however, created its own
problems. The courts never adequately explained how the rule of
reason should be applied. Most courts simply recited a long list of
factors without indicating the relevance or weight to be afforded
any particular factor.26 The absence of clear standards makes it
difficult to predict the outcome of rule of reason cases. If all
economic conditions must be considered, the courts presumably
must inquire into the market power of the parties to the restraints
before ruling on their legality. Such an inquiry requires a
determination of the relevant product and geographic markets and
the shares of these markets held by the parties. Determining
market definition and market shares can be a "formidable
undertaking," involving a fact-intensive inquiry of the parties
and their principal competitors.6 7 That determination can be
particularly difficult in high technology markets, in which market
shares and market boundaries can change quickly and the technical
sophistication of the relevant products often confuses the fact
finders.6 8 Indeed, most judges and juries are simply not capable of
making the economic decisions required by a full rule of reason
market power analysis. 69
265. Id. at 20; see also FTC v. Indep. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (applying rule
of reason to refusal by association of dentists to supply their patients' x-rays to insurance
companies); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985) (applying rule of reason to decision by purchasing cooperative to expel one of its
members); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (applying rule of reason to limits
imposed by NCAA on the number of times its member colleges could appear on television);
Cont'l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (applying rule of reason to location restrictions imposed by
television manufacturer upon its distributors).
266. The classic formulation of the rule of reason, set forth by Justice Brandeis in Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), includes such factors as the circumstances
peculiar to the defendant's business, the conditions before and after the restraint, the nature
and purpose of the restraint, and the competitive effects of the restraint. Id. at 238.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases failed to refine this open-ended formula. See, e.g., Cont'l
T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 49 n.15 (1977) (citing Justice Brandeis' formula).
267. Correia, supra note 254, at 752.
268. See Posner, supra note 20, at 936-37 (observing that "cases in the new economy
present unusually difficult questions of fact because of the technical complexity of the
products and services produced by new-economy industries").
269. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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The problems with the per se rule and the rule of reason
prompted the courts and enforcement agencies to search for an
intermediate approach to antitrust analysis. The courts and
agencies recently adopted a variation called the "quick look." Under
the quick look, the plaintiff need merely prove that a restraint is of
a type that is likely to have anticompetitive effects.270 After such a
showing, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to demonstrate
a procompetitive justification for the restraint.
The cases adopting the quick look failed to explain when the per
se rule, the rule of reason, or the quick look should be used to
analyze a particular restraint.271 The Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the issue in 1999, in California Dental Assoc. V. FTC.272 At
issue were advertising restrictions imposed by an association of
dentists. The FTC found the restrictions illegal under the quick
look. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that a quick look
approach was not appropriate. Instead, under a "less quick look,"
the Commission should have considered the potential benefits of the
dentists' limitations on certain types of advertising.273 Concluding
that "the quality of proof required [for competitors' collaborations]
270. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Where a practice has
obvious anticompetitive effects ... there is no need to prove that the defendant possesses
market power."); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658,673-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (employing
a truncated analysis for agreements among universities on financial aid offerings); U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593-94 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining the
plaintiff's advantage in having a reduced burden ofproof); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d
567, 569 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that a truncated rule of reason analysis applies "when the
agreement at issue is very similar to per se violations and might, but for prudential
constraints, be analyzed under the per se presumption"); In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in
Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988) (using quick look to analyze advertising restrictions
imposed by an association of optometrists).
271. The enforcement agencies' attempts to define when the quick look should apply have
been no more successful. The agencies' definitions range from "inherently suspect" conduct
in the FTC's Massachusetts Board decision, Massachusetts Board of Registration, 110 F.T.C.
at 604, to agreements that directly "restrict competition" in the approach advocated by the
Department of Justice, see Joel I. Klein, A Stepwise Approach to the Antitrust Review of
Horizontal Agreements 2, Address Before the ABA Antitrust Section (Nov. 7,1996), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/jikaba.htm), to restraints that have a "clear
likelihood of anticompetitive harm" in the Collaboration Guidelines jointly issued by the
FTC and the DOJ. Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 111, 1 20,853. These differing
formulations give little guidance to judges, juries, or litigants on the legality of particular
conduct.
272. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
273. Id. at 781.
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should vary with the circumstances,"27' the Court explicitly
recognized the proposals of certain commentators, including this
author, that Section 1 analysis should constitute a continuum,
allowing for different levels of scrutiny depending upon the
restraint at issue.27r The Court, however, left a critical gap in its
analysis when it failed to explain how particular restraints should
be classified on the Section 1 continuum. The Court simply stated
that no categorical line can be "drawn between restraints that give
rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and
those that call for more detailed treatment."
276
California Dental thus added its own layer of confusion to the
analysis of collaborations among competitors. After California
Dental, antitrust practitioners can no longer advise their clients,
with any degree of certainty, whether such arrangements will be
analyzed under the per se rule, the quick look, the less quick look,
or the traditional rule of reason.277
2. Confusion Over Analyzing Joint Ventures as Single or
Multiple Entities
There is a fundamental disagreement among the federal courts
about whether joint ventures should be treated for antitrust
purposes as single entities or as associations of independent
competitors. The distinction between the multiple and single entity
approaches is critical. If joint ventures are deemed to be associa-
tions of independent competitors, competitive restraints among the
parties may violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
"[every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
274. Id. at 780 (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1507 (1986)).
275. Id. at 780 n.15 (citing William Kolasky, Counterpoint: The Department of Justice's
"Stepwise" Approach Imposes Too Heavy a Burden on Parties to Horizontal Agreements, 12
ANTITRUST, Spring 1998, at 41, 43; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of
Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1771
(1994)).
276. Id. at 780-81.
277. The enforcement agencies have been unable to clarify the standards of California
Dental. Indeed, the agencies' Collaboration Guidelines, like California Dental, give little
guidance as to how particular joint ventures should be treated. The Collaboration Guidelines
merely repeat the Supreme Court's admonition in California Dental that the analysis ofjoint
ventures should vary "depending on the nature of the agreement and market circumstances."
Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 11, 20,856.
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trade."27 Under such an approach, the courts could preclude joint
venture partners from agreeing to limit competition among
themselves by, for example, restricting the output or fixing the
prices of the venture's products. However, if a joint venture were
deemed to be a single entity, such restraints could not violate
Section 1, because the requisite plurality of actors would not be
present.
The single versus multiple entity debate has arisen most
frequently in the context of sports leagues. A league's rules often
include restrictions on several aspects of non-athletic competition
among teams, such as relocation, expansion, free agency, television
appearances, and the "draft" of amateur players. In several
cases, these restrictions have been challenged under Section 1 as
illegal conspiracies among teams. Some courts have found such
restrictions illegal, concluding that the teams within a professional
sports league compete in an economic as well as athletic sense and
thus should be liable under Section 1 for implementing restrictions
on such competition." 9 Other courts, however, have concluded that
the cooperation among teams in a sports league is so pervasive that
the teams should not be regarded as economic competitors at all.
Under this view, the professional sports leagues have been deemed
single entities whose members are incapable of conspiring in
violation of Section 1.280
The Supreme Court itself has taken an inconsistent approach to
the issue of whether sports leagues should be treated as single
entities or as groups of competitors. In NCAA v. Board ofRegents,281
278. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
279. See, e.g., Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381,1387-90 (9th Cir. 1984);
N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1255 (2d Cir. 1981); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867,891-96 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
280. See Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. NHL, 783 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting plaintiffs' claim that they were illegally denied entry to NHL on grounds that they
were "not competing with the NHL; [but] they were seeking to join it"); Mid-South Grizzlies
v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1983) ("There is no record evidence that professional
football teams ... compete...."); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir.
1978) ("[7The NFL clubs which have 'combined' to implement the draft are not competitors
in any economic sense."); San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966,970 (C.D. Cal.
1974) ("[NHL member clubs] are not competitors in the economic sense in this relevant
market. They are, in fact, all members of a single unit ....").
281. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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the Court took a multiple entity approach. The Court held that the
NCAA could not limit the number of times each of its member
schools' teams could appear on television. The Court emphasized
that the NCAA colleges competed against each other for tele-
vision revenues, fans, and athletes.282 In Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc.,2 s. however, a case involving the non-statutory labor antitrust
exemption," 4 the Court concluded that the members of the NFL are
"more like a single bargaining employer,"2 85 because "the clubs
that make up a professional sports league are not completely
independent economic competitors, as they depend upon a degree
of cooperation for economic survival."" 6
B. Resolving the Deficiencies of Joint Venture Analysis
The courts can resolve both the single versus multiple entity
debate and the issues left open in California Dental by separately
considering the legality of (1) high technology joint ventures
themselves, (2) any restraints on competition implemented by joint
venture partners, and (3) any exclusionary conduct undertaken by
joint ventures with monopoly power.
1. Analyzing the Legality of Joint Ventures
In the first step of their analysis, the courts can concentrate on
any anticompetitive effects likely to result from the mere fact of the
parties' collaboration. This will allow the courts to clarify what
California Dental left unresolved: that is, the degree of inquiry
necessary to confirm the legality of particular collaborations among
competitors. The courts should establish a continuum under which
the degree of analysis will vary depending upon the purpose of the
joint venture at issue. Most high technology joint ventures do not
pose a threat to competition. Indeed, the courts can establish
282. Id. at 99.
283. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
284. This exemption allows collective bargaining agreements to include certain
.competition-restricting agreements" without running afoul of the Sherman Act. Id. at 236-
37.
285. Id. at 249.
286. Id. at 248 (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02).
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"safety zones" of conclusive legality for any joint ventures that are
not intended to combine their partners' market power at the
downstream production or marketing stages. In high technology
markets, most joint ventures either involve upstream activities-
such as standards-setting, research and development, or purchasing
collaborations--or the production or marketing of new products." 7
Because none of these joint ventures affect the pricing or output of
current products, they can have no adverse economic effect. Their
only effect is beneficial. Thus, the courts can approve such ventures
without any analysis of their economic effects. Since judges and
juries are not very good at judging the competitive effects of
high technology products, this approach will avoid the risk of
precluding efficiency enhancing arrangements. In most cases, the
outcome of the competitive analysis will be apparent, and there will
be no reason to undertake the difficult effort of establishing
anticompetitive effects, as in traditional rule of reason cases.
Only in the rare case of downstream production and marketing
joint ventures for current products will the courts have to engage in
any additional inquiry. The courts would have to determine
whether the beneficial effects of such ventures outweighed their
anticompetitive effects. Even in such cases, however, the courts'
approach need not be as complicated as under the traditional
rule of reason. The courts can simplify their analysis by adopting
a market power threshold. Since joint ventures are less anti-
competitive than mergers, 2" the courts should permit any
production or marketing joint ventures whose parties have a
collective market share below the threshold that would be
acceptable for a merger. Given the potential efficiencies of joint
ventures, the courts could justify a market power threshold forjoint
ventures as high as fifty percent.
287. Joint ventures involving current products at the downstream stage of the production
cycle are rare, because firms are more likely to acquire competing product lines than to enter
into joint venture for their production or sale. Most firms would prefer to control the
production and sale of their current products rather than to share such decisionmaking with
their competitors.
288. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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2. Analyzing Restraints Among Joint Venture Partners
After a court determines that a high technology joint venture
poses no threat to competition in and of itself, it should consider the
legality of any competitive restraints implemented by the joint
venture partners as well as any monopoly conduct undertaken by
the joint venture. Such an analysis would resolve the single versus
multiple entity debate by recognizing that the choices between a
multiple and single entity approach need not be mutually exclusive.
The courts would treat joint ventures as single entities when they
attempted to perpetuate their monopoly power and as associations
of independent competitors when their partners pursued their
own competitive interests. As one commentator has explained, "A
joint venture is both an economic actor in its own right and a
collaboration of its participants."2"9 A joint venture can engage in
conduct designed to perpetuate or extend its own monopoly power
in one market, and at the same time, act as a vehicle for its
partners to collude among themselves to restrict competition in
other markets.
Under the proposed approach, the parties would not be shielded
from liability under Section 1 simply because they had entered into
a legitimate joint venture. The shareholders of a corporation could
not escape antitrust scrutiny if they conspired to fix prices in areas
outside the markets served by the corporation. The courts should be
no less willing to preclude the independent competitive acts ofjoint
venture partners. For example, if the members of a B2B purchasing
joint venture agree to charge uniform prices for their products, the
price fixing arrangement should not be exempt from liability merely
because its participants happened to have formed a B2B. Under the
proposed approach, the courts would preclude such restrictions as
naked restraints of trade among the joint venture partners.29
289. Werden, supra note 109, at 704.
290. In United States v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the court
recognized that joint venture partners should not be able to use their venture as a shield
against Section 1 liability. The court struck down bylaws of the Visa and MasterCard credit
card systems that prohibited member banks from issuing competing credit cards. If the court
had followed a single entity approach, the output restrictions would have escaped antitrust
scrutiny altogether because, lacking monopoly power, neither the Visa nor the MasterCard
joint venture could have been liable for engaging in anticompetitive conduct under Section
2 of the Sherman Act. However, the court concluded:
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The "ancillary restraints doctrine," first developed in the late
nineteenth century, provides a precedent for considering the
legality of any competitive restraints separately from the legality
of the joint venture to which they are related. The doctrine was first
established in the 1898 case, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. 29' In that case, Judge (later President and Chief Justice)
William Howard Taft precluded a price fixing agreement among
pipe manufacturers. In his decision, Taft distinguished between
"naked" restraints, which should be illegal on their face because
they are unrelated to any efficiency-enhancing integration, and
"ancillary" restraints, which are permissible because they are
necessary to promote the legitimate objectives of a cooperative
arrangement. 2 For nearly eighty years, the federal courts
neglected Judge Taft's approach. In the last twenty years, however,
the ancillary restraints doctrine has re-emerged in the lower federal
courts, as they have begun to adopt a more sophisticated approach
to antitrust analysis. In several cases, the federal circuit courts
have separately examined competitive restraints among joint
venture partners to determine whether they were necessary to
promote a venture's legitimate objectives. 293
3. Analyzing the Conduct of Monopoly Joint Ventures
In the final step of their analysis, the courts should determine
whether a joint venture holds monopoly power in its market. Of
course, if the plaintiff cannot prove that a joint venture has such
If Visa and MasterCard were traditional for-profit stock companies, an
agreement among competitors not to deal with a supplier would constitute aper
se illegal group boycott.... Defendants' members should not be able to
accomplish via association rules what they would clearly be barred from doing
in any other context.... 'IJ]oint ventures should not provide an organizational
ruse for evading the antitrust laws.'
Id. at 401-02.
291. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
292. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282-83.
293. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc., v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 964 (10th Cir. 1994)
(denial of membership in credit card system); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noncompetition agreement among agents of Van
Lines); Natl Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986) (interchange
fee among members of credit card system); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776
F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (noncompetition agreement between retailers); L.A. Mem'l Coliseum
v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984) (NFL's relocation restrictions).
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power, a court's inquiry should end. Joint ventures with monopoly
power have both the incentive and ability to engage in anti-
competitive conduct. Such ventures should be liable under Section
2 when they engage in conduct designed to perpetuate or extend
their monopoly. The integration that occurs in a joint venture
creates a separate entity that is capable of acting in its own right,
whether it be for purchasing, research and development, or
marketing a particular product. In such cases, the joint venture is
acting as a single entity rather than as a confederation of its
participants.29 ' When a joint venture pursues such activities,
therefore, it can be assigned a single market share and treated as
a single actor for purposes of antitrust analysis.295 Joint ventures,
like individual firms, are perfectly capable of implementing access
restrictions, exclusive dealing arrangements, and other practices
designed to perpetuate or extend their monopoly power. Such
behavior is a particular threat in high technology markets, where
monopoly power is so lucrative and long-lasting. The proposed
approach would afford joint ventures no more leeway in pursuing
such conduct than individual high technology monopolists.
The following sections describe how, under the proposed
approach, the courts can judge the legality of (1) high technology
joint ventures themselves, (2) competitive restraints among joint
venture partners, and (3) monopoly conduct undertaken by joint
ventures.
294. Cf San Francisco Seals Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (holding
that the National Hockey League is "a single unit competing as such with other similar
professional leagues").
295. See Michael S. McFalls, The Role and Assessment of Classical Market Power in Joint
Venture Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 664 (1998) ("Because the parties will, by definition,
end all competition between themselves through the creation and operation of the joint
venture, their collaboration can be assigned a single market share, as is done in merger
analysis."). For cases applying such a single entity analysis, see FTC v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1984) (granting preliminary injunction
against an exclusive joint venture between two of the top six distributors of prerecorded
music); United States v. Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (enjoining joint
venture that would have ended all price and output competition among the parties in the
relevant market); United States v. Columbia Picture Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), affd mem., 659 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1981) (granting preliminary injunction against joint
venture of four of top six motion picture companies designed to create premium pay
television movie channel).
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VI. JUDGING THE LEGALITY OF JOINT VENTURES
The courts have sufficient experience with joint ventures to
place them on a continuum according to their competitive purpose.
In most cases, the parties' objectives for a venture should be a
reliable indication of its likely impact on competition. Thus, the
courts can use different degrees of inquiry depending upon a joint
venture's place on the continuum. Upstream joint ventures
designed for research and development, purchasing, or standards-
setting will require the least analysis of all, whereas certain joint
ventures at the downstream production and marketing stages will
necessitate a more detailed competitive inquiry. Even at the
downstream stages, however, the courts can simplify their analysis
by foregoing any inquiry into the competitive effects of ventures
designed to allow their partners to penetrate markets they could
not have entered on their own.
A. Upstream Joint Ventures
High technology joint ventures at the "upstream" level of
the production process can be upheld on their face because
their beneficial effects clearly outweigh any adverse effects
on competition. Research and development, purchasing, and
standards-setting joint ventures do not affect the parties' decisions
on pricing and output, which are the critical competitive factors
affecting consumer welfare.2 At the same time, such joint ventures
have obvious procompetitive effects. They promote innovation,
reduce transaction costs, and frequently reduce the prices paid by
consumers. Thus, the courts would gain little from a detailed
inquiry into the economic effects of such collaborations.
Legitimate research and development joint ventures should be
conclusively legal. There is, in fact, no evidence that research and
development joint ventures have any real adverse competitive
effects.297 Economic studies have demonstrated no relationship
296. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling Competition and Cooperation: A New
Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 871,921-22 (1994) (explaining
how research and development and purchasing joint ventures are removed from the stage
at which pricing and output decisions are made).
297. Antitrust regulators have argued that research and development ventures may
14120021
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between joint ventures and any decrease in overall research and
development expenditures in relevant markets.29 The efficiencies
of high technology research and development joint ventures are
obvious. Such ventures often allow smaller firms to participate in
research projects in which they lack the wherewithal to pursue
independently.299 E-commerce research and development joint
ventures can be particularly beneficial to consumers. B2Bs, for
example, allow firms to design new products online in a collab-
orative fashion, reducing costs as well as the time required to bring
a new product to market.3°°
Like research and development joint ventures, high technology
purchasingj oint ventures generate substantial efficiencies and have
few, if any, adverse effects. Such ventures would also be deemed
legal on their face under the proposed approach.0 1 Purchasing
reduce overall research and development efforts in the relevant market "for example, by
slowing the pace at which R&D efforts are pursued." Collaboration Guidelines, supra note
111, I 20,858. Thus, the Collaboration Guidelines take a less permissive approach to
research and development joint ventures, providing for a "safety zone" for such ventures only
when there are three or more "independently controlled research efforts in addition to those
of the collaboration" in the relevant market. Id. 120,864. However, since the passage of the
Sherman Act in 1890, the federal government has only challenged one research joint venture,
and in that case, the parties were using the venture as a device to delay the development of
a new technology that would have posed a competitive threat. See United States v. Auto.
Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), afld sub nom. City of New York v. United
States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970) (prohibiting four automobile manufacturers and their trade
association from conspiring to delay the development of pollution control devices for
automobiles). Indeed, conspiracies to prevent new technologies from development, however,
do not constitute joint ventures at all, because they lack both the requisite integration of
resources and the efficiency-enhancing objectives which are the hallmarks ofjoint ventures.
Such arrangements amount to nothing more than naked cartels, and they should be per se
illegal under traditional antitrust principles. See supra note 109.
298. Correia, supra note 254, at 759 n.82.
299. See U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, RESEARCHJOINTVENTURES-1980, 4 TR. REG. REP. (CCH)
1 13,120, at 1 20,654 (pointing out that individual firms may "lack the resources to finance
independent research projects on a reasonably efficient scale" and that the risks involved in
research may be "so high that the effort must be shared to make a research project
practicable.").
300. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 2, at 12 ("B2B's also may facilitate
collaborative conduct such asjoint product design. 'Increased collaboration between supplier,
buyer and customer reduces the time to develop, produce and distribute new products.').
301. The courts have generally upheld purchasingjoint ventures. Indeed, "v]irtuallyevery
case finding joint buying unlawful ... has essentially involved a naked price fixing
conspiracy." David A. Balto, Business to Business Arrangements: Antitrust Concerns,
Presentation to 49th Annual Spring Meeting of ABA Section of Antitrust Law 8 (March 28-
30, 2001) (on file with author). B2B purchasing joint ventures may harm suppliers by
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collaborations allow competitors to centralize ordering, combine
warehousing or distribution functions, and pool their bargaining
power to reduce suppliers' prices. Most companies buy goods and
services in amounts equal to more than one-half of their revenue. 02
By reducing their purchasing costs by only a small percentage,
firms can generate substantial increases in their profits. °3 B2B
purchasing joint ventures reduce purchasing costs by replacing
"multistep, labor intensive operations" with a "single interactive
electronic system."30 ' Indeed, a panelist for the FTC Staff Report
estimated that a "paper" transaction costing $100 would only cost
$10 when conducted through a purchasing B2B.30 5 Such cost
savings are often passed on to consumers in the form of lower
prices. 06
reducing their profit margins. See Roundtable on B2B Exchanges, supra note 62, at 12
(comments of John Paul MacDuffie, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) ("[Slecond-
tier or third.tier suppliers are ultimately the ones that really get squeezed.). If a B2B
possessed monopoly power over the purchases of a particular product, the B2B could use that
power to reduce the price paid to suppliers below the level that would prevail in a competitive
maiket. Under the proposed approach, however, the courts would examine such conduct
separately to confirm whether the B2B, acting as a single entity, was violating Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. Such conduct would constitute an improper exercise of "monopsony" power
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See infra Part VIII.D.
302. MAPI REPORT, supra note 33, at 10.
303. IBM saved just under $400 million in 2000 by moving its supplier relationships to the
Web. Nicole Harris, 'Private' Exchanges May Allow B-to-B Commerce to Thrive After All,
WALLST. J., Mar. 16,2001, at B1. The Covisint B2B purchasingjoint venture formed in 2000
by Daimler Chrysler, Ford, General Motors and several other automobile companies expects
to generate cost savings of at least $1000 per vehicle. John R. Wilke, Green Light is Likely
for Auto Parts Site, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2000, at A3. A B2B that includes more than fifty
large retailers has reduced its participants' purchasing costs by twelve to fifteen percent, or
a total of $45 million, in less than a year of operation. Totty, supra note 2. Purchasing B2Bs
allow smaller firms to obtain the types of quantity discounts usually available only to larger
buyers. See Roundtable on B2B Exchanges, supra note 62, at 13 (comments of David J.
Reibstein, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) ("[B2Bs are] gaining greater
purchasing power for a very fragmented set of consumers."). A CEO of a small steel company
has pointed out that "through use of a B2B he now has purchasing relationships with large
suppliers who previously would not have even 'notice[d]' [him]." FTC STAFF REPORT, supra
note 17, Part 2, at 6.
304. Bell & Adkinson, supra note 2, at 18.
305. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 2, at 2.
306. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMMIN, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), 1 13,153, at 20,812 (1996) ("Most joint
purchasing arrangements ... allow the participants to achieve efficiencies that will benefit
consumers....").
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In addition to cost savings, purchasing B2Bs can generate other
substantial efficiencies for their participants. A manufacturer can
use a purchasing B2B for"supply chain management," informing its
suppliers instantly of the number of components it expects to use
each day and even every hour.' °7 Some observers have estimated
that the automobile manufacturers can eliminate up to $100 billion
in excess inventory through B2B supply chain management. 8
Manufacturers can also use purchasing B2Bs to facilitate their
suppliers' design of new components. The automobile companies,
for example, are joining with their suppliers in B2Bs to design
components for new cars, saving the time and cost of faxing or
mailing revisions.0 9
Like research and development or purchasing joint ventures,
standards-setting organizations operate at the upstream level of the
production process and have no direct effect on prices or output.
They would also be deemed legal on their face under the proposed
approach. Standards-setting joint ventures certify the competency
of doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers, and other professionals
to practice their trade. Such ventures also may promulgate
standards to ensure that all products in an industry meet certain
minimum requirements for safety and interoperability. Standards-
setting organizations can, of course, engage in illegal conduct. A
group of competitors could, for example, establish arbitrary
standards that have no purpose other than to prevent new firms
from entering the market.310 However, under the approach proposed
in this Article, the courts would separately consider the legality of
such conduct and could preclude the conduct without invalidating
307: "[Siharing information quickly with supply chain partners ... [allows] them to
seamlessly adjust to changing market conditions." MAPI REPORT, supra note 33, at 5.
308. Lee Comes, Words from a Believer, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2001, at R21 (quoting Mark
Hoffinan, Chief Executive Officer of Commerce One). This ability has become more important
as firms have begun to outsource a greater portion of their manufacturing activity. General
Motors and Ford now outsource thirty to fifty percent of their total vehicle content.
Roundtable on B2B Exchanges, supra note 62, at 9 (comments of Professor Sunil Gupta).
Cisco does not even make most of its products, and Hewlett Packard and IBM are also
engaged in substantial outsourcing. See id. (describing Cisco's experience); Harris, supra note
303 (describing IBM and Hewlett Packard).
309. Totty, supra note 2.
310. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656,659-60
(1961) (precluding industry standards-setting organization from denying "seal of approval"
to competitor for arbitrary reasons).
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the entire venture. Most standards-setting joint ventures act in a
manner beneficial to consumers. Indeed, network markets could not
operate efficiently without a single standard of interchange."' If
such standards are openly disclosed, they can promote competition
by making it easier for several firms to supply the relevant network
services. 12 There are, in fact, examples of network industries in
which competition exists because standards-setting joint ventures
have established non-proprietary standards openly accessible to all
firms. Walt Disney, Sony, Warner Bros., and Paramount Pictures
are currently considering a joint venture that would establish
standards for digital film equipment for movie theaters. The
standards would allow rival manufacturers to compete in supplying
compatible equipment.313 Courts have no reason to preclude
ventures with such a potential beneficial effect in the relevant
market.
B. Downstream Joint Ventures
1. Production Joint Ventures
Joint ventures at the production level eliminate downstream
competition in the output of goods and services. Nevertheless, in
certain cases, such ventures can be upheld on their face. A
production joint venture may allow its partners to produce a
product or service that they could not have produced on their own.
Such ventures facilitate the type of long-term capital investments
that spur productivity. Regardless of the parties' market power, the
only competitive effects of such a venture are beneficial. Consider
a recent production joint venture between Intel and Hewlett-
311. See Balto, supra note 87, at 279 (observing that "without agreement on technical
interface standards, ... networks cannot be formed').
312. See id. (noting that "competitors could agree on the standards to be met, preserving
competition within the network").
313. Anna Wilde Matthews& Bruce Orwall, MajorStudios DiscussPlan to Equip Theaters
to Show Digital Films, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2001, at Al; see also Posner, supra note 20, at
928 (giving example of how uniform standards for the international telephone system allow
components to be supplied "by a vast number of separate firms and individuals"). There are
other examples of markets in which standards-setting joint ventures allow for competing
products, including computer games (with Sega, Nintendo, and Sony as competitors),
mainframe computing (IBM and DEC), fax machines, televisions and VCRs. See Rubinfeld,
supra note 33, at 863-64 (citing examples).
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Packard for the production of an entirely new type of micro-
processor for computer servers. The construction costs of micro-
processor manufacturing plants can exceed $1 billion. By sharing
their resources, the parties were able to produce a computer chip
that neither party could have produced on its own."1 4
The proposed approach would encourage the formation of
productionjoint ventures to build the broadband telecommunication
networks that will be required to meet the demand for Internet
services in the next several years. Like cable networks, fiber optic
networks have the ability to carry a broad range of information at
speeds necessary for the new game, music, and video services now
available on the Web. During the 1990s, cable companies, long
distance telephone companies, and local Bell telephone companies
embarked upon an ambitious program to construct national fiber
optic networks. However, these networks were designed primarily
for business customers.315 For the most part, telecommunications
companies neglected to upgrade the "last mile bandwidth" to
consumers' homes. 16 Delay in hooking up a high-speed version of
the Internet to homes is holding up adoption of a vast array of new
applications, including audio and TV-quality video. 17 Indeed, most
314. See David P. Hamilton, Gambling It Can Go Beyond PC, Intel Offers a New
Microprocessor, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2001, at Al. ("H-P decided it needed a partner that
could share the financial burden and help sell the chip to other computer makers, possibly
making it an industry standard.").
315. Why the Possible Sale ofAT&T Broadband Spooks 'Content' Firms, WALL ST. J., Aug.
27, 2001, at Al; Schiesel, supra note 72, at 1. It has been estimated that "[iUn 1999 and 2000,
over 150 million kilometers of optical fiber were laid world wide, enough to stretch to the
sun." George Gilder & Bret Swanson, The Broadband Economy Needs a Hero, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 23, 2001, at A14. As a result of this "network-building spree," many networks are now
operating at less than fifty percent of capacity. Mark Heinzl, Broadband Carriers Are
Hunting for "Killer Apps," WALL ST. J., June 14, 2001, at B10.
316. See Mark Heinzl, All-Optical Telecom Network Faces Slowing Economy, Excess
Capacity, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2001, at BI (referring to "the old copper wiring that carries
phone and data calls the 'last mile' to most houses and small office buildings"). In a recent
editorial, the Wall Street Journal opined that "the slothful deployment of broadband has
played a significant role in Nasdaq's struggles of late and the dot-com skid in general." Space
Invaders, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2001, at A26. Two commentators recently explained that "the
Internet as we know it is about seven years old, yet fewer than 7 million of 100 million
American homes enjoy broadband." Gilder & Swanson, supra note 315.
317. See Rick Kailgaard, Gotta Be Wireless, FORBES, May 14,2001, at 51 (explaining how
delay in the linking of broad bandwidth directly to consumers is "holding up the next
generation of Internet software, which requires streaming audio and TV-quality video"); see
also Daniel Akst, In Technology, Supply Precedes Demand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, § 3
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consumers are already waiting inordinate periods to access the
Internet.31 Fiber optic networks would provide consumers with an
alternative to cable for high-speed Internet access. The costs of
constructing such networks, however, are prohibitive for most
telecommunications firms. Even AT&T, with its vast financial
resources, is not capable of building such a network on its own.319
Certainly the cable companies, which are currently laboring "under
mountains of debt," do not have such capacity.32 ° Only by joining
together in a production joint venture could the local and long
distance telephone companies and cable firms obtain the financial
wherewithal to extend their fiber optic networks to consumers.
Joint ventures designed to construct such networks should be
permitted regardless of the parties' market power because they
would add a competitor to the relevant market that otherwise
would not exist.32'
Not all production joint ventures, however, have such a benign
competitive effect. Partners engaged in production joint ventures
that cover goods or services already produced by the parties will
refrain from competing with their own joint venture because such
competition merely reduces the parties' profits as members of the
venture. Thus the courts must engage in some inquiry into the
competitive effects of productionjoint ventures for current products.
(Money & Business), at 4 ("[Tlhe vast new fiber optic network will ... call forth unforseen new
applications ... once high-capacity networks overcome the last-mile bottleneck.").
318. The average wait in December 2000 was eighteen seconds. Thomas E. Weber, Will
Potholes Develop ifInformation Highway Slows?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2001, at B1; see also
Space Invaders, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2001, at A26 (referring to "America's thirst for
broadband access"). According to one author:
The agonizingly slow deployment of broadband has stopped the Internet in its
tracks. The technology for fast connections is well established, but 19 out of 20
U.S. families are stuck with poky dial-up modems, so that it takes them an
hour to download a video file that broadband could handle in two minutes.
James K Glassman, Broadband Failure has a Political Cause, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2001,
at A18.
319. See Deborah Solomon, Under Rising Pressure, AT&T's CEO Tries to Hold on to an
Icon, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,2001, at Al ("[Tihe company, with a current market value of $60
billion, is struggling to find ways to pay off its $36.5 billion in debt.").
320. Karlgaard, supra note 314, at 51.
321. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Analysis of Telecommunications
Joint Ventures, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 639, 687-89 (discussing how production joint ventures
among telecommunications firms can benefit consumers).
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The courts can simplify their analysis of such production joint
ventures by establishing a market share threshold for their legality.
If the parties to a production joint venture collectively hold less
than fifty percent of the joint venture product market, the venture
should not pose a serious competitive threat.322 The other com-
petitors in the market should be able to prevent the venture from
limiting overall output in a way harmful to consumers. Only when
a production joint venture exceeds the fifty percent threshold
should a court have to balance its potential efficiencies against its
adverse effects, and even in such cases, the courts need not pursue
an approach as complex as the traditional rule of reason. In many
cases, the net beneficial effect of a production joint venture will be
obvious from its purpose. If a production joint venture is of limited
scope, its efficiencies will usually outweigh its adverse effects."2
Consider, for example, a joint venture among the major motion
picture studios to finance the production of a single new digital film.
The studios might use the venture to learn from each other the
most efficient means of producing films in a digital format. The
studios' collaboration on the one film should not induce them to
compete any less aggressively in producing other films. The joint
venture's beneficial purpose-facilitating the production of new
digital films--outweighs any adverse effects that might result from
the studios' collaboration. However, production joint ventures of
broad scope should be precluded. The courts, for example, should
322. Some commentators have suggested even lower market share thresholds for joint
ventures. See, e.g., Gellhorn & Miller, supra note 250, at 868 (advocating thirty percent
market share threshold). The Collaboration Guidelines establish a twenty percent market
share threshold for competitor collaborations. Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 111,
20,864. The government's guidelines for health care joint ventures provide safe harbor
protection for health care joint ventures up to the thirty-five percent level, and the
government's merger guidelines indicate that the enforcement agencies would not be
concerned about a merged entity with less than thirty-five percent of the relevant market.
Mitnick, supra note 16, at 33.
323. The FTC's analysis ofthe 1984 productionjoint venture between Toyota and General
Motors is instructive. The FTC recognized that such a downstream venture between the first
and third largest automobile manufacturers in the world could have an adverse effect on
competition. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 386-87 (1984). However, the FTC also
noted that such effects would be limited because the venture only covered the production of
a single new automobile, and the parties were free to continue to compete in the marketing
phase. Id. at 386. The limited adverse competitive effects of the venture were easily
outweighed by the efficiencies that could result from the parties' integration of their
production capacity. Id. The FTC emphasized in particular that General Motors would have
the opportunity to learn more efficient Japanese manufacturing techniques. Id. at 387-88.
[Vol. 44:65
HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
not permit the major motion picture studios to combine all of their
film production operations in a joint venture. The cost savings and
other synergies resulting from the integration of the studios'
operations clearly would not outweigh the loss of competition that
would occur as a result of the venture.
2. Marketing Joint Ventures
Marketing joint ventures have the greatest anticompetitive
potential of all because they operate at the downstream level where
the parties' business decisions most directly affect consumers.24
Nevertheless, high technology marketing joint ventures should
qualify for a conclusive presumption of legality when they facilitate
the introduction of new products to the marketplace. In BMI, for
example, the joint venture allowed the musical composers to
market a product-a uniform copyright license for a wide range
of compositions-that the composers could not market on their
own.3" Two recent marketing joint ventures among the major
record companies may have a similar beneficial effect. 26 The joint
ventures, formed in response to Napster's unauthorized use of the
record companies' copyrighted music, allow their partners to license
a broad range of online music to consumers for a monthly fee. 27
Similarly, certain B2B marketing joint ventures may create
markets that otherwise could not exist. Idle, surplus, or perishable
inventory, for example, often cannot be sold by customary means.
Most sellers would not find it cost effective to disseminate
information concerning such products to the necessary range of
buyers and within the required period of time. 28 B2Bs make it
possible to reach a wide range of buyers for such products before
they become obsolete. The courts should uphold such marketing
324. As the Collaboration Guidelines point out, marketing "collaborations may involve
agreements [on price, output] or other competitively significant variables ... that can result
in anticompetitive harm." Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 111, 1 20,858.
325. BMI v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1978).
326. One joint venture, "Pressplay," is operated by Sony and Vivendi. The other joint
venture involves AOL Time Warner, EMI Group, and Bertelsmann. Anna Wilde Matthews
& John R. Wilke, U.S. Investigates 2 Joint Ventures in Online Music, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6,
2001, at A3.
327. See id; Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Living With Digital Piracy? It's Been Done Before,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2001, at A17.
328. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 2, at 7 (describing how B2B's can be used
to sell surplus inventory, perishable goods, excess bandwidth and excess trucking capacity).
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joint ventures on their face, because they have no adverse
competitive impact. Their only effect is to make new products
available to consumers. It would serve no purpose for the courts to
question the legitimacy of such a venture, even if it includes most
of the participants in the relevant market.
A marketing joint venture poses a potential threat to
competition when it involves current products that the parties could
have sold independently. In the absence of such a venture, the
parties presumably would have competed against each other, thus
reducing the prices and increasing the output of the relevant
products. The elimination of such competition will be particularly
harmful to consumers when the joint venture parties together
control more than fifty percent of the relevant market. Thus, the
courts should balance the beneficial and adverse effects of such
marketing joint ventures. It should not be difficult for the courts
to complete such balancing. The potential efficiencies of most
marketing joint ventures should be readily obvious. Certain types
of integration, such as risk sharing or combinations of operations,
serve as a good proxy for the procompetitive justifications of
marketing joint ventures. 29 Integrated marketing joint ventures
are capable of reducing marketing costs, eliminating duplication,
and effecting synergies in the delivery of products to consumers. For
example, by pooling the resources of several firms, B2Bs may allow
smaller suppliers to access more customers than they could have
reached on their own.3
3 0
The potential anticompetitive effects of a marketing joint
venture will be evident from the scope and duration of the venture.
If the joint venture is intended to last only for a limited time, the
parties will be acutely aware of the need to protect their own
competitive interests and may be less likely to use their collective
market power to raise prices or limit output.331 Marketing joint
ventures of limited scope may not even affect their partners'
329. Correia, supra note 253, at 758.
330. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 2, at 5 ("The CFO of a small steel
company ... used a B2B e-marketplace ... to 'hookfup with more than 50 new customers, 90%
of whom he had never heard of before.'); MAPI REPORT, supra note 33, at 11 ("[Slmaller
suppliers, with limited sale and marketing resources, are likely to participate in an electronic
auction for contracts that were previously awarded to larger suppliers.").
331. As the Collaboration Guidelines point out, "In general, the shorter the duration [of
a joint venture], the more likely participants are to compete against each other and their
collaboration." Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 111, 20,862.
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decision on pricing and output. For example, the major Hollywood
studios recently formed two joint ventures to market films on
demand over the Internet and cable television.8 2 Consumers will be
able to download the films to their computers and watch them at
their convenience. 3" Because each studio will continue to control
the price and availability of its own films,3 4 the beneficial effects of
the ventures (i.e., making a broader range of films available to
consumers online) clearly outweigh any adverse effects resulting
from the studios' collaboration. 38 The airlines' "Orbitz" online
marketing joint venture is also limited in scope. Although the
airlines participating in the venture control approximately eighty
percent of domestic air travel,336 the joint venture should be
permitted because the parties do not delegate to the venture the
authority to set fares.
Marketing joint ventures of broader scope, however, would be
precluded under the proposed approach. Ventures which exceed the
fifty percent threshold and which have the power to set prices
and/or reduce output rarely will generate sufficient efficiencies to
survive the balancing test. Consider a hypothetical joint venture
between a cable company and a local telephone company to provide
broadband Internet services to a particular community. Assume
332. One of the joint ventures, called "Movies.com," includes Walt Disney Co. and News
Corp.'s Twentieth Century Fox. The other venture, called "Moviefly," includes Sony Corp.,
AOL Time Warner's film unit, Vivendi Universal's Universal Pictures, Viacom's Paramount
Pictures, and Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. Anna Wilde Matthews, Antitrust Probe Into Web-
Video Ventures May Benefit From 1980's Cable-TV Case, WALL ST. J. Dec. 24, 2001, at B6.
333. Bruce Orwall, Five Studios Form Joint Venture for Video on Demand, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 17, 2001, at A3; Mathews, supra note 332.
334. Orwall, supra note 333.
335. The courts and agencies should also uphold recently announced joint ventures by the
major record companies which are designed to market music over the Internet. See id.
(referring to Justice Department investigation of such joint ventures).
336. Geewax, supra note 122.
337. But see id. (concluding that the Orbitz joint venture "likely will cause significant
anticompetitive harm"). In mid-2001, the major domestic airlines discussed a possible joint
venture to develop means for easing airport congestion and reducing flight delays. The
venture would have allowed the airlines to agree on more efficient ways of scheduling flights
at peak periods of demand. U.S. House Bill Would Give Airlines Antitrust Immunity, Dow
Jones News Service, May 10, 2001 (on file with author). The U.S. House of Representatives
considered a bill that would grant antitrust immunity to the airlines for the joint venture.
Id. However, under the approach proposed in this Article, it would be unnecessary to grant
such immunity. The courts could simply uphold the venture on the grounds that it is so
limited in scope, and so obviously beneficial to consumers, that its predominant effect is
procompetitive.
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that the joint venture has the power to connect homes and
businesses to the Internet and to set the prices for such service. The
parties to the venture could argue that the venture would eliminate
the duplicate costs of providing Internet service over both cable and
telephone lines and would encourage its participants to assume the
risk of constructing a new broadband system. Such efficiencies,
however, would be outweighed by the adverse competitive effects of
the venture, which would eliminate any possibility for competition
between cable and telephone companies in providing Internet access
to consumers in the communities served by the venture. 8'
VII. ANALYZING RESTRAINTS AMONG JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS
Under the proposed approach, a court, after determining that a
joint venture itself was permissible, would review any restrictions
among the joint venture partners to determine whether they violate
the prohibition in Section 1 against unreasonable restraints of
trade. The courts' analysis of such restraints need not be as complex
as under the traditional rule of reason. Once a court finds a joint
venture proper, it can easily determine the appropriateness of any
related restraints among the parties to the venture.33 9 A court
would not have to engage in any inquiry into the market power of
338. In most areas, the local cable and telephone systems remain parallel monopolies. The
four former "Bell" telephone companies-SBC Communications, BellSouth, Verizon, and
Qwest-still hold monopoly power over local telephone service, and many cable networks are
the sole source of such service in their markets. See Armstrong, supra note 69 (describing
monopolies of former Bell companies); Sandburg, supra note 70 ("The Baby Bells and the
cable-TV operators have the country pretty much to themselves, enjoying lucrative
monopolies in most areas."). Only rarely have local telephone and cable networks been
willing to compete in each other's markets. See Jared Sandburg, An AT&T-Comcast Deal
Could Set Back Telephone, Cable Convergence, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2001, at B1 ("[The
telephone and cable networks] size each other up, they dance around each other and they
back up to their familiar corners.' The upshot for consumers: higher cable and local phone
fees 'with no one in either market positioned to challenge or discipline them.'"). Furthermore,
these companies have not been reluctant to exercise their monopoly power in ways adverse
to consumers. As one commentator recently pointed out, "These protected industries preside
over supposedly scarce resources, like wires to your home or spectrum, and charge
accordingly." Andy Kessler, Goodbye Lucent. Hello Wi Fi, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2001, at A28.
The hypothetical marketing joint venture would only aggravate such problems. As a result
of their collaboration, the local telephone and cable companies would have no incentive to
compete in providing Internet services, and they would be even more likely to withhold
innovations and extract monopoly prices for their current services.
339. Of course, if a joint venture is deemed illegal, any related agreements by the parties
that limit competition should also be precluded without any further consideration.
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the parties or other economic characteristics of the relevant market.
It should simply consider whether such restraints are limited to the
scope necessary to promote the venture's procompetitive purposes.
Such restraints have no more adverse effect than the joint venture
itself, and they do not extend the venture's competitive reach into
other markets. The restraints would simply constitute internal
rules for the joint venture's operation, and thus they could not
be illegal under Section 1. If the restraints were disallowed, the
venture would be unable to achieve its efficiency objectives.
The courts, however, should preclude restraints among joint
venture partners which are broader than required to promote
the venture's objectives. Such restraints should be deemed "naked"
because they are unrelated to a venture's efficiency goals. Their
only effect is to limit competition among the joint venture part-
ners in another market. Since the parties would be acting as
independent competitors rather than as joint venture partners, the
restraints should be illegal under Section 1. Restraints which are
unrelated to the efficiency objectives of a joint venture are similar
in effect to cartels. Because such restraints have no legitimate
purpose and serve only to limit competition, they should be
precluded on their face, regardless of the parties' market power. 40
The only effect of such restraints is to limit competition among the
joint venture partners in another market, and they should not
escape liability simply because the conspirators happened to enter
into a joint venture.
A. Price Fixing Agreements
Courts should allow price-fixing agreements among the
members of a high technology joint venture when they are
necessary to achieve the venture's legitimate .objectives. Some
marketing joint ventures are so broad that they could not meet
their goals without the power to set prices. In BMI, the common
price established by the musical composers was a critical aspect of
the blanket license. Indeed, without an agreed price, the members'
340. In NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), for example, the Supreme Court
enjoined the defendant from limiting the number of times college football teams could appear
on television. The Court emphasized that these restrictions were broader than required to
further the NCAA's legitimate goal of promoting the efficient operation ofcollegiate athletics.
Id. at 104-20.
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musical compositions could not have been made available to
consumers at all.""' However, courts should not deem price-
fixing agreements ancillary to marketing joint ventures of more
limited scope. The FTC, for example, has charged that Warner
Communications and Vivendi conspired to fix prices in connection
with their joint venture to market compact discs and cassettes of
the 1998 performance of "The Three Tenors."42 In connection with
the venture, the partners agreed not to discount certain of their
other catalog products. Since this agreement had nothing to do with
the legitimate purposes of the venture, it should be illegal as a
naked price fixing agreement 43
Price-fixing agreements also are not ancillary to the legitimate
efficiency objectives of purchasing, research and development,
standards-setting, production, or other joint ventures upstream
of the marketing stage. Such agreements unduly extend the anti-
competitive scope of such ventures to downstream markets. Indeed,
in upstream joint ventures, the partners' mere sharing of price or
cost information may raise the inference of an illegal price-fixing
agreement. The courts have precluded competitors from sharing
such information because it helps firms to police price-fixing
agreements by eliminating uncertainty over how competitors are
pricing their products. " Such information-sharing can be a
particular problem in upstream B2B joint ventures. Internet
technology allows B2B participants to share information at an
unprecedented rate. 45 The parties can learn, in real time, the
341. BMI v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1978).
342. FTC Charges Music Distribution Joint Venture Restrained Trade, TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) No. 693 (Aug. 1, 2001), at 1. The "Three Tenors" are opera singers Jose Carreras,
Placido Domingo, and Luciano Pavorotti. Id.
343. As Joseph Simons, the Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, stated, "Naked
price fixing agreements such as this ... cannot be immunized by mere association with an
otherwise lawful joint venture .... Participation in a joint venture is not a license to fix prices
on products outside of the joint venture." Id.
344. See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (holding that an
agreement to exchange information violates Section 1). The Collaboration Guidelines point
out that competitors' sharing of price and cost information "may increase the likelihood of
collusion...." Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 111, 1 20,859.
345. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Executive Summary, at 2. The FTC Staff Report
commented on the adverse results of the pricing transparency that can occur in B2Bs:
"Eliminate the uncertainty, and participants will tend to move away from individual profit
maximizing models to a collusive one." Id., Part 3, at 6. Indeed, the risk of collusion may
increase with the development of "peer-to-peer" ("P2P") computing, which will allow vast
numbers of users to communicate directly with each other in real time without a central
154 [Vol. 44:65
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identities of the purchaser and seller in a transaction, the quantity
purchased, the date and time of the transaction and the purchase
price, as well as the production capacity of other B2B partici-
pants.34 The partners can use such ventures to signal anticipated
price changes and gain their competitors' tacit agreement to the
changes. 4" Some observers, for example, have argued that the
Orbitz joint venture could allow the participating airlines to
monitor implicit price-fixing arrangements.'" Thus, to avoid
antitrust liability, the partners to upstream B2Bs should construct
"firewalls" to ensure that the employees participating in the
ventures do not have access to information on their competitors'
prices, output, or costs.349 In most cases, the partners to such joint
ventures have no need to know such information in order to operate
the venture efficiently.
server. Charles T.C. Compton & Scott A. Scher, Peer-to-Peer Computing: Antitrust Questions
for a Fledgling Technology 3, Presentation to the 49th Annual Spring Meeting of the ABA
Section of Antitrust Law 3 (Mar. 28-30, 2001) (on file with author). Under P2P protocols,
central servers will no longer "act as 'gatekeepers' for sensitive data.' Id. This will allow
rivals to directly communicate sensitive competitive data to each other.
346. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Executive Summary, at 3; Rule et al., B2B or
Collusion?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 2000, at 36.
347. The Federal Trade Commission is already looking at the Ford, GM and Daimler-
Chrysler exchange to determine if the structure lends itself to unlawful price signaling or
coordination among buyers or sellers." Clare Ansberry, Let's Build an Online Supply
Network, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2000, at B10. In expressing their concern over information-
sharing in Internet joint ventures, the enforcement agencies have cited a 1994 consent
agreement involving airlines' alleged price signaling in a computerized fare publication
venture. See JONES, DAY, REAviS & POGUE, ANTITRUST COMMENTARIES, July 2000 at 3 (on file
with author) (citing United States v. Airline Publ'g Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,687
(D.D.C. 1994)). The joint venture allegedly generated detailed reports about future prices
that allowed the parties to signal their pricing intentions to each other. Rule, supra note 346,
at 72.
348. See Geewax, supra note 122 (noting concern of Thomas Underwood, an online travel
industry analyst, that the venture "permits price signaling and allows instant competitive
responses").
349. Bell & Adkinson, supra note 2, at 20 ("Through a combination of encryption, software
design, and firewalls, a properly designed B2B exchange can protect the confidentiality of
competitively sensitive information."). Ilene Knable Gotts, Antitrust Review of
Telecommunications Industry Mergers, 14 ANTITRUST, Summer 2000, at 58, 64 n.37
("Firewalls ... are a common way of restricting potentially anticompetitive information
exchanges."). In its investigation of the proposed B2B purchasing joint venture among Ford,
General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler, the FTC "focused on the electronic architecture of the
site and insisted that it include 'irewalls' to prevent any leakage of sensitive price and
product information...." Wilke, supra note 303. The FTC also required similar protections in
connection with its approval of the General Motors-Toyota joint venture. See General Motors
Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 384-88 (1984).
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B. Territorial Allocations
The parties to a high technology joint venture may agree to
various restraints that allocate markets and prevent competition
among the parties outside the legitimate scope of the venture. Such
restraints should be illegal under Section 1 because they eliminate
competition without any compensating efficiency benefit. The
airlines participating in Orbitz, for example, could use the joint
venture to assign each airline exclusive rights to particular routes.
Reservations could be programmed to ensure that no partner would
offer Internet fares in competition with another partner on its
designated routes. Such an agreement should be illegal as a naked
restraint of trade among the airlines. The agreement would not be
necessary to further the joint venture's legitimate goal of reducing
marketing costs. Its only effect would be to eliminate competition
in the sale of online airline tickets.
VIII. ANALYZING THE MONOPOLY CONDUCT OF JOINT VENTURES
When the parties to ajoint venture act collectively to pursue the
purposes for which the venture was formed, the venture is acting as
a single entity. In such cases, the venture should be assigned a
single market share for the purposes of antitrust analysis. The
venture can be considered a monopolist under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act if its market share exceeds seventy percent.35 0 Under
the proposed approach, the courts would examine such a joint
venture's conduct separately to confirm whether it violates Section
2. When a joint venture acts to perpetuate or extend its monopoly
power, it should be treated no differently than any other
monopolist. The courts have precluded individual monopolists from
engaging in conduct whose sole purpose is to perpetuate their
350. The existence of monopoly power "ordinarily may be inferred [when a defendant has]
the predominant share of the market." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571
(1965). A market share in excess of seventy percent typically has been deemed sufficient to
support an inference of monopoly power. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377,391 (1955) (inferring monopoly power from seventy-five percent market share);
Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 981 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that
seventy-one to seventy-six percent market share supports inference); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan
v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp. 826, 902 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (observing that for
market shares greater than seventy percent, "courts have simply inferred the existence of
monopoly power without specifically examining ... control over prices [or] competition").
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monopoly power in a current market or extend that power into a
new market."'1 Competitors should not be able to evade liability
simply by forming a joint venture to carry out conduct that they
would not have been allowed to pursue on their own.
A. Access Restrictions
A joint venture can often engage in monopoly leveraging when
it operates a high technology network. If the network holds
monopoly power, the joint venture can impose access restrictions
that exclude its competitors from the related market served by the
network. Such access restrictions can take several different forms.
A joint venture may adopt a bald rule forbidding its competitors
from membership in the venture, or it may impose more subtle
restrictions on its competitors. The access terms may be so onerous
that it is impossible for a competitor to use a joint venture's
network effectively. A joint venture may, for example, charge
competitors a price so much higher than its price to other parties
that it "has the same effect on the rival as a pure refusal to deal."352
A network joint venture can deny access to competitors simply by
designing its interfaces to be incompatible with the related products
of competitors.353 A purchasing B2B may be theoretically open to all
qualified parties, but it may close bidding on certain transactions
after receiving a limited number of bids. "These systems thus favor
those sellers with better integration into the exchange's systems,
typically those with the greatest ownership stake in the exchange
itself."354
Network joint ventures have a natural incentive to allow all
qualified participants to use their facilities, because the value of the
network increases in direct proportion to the number of users.
Indeed, the vision of most B2Bs is to "provide a platform on which
351. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the
Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809,826-44 (2000) (describing the federal courts' approach
in Section 2 monopolization cases).
352. Ordover & Willig, supra note 158, at 33.
353. "Interfaces are the specifications or formats that allow the various components in a
system to work together." Farrell & Katz, supra note 37, at 648.
354. FTC STAFFREPORT, supra note 17, Part 3, at 17. A B2B may also present information
on a computer screen in a way that favors the B2B's current members, or it may promulgate
discriminatory operating rules that "leave rivals with reduced fimctionality or higher costs."
Id., Executive Summary, at 3.
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all industry players will conduct procurement and sales
operations."3 5 If a venture acts against its self-interest and denies
access to qualified parties, there should be a strong presumption
that the venture is attempting to perpetuate or extend its monopoly
power. 56
Guaranties of open access will be particularly important when
B2Bs, telecommunications systems, or other electronic networks
control a critical gateway to the relevant market.357 In most cases,
an outsider will not be able to duplicate the advantages of such a
monopoly network. Consider a joint venture that controls a portion
of the Baby Bells' local telephone systems. The four remaining Baby
Bells-Verizon, BellSouth, SBC Communications, and Qwest-
still hold monopoly power in ninety percent of local telephone
markets.3' Long-distance carriers must access the Baby Bells' local
networks in order to reach consumers. 59 Since the Baby Bells' local
355. Bell & Adkinson, supra note 2, at 18; see also Roundtable on B-to-B Exchanges, supra
note 62, at 13 (comments of Professor Sunil Gupta) (suggesting that "open exchanges have
a better chance of succeeding").
356. See Correia, supra note 254, at 770 ("[The joint venture] may benefit from expanding
the membership due to economies of scale on beth the supply side and the demand side. In
that case, the exclusion is more likely to be aimed at keeping a maverick out of the market.")
(footnote omitted).
357. Some commentators have argued that open access rules have adverse effects on
competition among joint ventures. See id. at 763 (asserting that open access rules
"undermine the incentive to collaborate in the first place," encourage firms not to join a risky
research effort until it is successful, and prevent rival groups from forming competing
ventures); Werden, supra note 109, at 729 ("[I]f competing joint ventures would be better
than just one, mandating access probably makes matters worse ...."); Glassman, supra note
12, at A26 (criticizing FTC's requirement for open access to AOL Time Warner's cable system
as "notice to high-tech firms that ... their property rights ... may be stripped from them at
will for political reasons. The certain result of such policies will be to deter investment in
innovation."); Balto, supra note 301, at 10 ("If a venture is overinclusive it may reduce the
likelihood competing exchanges will be formed."). However, the beneficial effects of open
access rules far outweigh their adverse effect. Open access will only be compelled in those
circumstances in which a joint venture has obtained control over a critical gateway to the
relevant market and in which failure to compel access would result in a firm's complete
exclusion from the market.
358. Yochi J. Dreazen, Battle over Bells and Broadband Service Heats Up, WALL ST. J.,
May 15, 2001, at A28; see also Armstrong, supra note 69 (describing Baby Bells' monopoly
over local telephone service).
359. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 recognized that access to the local Bell networks
is essential for long-distance companies. The Act prohibits the Baby Bells from offering long-
distance service originating within their regions until they prove that they have provided
their competitors with access to their local telephone networks. See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (Supp.
1999).
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telecommunications networks are too expensive to duplicate,31joint
ventures which control any portion of a Bell system should be
required to give open access to any long-distance carriers that
desire to use the system. 6 '
Even in certain non-monopoly cases, a plaintiff may be able to
demonstrate that, but for access to a joint venture's network, it
could not compete effectively in a related market. Most of the
producers of a particular product, for example, may form a group of
ventures that together control the gateway to the relevant market.
If a firm cannot access at least one of those ventures, it will be
unable to compete in that market. Consider "MusicNet" and
"Pressplay," two joint ventures recently formed by five major record
companies to distribute music over the Internet. The members of
these ventures control eighty-five percent of the songs licensed for
distribution in the United States. 62 When the major U.S. record
companies sued Napster for copyright infringement, Napster
counterclaimed, alleging that the two joint ventures committed
various antitrust violations, including a refusal to license musical
compositions to Napster for its new "for-pay" Internet music
service. If proven, such a refusal to deal should be deemed an illegal
denial of access to the online music market. 63
360. See Schiesel, supra note 73 ("The local phone companies have networks that cannot
be duplicated.").
361. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1131-33 (7th Cir. 1983)
(requiring AT&T-which at the time of suit still owned local Bell telephone systems-to
allow MCI, its competitor in long-distance market, to interconnect its long distance lines with
AT&T's local lines). One commentator recently pointed out that
forcing monopolies to let others tap their systems is an effective way to foster
competition. Today's consumer Internet exists because of that kind of
competition. The Bells were required to give companies like America Online
and Earth-Link access to their phone lines for dial-up services. 'Does anyone
really believe so many consumers would be online today if Internet service had
been left to the Bells and the cable companies?
Thomas E. Weber, Static on the Line: One Man's Fight to Get a Speedy Internet Link, WALL
ST. J., June 18, 2001, at B1.
362. Matt Richtel, Napster Wins One Round in Music Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,2002, at
C1.
363. As the judge in the case recently opined, "[Tihese joint ventures look bad, sound bad
and smell bad." In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (N.D. Cal.
2002). The Justice Department stated in October 2001 that it was commencing "an antitrust
investigation into whether the [record] companies have misused their copyrights to dominate
the digital market." Richtel, supra note 362.
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Certain B2B joint ventures may control resources to which all
firms in the relevant market should be allowed access. B2B
purchasing ventures, such as those being established by the Big
Three automobile companies, 64 may include so many of the firms
in the relevant market that it would be impossible for a nonmember
to form a comparable B2B.3" 5 Competitors denied access to such
purchasing B2Bs would be unable to obtain the same discounts on
raw materials, putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Access
to certain B2B marketing joint ventures may be just as critical to
a firm's success. For example, Southwest Airlines is not a member
of the major airlines' Orbitz joint venture. Southwest has charged
that "I t ]he airline owners of Orbitz have a long record of conspiring
to eliminate competition, especially from low-fare airlines." 66 The
owners of Orbitz should not be permitted to preclude Southwest
from participating in the online reservation system on terms
comparable to the original partners. Since Orbitz includes most of
the world's airlines, carriers such as Southwest would be at a
competitive disadvantage if they were not allowed to have their
fares displayed as prominently in the venture's reservation system
as the fares of the original partners.
The courts should be able to easily devise remedies for firms'
inability to access essential joint ventures. Firms need not
necessarily be admitted as equity partners to the venture. They
simply must be allowed to use the facilities of the venture as
required to compete in the relevant market. Low-cost airlines, for
example, could be allowed to market their Internet fares on Orbitz
without being admitted as full partners. The airlines could be
charged a reasonable fee designed not only to amortize the costs of
364. Ford, General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler have announced ajoint arrangement to
purchase materials over the Internet. Robert L. Simpson et al., Big Three Car Makers Plan
Net Exchange, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at A3. The joint venture is expected to have "a
market capitalization of $30 billion to $40 billion within a couple of years, rivaling the auto
makers' own valuations." Id.; see also John R. Wilke & Gregory L. White, FTC Opens
Antitrust Inquiry into Plan by Big 3 Car Makers for Online Venture, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,
2000, at A6. The venture "is expected to wield staggering purchasing power of as much as
$240 billion a year." Wilke, supra note 303.
365. One commentator has concluded that the relevant question should be whether "the
excluded firm [can] secure the same benefits from its own B2B venture or through an
alternative B2B arrangement." Balto, supra note 301, at 28.
366. John R. Wilke, Twenty States Oppose Airlines' Proposal for Joint Venture in Online
Reservations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2001, at A10 (quoting a complaint by Southwest to the
Transportation Department).
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their participation but also to reimburse the original partners for
their up-front risk in establishing the joint venture. Furthermore,
any open access requirements should expire if, at any time in the
future, a viable new provider of the same services enters the
relevant market.367
B. Exclusive Dealing
High technology joint ventures often prohibit their members
from joining or dealing with competing ventures. Such exclusivity
requirements can be in the form of "carrots" (incentives to deal with
the incumbent joint venture) or "sticks" (penalties for dealing with
competing ventures). B2Bs, for example, may give participants
increased equity interests or discounts on services in return for
their commitment to run all sales or purchase transactions
exclusively through the venture.368 B2Bs may also impose fees on
participants who deal with competing ventures or simply deny
membership to participants who do SO. 3 69 When they are first
formed, B2Bs legitimately may require exclusivity commitments
from their participants. Newly formed B2Bs "must show their
participants (and financial backers) that they will indeed attract
and keep enough volume to survive.3 70 It would be reasonable
for a B2B to prohibit its founding members from joining or
participating in competing B2Bs. Such restrictions represent a
commitment by the founding members to ensure the B2B's
success.
371
367. See Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1187, 1216 (1999) ("[Tihe owner of a facility is free to expel a user ... once a rival provider of
the same kind of facility enters the geographic market.").
368. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 3, at 23 (describing such exclusivity
"carrots"); Gail F. Levine & Hillary Greene, Antitrust Guideposts for B2B Electronic
Marketplaces, 15 ANTrrRUST, Fall 2000, at 26, 28 (same).
369. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 1, at 22 (describing such exclusivity
prohibitions); Balto, supra note 51, at 844 (describing exclusivity penalty fees).
370. Levine & Greene, supra note 368, at 28; see also Bell & Adkinson, supra note 2, at
22 ("This assurance that others will actually participate is necessary to induce the parties
to incur the costs of building the exchange."); Rule et al., supra note 346 ("There may be good
reasons for obtaining minimum commitments from [B2B] participants (e.g., to cover the costs
of setting up and operating the site.)").
371. See Bell & Adkinson, supra note 2, at 22 (pointing out the reasonableness of
exclusivity restrictions for founding members).
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After a B2B comes to dominate the relevant market, however,
a court may assume that any continuing exclusivity requirements
have no purpose other than to perpetuate the B2B's market
power.372 B2Bs, like other networks, become more attractive to
users as additional participants are added. 7 ' Once a B2B obtains
critical mass and attracts an increasing number of buyers and
sellers, its network advantages may cause the market to tip in its
favor. Such B2Bs are likely to achieve a durable form of monopoly
power.3 7' Dominant B2Bs thus do not need exclusivity requirements
to assure their effectiveness.375 Furthermore, after a B2B becomes
dominant, exclusivity clauses have a more adverse competitive
effect in the relevant market. Exclusivity requirements imposed by
dominant B2Bs leave little, if any, room for competing B2Bs to gain
control over a sufficient volume of transactions to be viable. 76 It is
hard enough for a firm to enter the relevant market and compete
with a dominant B2B. Exclusivity rules, however, make entry
nearly impossible, because most, if not all, prospective users of a
new B2B will be explicitly precluded from participation. Thus, a
dominant B2B can use exclusivity rules to create "an almost
impervious barrier to competitive entry....
372. See Balto, supra note 301 ("[A] collateral restraint that is lawful when the venture
is a fledgling might ripen into illegality as the venture matures into a position of strength.").
373. See Bell & Adkinson, supra note 2, at 19 ("B2B exchanges can be seen as exhibiting
network effects-the effects that arise when the value of the network to all increases with the
addition of each participant.").
374. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
375. As the FTC Staff Report pointed out, "Given that a B2B with strong network
efficiencies would hold inherent attractions for buyers and sellers ... [it may be questioned]
whether exclusivity requirements are reasonably necessary." FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note
17, Part 3, at 33. A B2B may also argue that exclusivity requirements are necessary to
ensure that participants do not share the B2B's proprietary competitive information with its
rivals. A B2B can, however, protect its proprietary information through less restrictive
means, such as confidentiality agreements.
376. Levine & Greene, supra note 368, at 29. The FTC Staff Report emphasizes that
"[tlying the participants to a single B2B may undermine the ability of alternatives to
compete, effectively increasing the B2B's market power." FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17,
Part 3, at 29; see also Rule et al., supra note 346, at 72 ("The concern would be that
exclusivity could entrench the dominant player-here the dominant B2B."). In United States
v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the court demonstrated a similar
concern that dominant credit card systems could perpetuate their market power through
exclusivity requirements. Id. at 379. The court struck down bylaws of the Visa and
MasterCard credit card systems that prohibited member banks from issuing competing credit
cards. Id. at 408.
377. Balto, supra note 51, at 804. Similar concerns have been expressed about exclusivity
HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
Other high technology joint ventures that have achieved
dominance in their markets also should not be permitted to impose
exclusive dealing arrangements. For example, five motion picture
studios (Sony, Warner Bros., Universal, Paramount, and MGM)
have formed "MovieFly," a joint venture to market films on demand
over the Internet and cable television. 378 Given its partners' market
power, MovieFly clearly will hold a dominant position in marketing
films online. The courts should preclude MovieFly from requiring
IAPs, ICPs, and cable systems to purchase films exclusively from it.
Such arrangements would foreclose other studios from these critical
consumer distribution channels. MovieFly has no rational motive
for imposing exclusivity rules upon its customers, other than to
perpetuate its dominance in the online movie market. Under the
proposed approach, the courts could ensure that MovieFly does not
use such rules to prevent other movie studios from competing in the
market for on-demand films.
3 79
requirements for other network joint ventures. Prior to 1992, for example, "MAC," one of the
dominant national ATM networks, did not permit its bank members to participate in rival
systems. If a bank wanted to participate in a competing network, it would have had to
withdraw all of its ATMs from MAC. Individual banks were unlikely to do so unless a
"critical mass" of other banks decided at the same time to migrate to the other system.
"Faced with that'all or nothing' decision, few banks chose to align with competing networks."
Id. Some commentators and antitrust enforcers have argued, however, that when there are
competing joint ventures in the relevant market, exclusivity requirements may actually
enhance competition. In the absence of exclusivity clauses, for example, banks have been able
to participate in both the Visa and MasterCard credit card systems. The resulting cross-
ownership may reduce the incentive for these two systems to compete. See Kenneth E. Scott,
Electronic Commerce Revisited, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1338 (1999) ("Banks compete
vigorously to issue cards or sign up merchants, but competition between Visa and
MasterCard is muted."). But see Visa U.S.A, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 378-79 (declining to find dual
membership of banks on Boards of Visa and MasterCard systems to be illegal).
378. Matthews, supra note 332.
379. See id. (stating that test of legality of Moviefly will be whether venture keeps "rivals
out of the market through any exclusive agreement"). To date, however, Moviefly has stated
that it will not "demand exclusive runs of each film." Id. In United States v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc., the court indicated that such an exclusivity requirement should be
illegal. 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In that case, four of the six major film producers
had formed a joint venture to operate a pay television movie channel. The court held that the
partners violated the Sherman Act by agreeing to make their motion pictures available only
to their movie channel on an exclusive basis for an initial period of nine months. Id. at 434.
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C. Standards-Setting
Although standards-setting joint ventures should be legal on
their face,8 ' they can engage in conduct that restricts competition
in the market for services provided by the ventures' members.
On one hand, standards-setting can help such markets run more
smoothly. Certifications standards help guarantee that doctors,
lawyers, accountants, engineers, and other professionals are com-
petent to practice their trade. In certain cases, standards-setting
joint ventures may promote competition. A uniform standard for
computer operating systems, for example, could ensure that
many different applications programs would run effectively on
competing systems. Standards-setting joint ventures, however,
also can attempt to restrict entry to the market for products or
services provided by the members of the venture. By adopting strict
licensing standards, the members of a professional association "can
effectively control competition and preserve their collective market
dominance." 8 ' For example, the members of a trade association
may certify the safety of products in a way that unfairly excludes
competing products from the market.382
Under the proposed approach, a standards-setting joint venture
would violate Section 2 when it acts arbitrarily to exclude particular
competitors from the relevant market."' Such a joint venture
should not be permitted to adopt arbitrary rules that establish its
own members' products as the industry standard. Indeed, given the
short duration of high technology product life cycles, a joint venture
could exclude a rival from a market merely by delaying the
380. See supra notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
381. Marina Lao, Comment, The Rule of Reason and Horizontal Restraints Involving
Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 499, 522 (2000).
382. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658, 660
(1961) (finding that trade association may have refused to grant "seal of approval" to a gas
burner in order to exclude the product from the relevant market).
383. Although a standards-setting joint venture could be regarded as an essential facility,
the courts should not compel such ventures to admit all competitors in the market to
membership. A standards-setting venture may only be able to operate efficiently if it restricts
its membership to a small group. See Balto & Pitofsky, supra note 43 ("[Tlhe ability to
restrict membership to a standard-making body may be efficient and procompetitive, based
on the proposition that a relatively small group may function more effectively than a more
inclusive one....*). The courts must be careful not to impose requirements that cause even a
slight delay in establishing an industry-wide standard for high technology markets, where
the pace of technological change is so swift.
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certification of its product.38' Thus a standards-settingjoint venture
must follow due process rules which are transparent, objective, and
fair and do not discriminate in favor of the participants' products.385
D. Monopsony Conduct
"Monopsony" conduct constitutes the exercise of market power
by buyers to "drive down the purchase price of an input by buying
less of it and, therefore, depress output."8 6 Although lowering costs
is generally considered beneficial to consumers, a collective effort
to drive prices below a competitive level could lead suppliers to sell
less of the relevant product, making fewer goods available to
consumers. 87 Many suppliers fear that the auctions that will be
conducted by the new B2B purchasing joint ventures will unduly
reduce, or entirely eliminate, their profit margins. 8 In order to
possess monopsony power, a purchasing collaboration would have
to include all, or almost all, the buyers in the relevant market. 38 9
384. See Gellhorn & Miller, supra note 250, at 864 ("Where ... the duration of product life
cycles [is] brief, delay in the approval of a standard critical for entry into a market can be as
effective as direct exclusion.').
385. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 510-11 (1988)
(finding that a fire protection association improperly set standards for electrical wiring
systems through procedure lacking in due process). If ajoint venture petitions a government
entity to become involved in standards-setting, the joint venture's conduct may be exempt
from antitrust liability. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670
(1965) (holding that "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence
public officials regardless ofintent or purpose"); E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961) (holding that firms may "attempt to persuade the
legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce
a restraint or a monopoly").
386. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Executive Summary, at 3.
387. See Balto, supra note 301, at 22 (noting that "the reduction in the input price will
most often result in higher prices to consumers because it will lead to less of that input being
sold").
388. See Jeffrey Bull et al., Suppliers Ponder Impact of Centralized System, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 28, 2000, at A16 (stating that a recent auction "saw price reductions of 10% for tires and
40% for rubber hoses-terrifying numbers in an industry where profit margins rarely make
it out of the single digits"); Totty, supra note 2 ("[Sluppliers are wary that B-to-B's promised
savings will come out of their balance sheets."). As an automobile analyst recently explained,
"These online auctions are really going to squeeze the margins of some suppliers who can't
afford to be squeezed." Bull et al., supra (quoting Rod Lache, automobile analyst for Deutsche
Banc Alex Brown).
389. A B2B would not likely possess monopsony power in markets for indirect goods (such
as maintenance, repair, or overhaul items) purchased by many other buyers. The greatest
threat of monopsony power occurs when a large portion of the purchasers of direct inputs
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Any agreement among buyers in a purchasing collaboration with
monopsony power to take concerted action to reduce their suppliers'
prices should be illegal under Section 2. Such conduct improperly
extends the market power of the buyers to the upstream supply
market. Purchasing B2Bs may, in fact, be in a unique position to,
exercise monopsony power."9 Through its information-sharing
practices, a B2B can effectively coordinate its members' decisions
on the prices to be paid for certain products.3 9'
CONCLUSION
During the next several years, the federal courts and
enforcement agencies increasingly will be called upon to analyze
monopoly conduct and competitor collaborations by high technology
firms. The means chosen to judge such conduct will have a
substantial bearing on the direction of the American economy in the
twenty-first century. The courts' current approach to high tech-
nology competition is confused and inconsistent, and it deters
American firms from making investments that could enhance the
nation's productivity. This Article proposes a new approach that
builds upon the courts' strengths in analyzing the purpose of
defendants' conduct and avoids their weakness in economic
analysis. The proposed approach is consistent with a long line of
federal precedent extending to the earliest days of the Sherman Act.
By adopting the approach proposed in this Article, the courts can
finally ensure that antitrust enforcement facilitates rather than
hinders growth in high technology markets.
(such as specialized raw materials or machinery) collaborate in a purchasing B2B. Levine &
Greene, supra note 368, at 29-30.
390. In its investigations of the B2B purchasing joint venture among the Big Three
automobile companies, the FTC was "especially concerned about monopsony or oligopsony,
in which one or many major purchasers band together to squeeze suppliers and force down
their prices." Wilke, supra note 303.
391. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, Part 3, at 14-15 (voicing concern over such
coordination).
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